Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities

Edited by
Frank Cassidy
Shirley B. Seward

The Institute for Research on Public Policy

A National Presence

Founded in 1972, the Institute for Research on Public Policy is an independent, national, non-profit organization with offices across Canada.

The mission of the Institute is to improve public policy in Canada by promoting and contributing to a policy process that is more broadly based, informed and effective.

In pursuit of this mission, the Institute:

- identifies significant public policy questions that will confront Canada in the longer term future, and undertakes independent research into those questions;
- promotes wide dissemination of key results from its own and other research activities;
- encourages non-partisan discussion and criticism of public policy issues in a manner which elicits broad participation from all sectors and regions of Canadian society, and links research with processes of social learning and policy formation.

Governance of the Institute

The Institute is governed by a Board of Directors, advised by representatives of federal, provincial and territorial governments and of other national research organizations, and by panels of external authorities, drawn into *ad hoc* advisory committees formed to assist the Research Committee. Implementation and administration of the Institute's policies and programs and management of the staff are the responsibility of the president, who is the chief executive officer.

Method of Operation

The Institute is decentralized, employing researchers across Canada. This ensures that research undertaken by the Institute involves contributions from all regions. The Institute also works with individual researchers or institutes in other countries.

Researchers are hired on contract for a limited period, often the duration of a project. This enables the Institute to renew its staff regularly, to reflect the evolving nature of its research program. It also helps to increase the number of first-class researchers employed by the Institute.

Independence and Neutrality

The Institute's independence is assured by an endowment fund, to which federal and provincial governments and the private sector have contributed. The Institute receives grants and contracts from governments, corporations and foundations, both to support program activity and to carry out specific research projects.

The Institute promotes public understanding and discussion of issues of national importance, whether controversial or not. It publishes its research findings with clarity and impartiality. It does not control or influence the conduct of particular research or the conclusions: conclusions or recommendations in a publication of the Institute are solely those of the author, not of the Institute, its Board or contributors. The Institute maintains neutrality on issues of public policy.

The president bears final responsibility for the decision to disseminate information under the Institute's imprint. She is advised on the accuracy and objectivity of a manuscript by both Institute staff and outside reviewers. Publication of a manuscript signifies that it is deemed to be a competent treatment of a subject worthy of public consideration. Publications of the Institute are in the language of the author, with an executive summary in both official languages.

Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities

Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities

Edited by
Frank Cassidy
and
Shirley B. Seward

The Institute for Research on Public Policy
L'Institut de recherches politiques

92-02843/

Copyright © The Institute for Research on Public Policy 1991
All rights reserved

Printed in Canada

Legal Deposit Fourth Quarter
Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
Alternatives to social assistance in Indian communities

Prefatory material in English and French.
Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-88645-137-X

1. Indians of North America — Canada — Employment.
2. Indians of North America — Canada — Social conditions. I. Cassidy, Frank. II. Seward, Shirley B.
III. Institute for Research on Public Policy.

E78.C2A57 1991 331.6'997071 C92-098524-6

Camera-ready copy and publication management by
PDS Research Publishing Services Ltd.
P.O. Box 3296
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3H7
(902) 494-3865

Published by
The Institute for Research on Public Policy
L'Institut de recherches politiques
P.O. Box 3670 South
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3K6

Contents

Foreword ix

Avant-propos xi

Acknowledgements xiii

I. Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian Communities 1
Frank Cassidy

Introduction 3
The Current Situation 4
Searching for Alternatives 5
A Holistic Approach 6
People, Not Programs 7
Self-Government 9
Respect for Indian Culture 10
The Next Steps 12

II. The Use of Social Assistance for Employment Creation on Indian Reserves: An Appraisal 15
Hugh Shewell

Acknowledgements 16

Introduction 17
Part I. An Overview of the Principal Employment Creation Programs Based on Social Assistance Transfer 18
1. Work Opportunity Program 20
2. Band Work Process 24
3. New Employment Expansion Development Program 25
4. Indian Community Human Resource Strategy Program 28
Concluding Comments 30
Part II. Social Assistance and Employment: A Report on Discussions with Selected Indian Bands in British Columbia 31
1. Moricetown 32
2. Osoyoos 39
3. Penticton 44
4. Stoney Creek 48
Part III. Dominant Themes and Issues 53
1. Managing Indians under the Guise of Indian Self-Management 53
2. The Work Opportunity Program Policy and Guidelines 54
3. Access to Off-Reserve Employment 55
4. Social Assistance, the Community, and the Idea of Work 56
5. Stretching the Rules 57
6. Daycare 59
Part IV. Social Assistance in Context 59
1. Background to the Social and Political Context 59
2. The Immediate Historical Background to the 1964 Treasury Board Authority 64
Part V. Conclusion 71
Notes 73

III. Work and Welfare 83
Andrew Armitage

Three Views of Work and Welfare in Their Cultural Context 85
Values 86
Residual Strategies: "Workfare" 90

Institutional Work Incentives and Supports 95
Social Development Strategies 97
1. The Socio-Structural Level 98
2. The Community Level 102
Other Perspectives on the Work/Welfare Debate 104
1. An Economist's Perspective 104
2. A Cyclical Perspective 105
Conclusion 105
Notes 106
Bibliography 109

Annex A - Agenda 113
Annex B - List of Participants 115
Related IRPP Publications 117

Foreword

There is a broad agreement that the current approach of federal and provincial governments to social assistance in First Nations communities is not working. It is, by and large, seen as culturally insensitive and excessively costly. Moreover, it creates rather than discourages dependence upon governments. As First Nations move toward exercising more of their powers of self-government, the existing programs in this field increasingly are being challenged, and new approaches are being explored. Such approaches will have to be community-based and they will need to be built upon a recognition of the inherent authority of First Nations, but the specific nature and dynamics of the appropriate new orientations will take some time to emerge.

Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities is concerned with these matters. This book reflects the on-going interest of this Institute in matters relating to aboriginal self-government, economic development and land and resource issues. Over the past few years, the Institute has published several books on these topics, including Frank Cassidy and Robert Bish's *Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice*; Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale's *After Native Claims? The Implications of Comprehensive Claims Settlements for Natural Resources in British Columbia*; Fred Wien's *Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia*; Harold Bherer, Sylvie Gagnon, and Jacinte Roberge's *Wampum and Letters Patent: Exploratory Study of Native Entrepreneurship*; the Proceedings of the National Conference on Native Entrepreneurship—*Native Entrepreneurship: The Key to Autonomy*; and, recently, Frank Cassidy's *Reaching Just Settlements: Land Claims in British Columbia*. Although this book, like the ones cited, belongs to the period of my presidential predecessor, I am pleased to associate myself with the IRPP's work on First

Nations issues. With these and other publications, this volume is intended to shed light on some of the most pressing public policy issues of our day—and, indeed, one of the outstanding moral issues confronting Canadian society as the foundations of our community are re-built.

In this task, we need new ideas about the nature of the relationships between Canada, the provinces and First Nations. We need to be creative and open in criticizing and accepting criticism of our past failures in developing public policy regarding First Nations. This book is intended to stimulate and help Canadians to undertake such a searching reappraisal of the underlying philosophy and structure of existing social assistance programs in First Nations Communities—and in particular to promote their reorientation toward economic opportunity wherever cultures and circumstances permit.

Monique Jérôme-Forget
President

December 1991

Avant-propos

Il est généralement reconnu que l'approche actuelle des gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux en matière de sécurité sociale auprès des Premières Nations ne donne pas les résultats escomptés. On juge généralement cette approche imperméable à la culture et extrêmement coûteuse. De plus, elle engendre la dépendance envers l'aide publique au lieu de la décourager. Les Premières Nations essayant de plus en plus d'exercer leur pouvoir d'autodétermination, les programmes de sécurité sociale existants se heurtent à des contestations sans cesse plus fréquentes, et sont actuellement étudiées. Ces approches devront s'appuyer sur la collectivité et reconnaître l'autorité inhérente des Premières Nations, mais un certain temps s'écoulera avant de pouvoir cerner la nature et la dynamique particulières des nouvelles orientations.

C'est ce qu'examine ***Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities***. Cet ouvrage traduit l'intérêt que l'Institut de recherches politiques porte depuis toujours aux questions concernant l'autodétermination des peuples autochtones, le développement économique et tout se qui se rattache au territoire et aux ressources. Au cours des dernières années, l'Institute a publié plusieurs ouvrages sur ces sujets, notamment *Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice* de Frank Cassidy et Robert Bish; *After Native Claims? The Implications of Comprehensive Claims Settlements for Natural Resources in British Columbia* de Frank Cassidy et Norman Dale; *Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia* de Fred Wien; *Wampoum et lettres patentes : étude exploratoire de l'entrepreneuriat autochtone* de Harold Bherer, Sylvie Gagnon et Jacinte Roberge; *L'entrepreneurship autochtone, la clé de l'autonomie*, compte rendu du colloque national sur l'entrepreneuriat autochtone; et, plus récemment, *Reaching Just Settlements: Land Claims in British Columbia* de Frank

Cassidy. Bien que ce livre, comme d'ailleurs tous ceux qui viennent d'être cités, ait été préparé durant le mandat de mon prédécesseur à la présidence, je suis heureuse d'être personnellement associée aux recherches de l'IRP sur la question des Premières Nations. Avec ces ouvrages et d'autres, non cités, le présent volume a pour objectif de présenter au grand jour quelques-unes des questions de politique publique les plus brûlantes d'actualité et, avouons-le, un des problèmes moraux auquel la société canadienne n'a pas encore trouvé de solution à l'époque même où l'on tente fiévreusement de rebâtir les fondations de notre pays.

Pareille entreprise nous obligera à repenser la nature des relations entre le Canada, les provinces et les Premières Nations. Nous devrons faire preuve de créativité et garder l'esprit ouvert lorsque viendra le temps d'analyser nos échecs antérieurs et d'accepter les critiques concernant l'élaboration de politiques pour les Premières Nations. Le présent ouvrage devrait stimuler et aider les Canadiens à entreprendre un nouvel examen de la philosophie et des structures sous-jacentes aux programmes actuels de sécurité sociale au sein des communautés autochtones, et plus particulièrement, en promouvoir une réorientation en vue de permettre la réalisation des possibilités économiques chaque fois que la culture et les circonstances le permettent.

Monique Jérôme-Forget
Présidente

Décembre 1991

Acknowledgements

As co-editors of this volume of proceedings, and organizers of the March 1990 national Workshop on Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian communities, we are indebted to many organizations and individuals.

The workshop would not have been possible without the collaboration of the Assembly of First Nations. At all stages of this project, which included background research as well as the organization of the workshop, the Assembly of First Nations provided guidance, advice and encouragement. We are particularly indebted to Ovide Mercredi and Neil Sterritt, who devoted considerable time and effort to this endeavour.

We are also grateful for the generous financial support provided by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. We appreciate the special efforts of John Rayner and Susan Williams, who were committed to the concept of dialogue.

The quality of discussion at the workshop was attributable to the 25 participants representing First Nations from across Canada, federal and provincial governments, and the research and social policy communities. Discussion was facilitated by the excellent background papers prepared by Hugh Shewell and Andrew Armitage.

Many Institute staff collaborated in the organization of the workshop and the production of this volume. We are particularly indebted to Leigh McGowan, Chrystine Frank, Phil Rourke and Ruby Day.

Frank Cassidy
School of Public Administration
University of Victoria

Shirley B. Seward
Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer
Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre

I.

Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian Communities

by

Frank Cassidy
School of Public Administration
University of Victoria

I.

Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian Communities

Frank Cassidy

Introduction

The Institute for Research on Public Policy sponsored a national workshop on Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian Communities on March 28 and 29, 1990 in Ottawa. With approximately 25 participants representing First Nations from across Canada, federal and provincial governments, the academic and social policy communities, and the Institute, this workshop was intended to provide a forum for reviewing the current and alternative approaches to welfare in Indian communities, with special reference to the relationship between economic and social development and, more specifically, work and welfare.

The workshop was not a formal consultation between First Nations and the federal government. The intention was for the Institute to provide a meeting ground where free, open and probing discussion could take place and related public policy research priorities for the future could be discerned.

In preparation for the event, two papers were written by researchers associated with the Institute. One, "The Use of Social Assistance for Employment Creation on Indian Reserves," was written by Hugh Shewell of the University of Toronto. It is an overview and analysis of the employment creation programs of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), which relied upon social assistance transfers. The paper's focus is the impact of and response to these programs in Indian communities. In particular, Shewell looks at four communities in British Columbia and their innovative and, at times, frustrating interactions with these programs. The second paper, "Work and Welfare," is by Andrew Armitage of the University of Victoria. It is a conceptual review of the

literature on work and welfare, with special reference to government attempts to merge the two in Native communities.

As planned, the workshop focused on the two papers as a way of reviewing the current situation and raising ideas about alternative approaches to welfare reform. Efforts also were made to identify topics for further study and discussion. Two additional papers were tabled during the workshop. One was the "Notes for an Address by Ovide Mercredi, Manitoba Regional Chief, on behalf of the Assembly of First Nations."

The second paper, "A Strategic Plan for Treaty Indian Welfare Reform," was tabled by Tom Iron on behalf of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations.

In this paper, the discussions and papers tabled during the workshop will be addressed under three headings: The Current Situation, Searching for Alternatives, and The Next Steps. The objectives are to summarize the views put forward regarding INAC's current social assistance and work opportunity programs, to present the major themes that emerged in the discussion of how INAC's approaches in this area might be altered, and to identify the directions that might be taken as critical thinking on this important public policy issue continues.

The Current Situation

Throughout the workshop, the First Nations participants pointed out repeatedly that INAC's present social development programs are in need of serious revision. As Hugh Shewell and Andrew Armitage observed, these programs are based on the residual model of social welfare, which is the dominant one in Canadian society. This model is keyed to the administration of individualized social assistance transfers to people who have failed, for whatever reasons, to meet the minimal demands of the labour market. Such transfers are provided only as a last resort to those who have no other means of support.

In Native communities, the First Nations representatives asserted, this approach is ineffective, inefficient, and culturally inappropriate. It places a stigma on those involved and, indeed, on the whole community. It creates dependency, rather than fostering self-reliance. It does not build. It destroys.

Quoting an elder from his tribe, one participant characterized the outcome of the residual approach in this way: "We never knew we were poor, until we were told we were poor." Welfare in Indian communities is a response to poverty that all too often creates more dependence and poverty; ironically, it is a response that involves millions and millions of federal dollars every year. As Lynn Brooks of the Council for Disabled Persons in the Northwest Territories asserted in post-workshop comment, "All participants felt that the present S/A (social assistance) system does not work, it is demeaning and promotes systemic discrimination." In his paper Chief Mercredi put it in this way:

> There can be no denial of the hard fact that Canada has responded to our social and economic needs by allocating and administering more and more welfare in each

succeeding generation of Indian people. Likewise, there can be no denial of the voices of Indian leaders who decry the use of welfare as a substitute to more direct measures to deal with the poverty in our communities.

On a similar note, one federal official commented that "there is a major contradiction between how much money is available and the ability to use it."

In an effort to break the cycle of poverty in Indian communities and, more specifically, to enhance the independence and employability of persons receiving social assistance, INAC has devised a series of programs such as the Work Opportunity Program (WOP). The idea is to use social assistance funds with monies from other sources to create short-term employment experiences for welfare recipients and to do so in the context of projects intended to result in community betterment. In the absence of sufficient funding for education, training and economic development, this program has become, as Shewell asserts, integral to economic planning for many bands in Canada.

The approach has produced some successes, but for the most part it has failed. On the basis of his research, Shewell concludes that "the guidelines that govern the program are seen to be anachronistic, inflexible, destructive of incentive, and paternalistic." After a 12-month period, participants are required to leave projects. This disrupts the work involved and is often an all too strong reminder to the individual that he or she is "only on social assistance," after all. Projects are disrupted by government guidelines in other ways. INAC requires that revenue produced as a result of WOP projects be applied against the future use of social assistance transfers in the community. This reduces the incentive to succeed, because the funds involved do not enable the community to build positively on its efforts. The uncertainty of funding beyond one fiscal year and the lack of supplementary funds from other programs add further to the problems with WOP, as currently designed.

"Generally speaking," Shewell concludes, "work opportunity and like programs are seen [in Indian communities] as an immediately available method of ameliorating a bleak world of social assistance. This is not to say that it is a preferred method." Rather, the Work Opportunities Program militates "against successful creation of employment, enterprise and a sound community infrastructure." This is so, in large measure, because it is the result of top-down thinking from outside the communities. As Shewell's case studies indicate, where successes occur, they occur despite, and sometimes in violation of, the rules. In the not so long run, such an approach is not viable. In fact, it is just one more agent of the poverty and dependence that characterizes the current situation.

Searching for Alternatives

No one at the workshop questioned the need for welfare reform. Indeed, in his paper, Andrew Armitage called for a move from the residual model to a "social development" approach for governmental provisions that seek to closely associate work and welfare. Such an approach, he suggested, would be "directed to correcting the social conditions

from which social problems have developed . . . and so requires that consideration be given to strategies of community development and empowerment."

Most participants pointed to the need for welfare reform, but reform has not been easy in coming. Nor can it be marginal; it must be thorough-going and guided by sound principles. It must be guided by the needs in First Nations communities and it must be reconciled with other values such as ministerial responsibility, accountability, and fiscal constraint. As the discussion proceeded, four themes concerning the nature of the principles that might guide reform emerged. Several of the participants ascertain that welfare reform must be based on measures that incorporate

- A holistic approach aimed at establishing and fostering self-reliance in Indian communities.
- An overriding emphasis on people, not on programs and guidelines.
- A sharp acceleration in the move from paternalism to support for First Nations' self-government and self-determination.
- A strengthened and extended respect for the cultural values and differences in Indian communities.

In an important sense, these four themes might provide a basis for the criteria that could be used to assess various approaches to welfare reform, although it must be emphasized that the type of reform most participants called for would change welfare radically; it would in fact become a fundamentally different form of intergovernmental fiscal transfer in Indian communities. This may seem to be a daunting task, but it is clearly the one at hand.

A Holistic Approach

The antidote to dependence, several participants noted, is self-respect. Self-respect can only be rooted in self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Hugh Shewell notes:

> Indian communities are determined to achieve a level of economic self-sufficiency and independence that will ensure their cultural and political survival . . . they want to stop the drain of dollars from their communities into the dominant and local economies. To do this, they want to use government funds to marshal all the resources they can. In this sense, there is a clear shift away from viewing social assistance and social development programs as passive, perpetual measures of support to one of making them an active solution to the problem. If this means redirecting social assistance into projects that will develop and help sustain an economic base, then they are prepared to do this.

As one First Nations participant put it, "We need sustainable and maintainable development on reserve. We need to keep our people."

Self-reliance, as Chief Mercredi reminded those present, can arise only out of the exercise of the right to development, the right to participate in, contribute to and enjoy

economic, social, cultural and political transformation in such a way that all human rights and freedoms are fully realized. If this is to be so, the term development will have to be redefined and used very carefully. Too often, development has come to mean change imposed from the outside, change predicated on an external definition of success, with success being understood as becoming part of the urban, industrial system. Development has to mean something quite different if Indian communities are to strengthen their self-reliance. Development must mean an unfolding from within, a process of self-definition and control.

As such, social and economic development efforts need to be merged holistically, in a thorough and consistent manner. Participants offered several examples of how this might take place and is taking place in Indian communities. In the Northwest Territories, family violence workers have been trained while receiving social assistance and now provide a well-received and innovative community service funded by government. On the west coast of Vancouver Island, the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council (NTC) has used the flexibility it has under its Alternative Funding Arrangement with INAC to take monies intended initially for social assistance and convert them for use in an economic development effort tied to the NTC economic development corporation.

Social development, a number of workshop participants pointed out, can reinforce and ignite economic development and the right to development can be an authentic one if certain measures are adopted as part of a holistic approach to fostering self-reliance. Education and training need to be integrated. Sources of capital funding for start-up efforts need to be made available and accessible. People must be able to care for their most basic needs of sustenance, clothing and housing. Adequate support services also need to be in place. This is particularly the case with regard to daycare. As Hugh Shewell noted, all four British Columbia bands he visited decried the absence of a comprehensive daycare policy comparable to that of the province.

Self-reliance starts with measures such as these. It is rooted in an emphasis on people rather than programs, on communities rather than policies, on services rather than guidelines and regulations. This was the second theme permeating many comments at the workshop.

People, Not Programs

Right from the beginning, the First Nations representatives pointed to the need for "concrete" and "open-minded" thinking, for "workable solutions" based on people in communities and not on externally imposed guidelines. As the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations noted in the paper it tabled at the workshop:

> New policies are required which clearly and formally commit Canada to investing in personal growth and education; and investing in Indian Nations who are dealing effectively with social problems. Federal departments need to allow Indian Nations to establish the necessary integrated system of interventions and incentives. Canada's role should be facilitative and promotional rather than central artist.

Several requirements would flow from such an approach. There would be a need to cut unnecessary red-tape, to introduce provisions that are efficient in terms of time and effort and that encourage appropriate processes in communities rather than working against them. This might happen in many ways. A band social worker in one of the communities visited by Shewell suggested, for example, that Indian governments could be allowed to retain, over a negotiated and specified time period of perhaps three to five years, the amount of social assistance saved through the creation or obtaining of employment for individuals who would otherwise have been receiving assistance. These amounts could then be earmarked for community development and investment.

With such an approach, employment could be generated for individuals and the community could enrich itself more generally. To succeed, the guidelines for the approach would have to be appropriate to the people and communities involved. In fact, they would probably be most appropriate if they were designed by communities themselves. If this were to happen, the role of the federal government and its relations with Indian governments would change fundamentally. Funding arrangements rather than program design would become the focus for interactions between federal departments and First Nations, and these arrangements would have to be flexible, consistent and dependable.

For arrangements such as this to emerge, the federal government would have to change the basic framework underpinning INAC's authority to distribute social assistance. Indian Affairs has been operating under the same Treasury Board authority since 1964. This measure authorizes INAC to adopt local, provincial or municipal rates and administrative procedures in providing social assistance. This policy does not make sense, however, in light of the need to recast the federal role from a directive to a facilitative one. As Andrew Armitage noted in his paper, Work and Welfare,

> Such a policy makes sense only while the ultimate objective is the assumption of all policy and program responsibility by the Provinces. It may be timely to recognize that this objective has the support of neither the provinces nor Native peoples and that discussion should be begun with Native people on the process and stages through which they can move to assume full responsibility not only for the delivery of social programs but for policy and program design.

In a critical way, the 1964 Treasury Board authority binds INAC and Indian governments to models of social welfare that are not indigenous to Indian communities. People in need become "clients." Social workers become "professionals" who must deal with clients in ways dictated by preset and externally established guidelines and standards. Neither the client nor the professional is any longer a simple member of the community.

Much has changed in Indian communities and in the relationships between Canada and First Nations since 1964. The federal government now recognizes Indian self-government more actively, if still not fully. It has programs in place to do so, to facilitate and support Indian control of Indian education, to enhance economic development, and to provide alternative funding arrangements, so that more autonomy can exist at the community level. These measures need to be supplemented by steps to provide for alternative approaches to social assistance, approaches that are tied holistically to self-

government, education, economic development, and financing efforts that in turn respect the right of Indian peoples to self-government and self-determination.

Self-Government

Closely tied to the emphasis on people rather than programs was another theme that emerged at the workshop. This third theme revolves around the necessity for the federal government to move more quickly in implementing its avowed support for the concept of Indian self-government. Several First Nations participants made this point more than once. "We have to change the government's view that it needs to take care of us," one asserted. "We can take care of ourselves." Another put it this way, "INAC needs to get away from the 'I'm gonna worry about you' program mentality." Still another said, "It's easier to initiate change ourselves than to have you [INAC] initiate change for us."

The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations reinforced this notion in its Strategic Plan, which begins with these words:

> It is well known that in order for change to occur, the motivation for change must come from within a social group—in this case Treaty Indian Nations. Unless the Indian community takes ownership of the problem; unless Indian people believe that they can directly control their own institutions and service systems; and unless Indian people believe they can influence change, then no meaningful change will occur. It is fundamental that Indian people believe in and use their own decision-making and service delivery structures and systems. **It is equally fundamental that federal and provincial governments provide full recognition of Indian Nations' governing and management systems.** Without this basic recognition and respect, effective change will never occur in Indian country.

Andrew Armitage sounded similar themes in concluding his paper. The challenge for the proponents of social development, he suggested, is to abandon a view that focuses on the protection of individuals and to replace it with one that revolves around respect and recognition of First Nations. "We should look," Armitage argued, "for ways to empower communities and beneficiaries and equip them to exercise the freedoms that the welfare state was expected to provide." And, he added, "We should resist measures that confirm and extend the paternalistic, patriarchal and bureaucratic maze that it has become."

As Armitage, Shewell, and many of the workshop participants asserted, there is a need to get away from the close management of Indian communities under the guise of Indian self-management. Moreover, self-management needs to be expanded to a much fuller notion of self-government, a notion that reflects the necessity and reality of self-determination. Welfare reform, Neil Sterritt of the Assembly of First Nations observed, must be placed in the context of the responsibilities of the government of Canada, going all the way back to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Canada, he asserted, must actively recognize and promote Indian self-government. Welfare reform, Sterritt suggested, is a matter of encouraging the federal government to adhere to self-government in Indian communities. If self-government is to go forward as it should, what is needed is a

standard of conduct concerning how the federal government conducts itself in relation to Indian communities. A commitment to self-government, Sterritt maintained, must be basic to this standard.

The FSIN Strategic Plan points to several principles for "Indian control" that the federal government would have to recognize if it were to adhere to such a standard. The most critical of these relate to the jurisdictional rights that Indian governments assert in all matters pertaining to their citizens, including the right of these governments to determine the level of services and the standards for their provision. Another basic principle is that the primary accountability of Indian governments should be to their citizens rather than external authorities. Another concerns the maintenance and strengthening of the federal Trust Responsibility and related fiscal obligations to Indian peoples.

On the basis of principles such as these, the FSIN asserted, First Nations governments will develop and direct the services required "to provide a stable, healthy, productive community atmosphere in which all individuals will find support and encouragement and an acceptable quality of life." All the First Nations representatives at the workshop made it clear that they share a similar vision: self-government needs to be joined with holistic approaches to public policies that emphasize people, not programs or rigid guidelines. These are the keys to welfare reform—so long as they are employed with a genuine respect for the traditions, cultures and values of Indian peoples.

Respect for Indian Culture

A fourth theme centred around the view that, beyond all other requirements, the federal government must realize, as the FSIN put it, that "Any solutions and all new directions must be based upon Indian perceptions, values, customs, and practices." As one participant noted, "We don't want skills that are just for a job, we want the skills to be a good Indian." The concern about attempts to merge work and welfare that is implied by this comment should not be dismissed lightly.

Andrew Armitage pointed out that much of the debate about work and welfare in North America has been conducted in terms of cultural assumptions and patterns that have little, if anything, to do with the cultures of First Nations societies. In these societies, people are not seen as separate and autonomous individuals set apart from the community in fundamental ways. Rather, individuals and the community are indivisible. In this context, the concept of work is much broader than it is in western industrial society. Work in First Nations communities is whatever the individual does to foster the life of the community; it is simply that—no more and no less. As Lynn Brooks observed in a comment on Armitage's work:

> It clearly illustrated the dominant culture's view of employment as an enforced, moral obligation rewarded by monetary gain as the only acceptable view of work. This rigid and shallow view of work systemically discriminates not only against the traditional values of Native persons who, in time-honoured manner, have incorporated the work of

> living and sustaining their communities into their very being, but it discriminates against those who choose to volunteer their labour, those who work for "in kind" rewards, those who care for children and homes (usually women), and disabled persons greatly disadvantaged in the market economy.

If social assistance and work opportunity program is to be appropriate to Indian communities, it must be much more in touch with the culture and tradition of these communities. It must accept the definition of work as formulated by them. It must support and encourage activities that benefit the community. And as it does so, it must be guided by traditional values such as respect, reliance upon the family, the wisdom of the elders, caring and sharing. Social assistance provisions, one participant noted, often help to break down families. They must be reformed so that instead they strengthen and rely upon families. This can happen, workshop participants were told, only from within the community and in the Indian way.

A critical aspect of respecting the values and traditions in Indian communities is recognizing that there are tremendous differences in the nature of these communities between one First Nation and another and between urban and rural settings. Experience shows that different Indian communities want to develop in different ways. Much evidence of this fact was offered at the workshop. Chief Joe Norton of Kahnakawe noted that in his urban community there is much more emphasis on individual enterprise than in the British Columbia communities featured in the Shewell paper. The community is still paramount, he observed, but it supports self-employment to a greater extent. Other participants noted that urban and rural Indian communities face different challenges. Urban Indians often want greater access to the large markets and broader opportunities in the surrounding area. By contrast, Indian people in rural settings might place much greater emphasis on developing a full range of capacities to provide directly for their own needs.

Despite the differences between Indian communities, fundamental to almost all of them is a much greater emphasis on community and collective pursuits than is commonly the case in Canadian society. Canadians tend to place a great deal of emphasis on individuals and individual rights. Work and welfare are viewed in this light. Many Canadians see welfare as an individual right; accepting welfare is also seen as an indication of individual failure. For many Indian people—and from the perspective of traditional Indian values and cultures—welfare, properly conceived and administered, is truly ***social*** assistance, as Hugh Shewell observed. It is a collective right and a part of all other community endeavours.

As some participants pointed out, these perspectives must be considered carefully and thoughtfully. "What are the implications for individuals in Indian communities," one participant asked. "Do they have any rights, any guarantees as Canadians?" This is an important question, and it is equally important that it be posed, as it was at the workshop, in the context of respect for the values and customs of Indian peoples. If the federal government is going to change its policies concerning welfare in Indian communities, many such questions will need to be posed—and their possible answers will need to be explored. Indeed, the answers are critical aspects of the next steps that might be taken in the search for alternative approaches to welfare in Indian communities.

The Next Steps

A key goal of the workshop on Approaches to Welfare in Indian Communities was the development of a research agenda. Much of the workshop discussion focused on the necessary changes that might be effected in relation to INAC's social assistance programs, which emphasize employment and community development. With reference to such changes, First Nations participants frequently remarked that they feared "a long drawn-out process" in which substantial reforms would be diluted and whittled down by entrenched bureaucracies. They asserted that the process would be accelerated only by self-directed initiatives in their communities. They expressed little confidence in any help from external agencies or interests.

On the other hand, the INAC representatives at the workshop were ready to consider the problems associated with their programs and possible alternative approaches to them. This open attitude will be necessary as the process of welfare reform proceeds, for the next steps will involve learning more actively from and encouraging self-directed innovations in Indian communities. This can happen in a number of ways. In particular, it can be accomplished with the help of direct funding to communities seeking to implement innovative approaches. There is also a need for tightly focused research into related matters. Here, as appropriate, attention will be given to the latter task.

The papers by Hugh Shewell and Andrew Armitage provide a good basis on which to build. Shewell's effort to record some of the innovations in WOP programming in Indian communities gives a real sense of what is happening, in some communities at least, and what might happen in others. The lessons that can be drawn from these efforts are limited, however, because of the INAC guidelines that bind WOP programs in particular and social assistance provision in general.

The use of community case studies can be fruitful if they focus on areas where INAC guidelines are not as restrictive. Three such instances might include innovative activities of band and tribal councils that have negotiated Alternative Funding Arrangements; initiatives in regions where land claims agreements have been or are in the process of being implemented; and accomplishments in communities where economic development initiatives have targeted people with a history of difficulties in securing long-term employment.

In instances such as these, the First Nations involved may have acquired enough autonomy and flexibility to adopt innovative approaches to welfare reform. If they were willing to be part of and to provide some direction for studies to record their experiences, it might be possible to draw together a wide range of case studies. This in turn may suggest some useful generalizations about the patterns that underlie successful community-based approaches to welfare reform. From these patterns in turn more or less specific models may emerge. Such models could be of use to other communities seeking their own route to social and economic development. They also may be of assistance in clarifying the different constraints and possibilities in urban, rural and semi-rural communities; in bigger and smaller communities; and in communities that emphasize either individual or more co-operative approaches.

To date, the Institute has experienced good results with approaches based on case studies in Indian communities. Recently, it has published several studies examining cases related to economic development involving Indian people, including *Wampoum et lettres patentes* by Harold Bherer, Sylvie Gagnon and Jacinte Roberge; *After Native Claims? The Implications of Comprehensive Claims for Natural Resources in British Columbia* by Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale; and *Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia* by Fred Wien. These studies indicate that generalizations about many public policy questions involving First Nations can and should be informed by an understanding of the emerging realities in First Nations communities.

Generating more case studies is one step that could be taken as part of a research effort intended to support the goal of welfare reform in Indian communities. There are others. There is a need for more demographic research on the basic economic and social conditions in Indian communities. Such an effort would complement the associated research and place it in a frame of reference, thereby highlighting critical needs. It also might be very useful to look outside Canada, to the United States, New Zealand, Australia, and other jurisdictions, for models that are emerging from the efforts of indigenous peoples to exercise the right to development in their communities. In Canada, the provinces might have taken or be considering innovative approaches to welfare reform in a more general setting; these also might provide interesting lessons. So too might the literature on community development and community economic development. In addition, it would be helpful if the indigenous views of work and social assistance in First Nations societies were illuminated and documented. All of these research efforts can be shared in print, and it would also be productive to continue sharing them in a variety of meetings involving First Nations representatives, federal and provincial officials, and members of the academic and social policy communities.

Another possible line of research and effort relates to the federal government's administrative and policy arrangements concerning social assistance in Indian communities. As Lynn Brooks notes,

> ... what needs to be researched is the ways and means to devolve the cumbersome, paternalistic and top-heavy health and welfare systems we now have and evolve some meaningful, positive and effective ways of dealing with the provision of basic human needs in an atmosphere of respect, autonomy, and mutual accountability. No small task.

If this task is to be addressed successfully, it will have to start with the basic elements of INAC's policy framework for social assistance. The 1964 Treasury Board authority is badly in need of change. INAC's slowness in giving up this authority is somewhat understandable. Because its funding rates are tied to provincial rates, it is able to use the authority to insulate itself from a variety of expenditure pressures, but this tie also harbours many disadvantages. Where financial restraint or policy changes take place in a province, as in British Columbia in the mid-1980s, for instance, Indian peoples can be subjected to measures that are inappropriate and inequitable from a national perspective. Further, the authority binds INAC to an approach that ties social assistance benefits to individuals, while most available evidence indicates that many

Indian peoples would prefer a more direct focus on communities and the benefits that individuals can derive in that context.

Concrete thinking about a new authority is necessary, and as the Treasury Board authority is recast, these points should be kept in mind. Perhaps what is necessary is an approach aimed at tying social assistance funding in particular communities to factors such as poverty levels and other community-specific demographic data, as well as, in some cases, actual economic and social development possibilities. If such an approach is developed, it will be important to ensure that it conforms with the idea that the federal government should be facilitative rather than directive in its approach to welfare and work provisions.

As thinking proceeds on these issues, it will be important to approach the task with what one workshop participant described as "several degrees of caution." The participant was referring, in particular, to the need to keep welfare reform efforts isolated from the federal government's general cost-cutting activities. "Welfare reform in Indian communities cannot be a matter of government restraint," the participant noted. "It must be seen as an element of community-based and controlled development." Some participants saw other potential pitfalls. "The common purposes of welfare programs," one suggested, "are not for community and employee skill development." Still another noted that "A strong effort will be necessary to make sure that the broad character of welfare reform is not lost as the reform proceeds."

Several others sounded similar notes of caution. "We need to watch out," one participant urged, "that we are moving forward to empowerment and not backwards to impoverishment." Another put forward a similar view: "We should not be substituting working for poverty for just plain poverty." Finally, several participants noted the need to look at the adequacy of overall federal funding levels for social assistance in Indian communities, along with the innovative ways that given amounts of funding can be used.

"Ideas," Neil Sterritt noted at the close of the workshop, "can have an impact and a force. They can bring about change. We must not forget that." If Canadians are going to think about welfare reform in Indian communities, they will have to listen to these communities. The ideas and visions that can be generated by broader discussions can also have an impact in this context. "No one," as one participant noted, "is prepared to justify the current system, but the system tends to go on." Perhaps innovative ideas and open discussion can be fused with community-based and -directed initiatives to create the kind of understanding necessary to change the welfare system in ways that are appropriate to and reflective of the values and aspirations of Canada's First Nations. No less is necessary.

II.

The Use of Social Assistance for Employment Creation on Indian Reserves: An Appraisal

by

*Hugh Shewell**
Ph.D. Candidate
National Welfare Fellow
University of Toronto

* The author gratefully acknowledges the work of Ms. Marie Watts, whose field research and comments contributed to this paper.

Acknowledgements

The writer wishes to thank the following persons for their kind participation in this study and report:

Ms. Debbie Beauclair	Osoyoos Indian Band
Mr. Dale George	Osoyoos Indian Band
Chief Hubert George	Osoyoos Indian Band
Ms. Celena John	Stony Creek Indian Band
Ms. Marlene Johnny	Stony Creek Indian Band
Ms. Mabel Louie	Stony Creek Indian Band
Ms. Mona Louie	Osoyoos Indian Band
Mr. Al Mason	Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Government Commission
Mr. Ken Matsune	Penticton Indian Band
Mr. Lloyd McDames	Moricetown Indian Band
Ms. Veronica McGinnis	Osoyoos Indian Band
Ms. Darlene Morgan	Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Government Commission
Mr. Gordon Peters	Osoyoos Indian Band
Mr. Kenn Visser	Osoyoos Indian Band

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada,
REED Directorate, National Capital Region

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada,
Social Development Directorate, National Capital Region

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada,
Social Development Program, B.C. Region

Indian and Northern Affairs Canada,
Social Development Program, Central District Office, B.C. Region

II.

The Use of Social Assistance for Employment Creation on Indian Reserves: An Appraisal

Hugh Shewell

Things haven't changed. I see the trucks going by my house. The logging trucks in the morning. None of our people are in those trucks going out to work. Now the river . . . that was our way of life. Our provisions come from the river . . . . So all these things come to me, our people are still the same . . . unemployed and poor.[1]

Introduction

In 1971 the federal Treasury Board authorized the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to conduct a pilot project on the use of social assistance funds to create on-reserve employment. Since that time the Department has developed a variety of special programs designed to stimulate employment creation through the use of social assistance funds and, simultaneously, to foster improved individual work skills, enhance overall community environments, and—not least important—reduce the high rates of social assistance dependence experienced on most reserves in Canada.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the reported experiences in employment creation of four Indian bands in British Columbia. The examination takes place in the context of the modern Canadian democracy in order to reveal the dilemmas confronting many Indian bands today. Inevitably, any discussion of social assistance and employment creation on Indian reserves in Canada leads to a more fundamental discussion of the tensions underlying the relationship between Indian peoples and the government of Canada.

The paper is divided into five parts. The first part gives an overview of the main employment creation programs that have used social assistance funds, their objectives,

commonalities and differences. Some internal departmental observations about these programs are provided where they were available and relevant. Some statistical data are also presented.

The most significant part of the paper, the second part, reports on the field study of four Indian bands in British Columbia and their experiences with social assistance and employment creation. Most important, the field study reveals the inherent conflict of the social assistance program with Indian cultural values and its damaging effect on Indian community life and sense of independence. Not surprisingly, a strong sense of resistance to government programs emerges.

The third part highlights the themes and issues raised in the field study and provides analytical comments. The fourth part attempts to discern a deeper analytical link between the themes and issues that have emerged and the overall Canadian context in which they occurred. This includes a review of the assimilation policies practised by the federal government and the provision of social assistance as an aspect of those policies. Of particular note is the fact that the current 1964 federal Treasury Board authority (under which the government provides social assistance) pre-dates the government's intention, declared in 1971, to abandon the policy of assimilation.[2] Finally, some attention is given to the nature of the welfare system as it is administered on Indian reserves.

The fifth and concluding part assesses the overall impact of social assistance and employment creation programs. A central conclusion is that the goal of reducing Indian dependence on social assistance cannot be achieved through continued initiation of these programs by the government; this will occur more probably only through Indian initiative and control.

Part I. An Overview of the Principal Employment Creation Programs Based on Social Assistance Transfer

In July 1964 the federal Treasury Board authorized the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, to adopt local provincial or municipal rates and administrative procedures in providing social assistance to Indian persons resident on reserves in Canada. Later that decade, in 1969, the government introduced the White Paper on Indian Policy which proposed to do away with the Department of Indian Affairs and to assimilate Indian people fully into Canadian society. The Indian response was immediate; they rejected the White Paper entirely. Instead, the Indian leadership insisted that their future lay in increased autonomy and self-determination as distinct peoples. In 1971 the government withdrew the White Paper and announced an official end to the policy of assimilation.

Despite this current change of policy, the 1964 authority for social assistance remains in place—an authority that binds the provision of assistance to European, not Indian models of social welfare. The particular model of assistance—common in its basic form to all the provinces—is known as the residual model; this means that it is a program

of last resort. To be eligible for assistance, applicants must have exhausted all resources available them.

As well, and most important, the model assumes that the labour market is the chief distributor of income and that the need for social assistance is only temporary. Either the individual will find employment, or whatever economic conditions caused the loss of employment will be corrected and the labour market will resume its proper role as the source of income. Thus, the model takes for granted that the recipient of assistance is fully integrated into the labour market and the cash economy, and therefore has access to wage employment.

Since 1971, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) has initiated four principal employment creation programs that permit an individual's (and her/his dependants') social assistance entitlement to be transferred to her/his wage component within an employment project.

1. **The Work Opportunity Program (WOP)**
   - began in 1971 as a pilot project
   - received Treasury Board authority for the transfer of social assistance funds in February 1972
   - approved as a continuing program by the minister in August 1972
   - remains the current authority by which social assistance funds are transferred, although the other components of the program (i.e., capital funds, operating expenses, etc.) are no longer funded
2. **Band Work Process (BWP)**
   - formalized in 1977
   - special Treasury Board authority for the transfer of social assistance
   - terminated in 1980
3. **New Employment Expansion Development Program (NEED)**
   - initiated by special Treasury Board authority, 1983
   - terminated in mid-1984
4. **Indian Community Human Resources Strategy Program (ICHRS)**
   - initiated by special Treasury Board authority, 1985
   - uses WOP authority for social assistance transfer.

The four programs share two objectives: reducing Indian dependence on social assistance *and* developing increased employment opportunities on reserves. With respect to the first objective, Indian social assistance dependency rates are substantially higher than those in the general population. Although the data sources are not entirely reliable, the figures in Table 1 provide some idea of the disparities in rates of dependence. Because of the significant difference between the two populations, it was thought—and presumably it continues to be thought—that a primary solution lay in creating employment opportunities on the reserves. This was the solution proposed in 1971, and it is a solution that continues to be pursued in 1991.

Table 1
Social Assistance Dependency Rates Expressed as a Percentage of Population[3]

	1971	1981	1986
Indian	57.0	59.0	43.7
Non-Indian	6.4	6.2	7.5

In addition to sharing these two objectives, all four programs emphasize community service and development projects as the main type of employment creation for which funding is available. As a result, many bands develop non-profit social service programs, housing and public works projects. The programs are also used for land management, environmental protection, physical improvements to the communities (e.g., landscaping, painting, restoration), fencing, and silviculture. In fact, a review of the file material in Ottawa and in the British Columbia regional office revealed a rich array of projects and ideas.

To understand each program and its characteristics, we will review each briefly.

1. Work Opportunity Program

The present objective of the WOP is essentially the same as when the program was originally conceived. The objective is stated in the Social Assistance Policy Manual of the Social Development Program, British Columbia Region:

> The Work Opportunity Program within the context of Social Assistance Policy and Procedures has a primary objective to enhance the independence and employability of persons in receipt of Social Assistance. The program seeks to achieve this objective by utilizing Social Assistance funds together with funds from other sources to create time limited employment experiences for on-reserve residents who would otherwise be unemployed.
>
> An important, secondary objective of the Work Opportunity Program is the provision of needed community services, the development of community facilities or the improvement of the community environment.[4]

When it was initiated in 1971 as a pilot program, each project was approved in Ottawa. The Indian communities responded with many different proposals. The INAC Annual Report for 1971-72 announced the initiation of the program and stated that "18 projects proposed by bands were carried out with excellent results. Employment was created and a positive change in social attitudes was observed. In each case not only was the individual helped, but the community as a whole benefitted . . .".[5] The following year the program was decentralized to the regions.

Growth of WOP peaked in 1973-74. WOP figures from the Department's annual reports for the three years between 1972 and 1975 are shown in Table 2. After that there were no further reports on WOP; the program was terminated although the Treasury Board authority was not rescinded. This meant that, while the Department no longer maintained a WOP program fund, bands could, if they wished, access other funding sources and continue to transfer social assistance funds according to the procedural guidelines. In the early and mid-1980s, in the absence of any other consistent employment mechanism, bands in British Columbia continued to make use of the WOP authority, as demonstrated in Table 3.

Comparable figures for Table 3 are not available nationally for this period. However, in 1986-87 departmental headquarters reported that 3.3 per cent of total social assistance (SA) expenditures had been transferred under the WOP authority. This transfer had created 18,718 person-months of employment, or roughly 1,560 jobs. Similarly, in 1987-88, 3.3 per cent of total SA expenditures was transferred. There were 1,714 WOP projects, which had created 20,283 person-months of employment, or about 1,690 jobs.[6]

Table 2
Available Work Opportunity Program Data, 1972-1975[7]

	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75
Number of projects	101	294	260
Number of jobs created	1500	3000+	2000
$ Sources:			
Work Opportunity Program Fund	$500,000	N/A	N/A
Band Revenues	235,000	N/A	N/A
Social Assistance	750,000	N/A	N/A
Other DIAND sources	485,000	N/A	N/A
Other sources	413,000	N/A	N/A
Total $ (millions)	$2,383,000	7,000,000	5,000,000
Social Assistance as percentage of Total	31.5	N/A	N/A

Another way of assessing WOP use is to examine its impact on caseload categories. While such an assessment was not possible nationally, figures from the British Columbia region provide some information (Table 4). What is immediately apparent from Table 4 is the consistency of use among both single people and families, both in absolute numbers and in percentage terms. The only significant change in the use of WOP occurred in 1984-85, the only year in which the NEED program operated for a full year. The consistency of these figures should also be seen in the context of the WOP authority itself during this period; i.e., it existed only as an authority to transfer social assistance funds, not as an additional source of funds. Additional funds were available mainly from the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission and occasionally from other departmental programs.

Table 3
Work Opportunity Program Data: B.C. Region, 1983-1988 [8]

	1983-84	1984-85	1985-86	1986-87	1987-88
Number of projects[1]	82	64	83	96	93
Number of jobs created[1]	588	351	507	528	478
SA $ transferred	$2,663,500	$1,724,500	$2,660,200	$2,992,000	$2,665,600
Percentage Total SA Expenditure[2]	9.3	5.8	7.9	8.2	7.5
Percentage Total SA Caseload[3]	8.6	5.2	6.9	6.9	6.4

Notes:
1. Project and job numbers are estimates only. 1988 data are incomplete.
2. Percentage Total SA expenditure equals the percentage amount of the total SA. expenditure represented by the total SA $ transferred.
3. Percentage Total caseload equals the total SA $ transferred also represents times per cent of the total number of SA cases.

Table 4
Work Opportunity Program Data Expressed as a Percentage of Total Caseload and of Employable Caseload:B.C. Region, 1983 TO 1988 [9]

Year	Total SA Cases	WOP Cases	WOP as % of Total Cases	WOP as % of Employable Cases
		Singles		
1983-84	3470	281	8.0	12.5
1984-85	3512	155	4.4	6.6[1]
1985-86	3893	212	5.4	7.7[2]
1986-87	4029	221	5.5	7.6
1987-88[3]	3919	201	5.1	7.2
		Families		
1983-84	3250	307	9.4	17.1
1984-85	3221	196	6.1	10.1[1]
1985-86	3501	295	8.4	13.5[2]
1986-87	3628	307	8.5	13.5
1987-88[3]	3444	277	8.0	12.1

Notes:
1. NEED Program introduced.
2. ICHRS Program introduced.
3. 1987/88 data are incomplete.

The figures in Table 4 also suggest that bands attempt to use WOP in such a way that there is a proportional benefit, not by the number in a caseload category (i.e., the number of singles compared to the number of families), but by the population distribution by category. For example, in 1986-87 in British Columbia there were about 4,029 single persons receiving social assistance on-reserve and 3,628 families, made up of 12,774 recipients and dependants. Thus, there were about three times as many family members as singles on social assistance. The WOP figures do not translate exactly into that distribution, but they do reflect a family emphasis. This emphasis is even more pronounced when WOP is seen as a percentage of the employable caseload.

The Work Opportunity Program has been used consistently by Indian bands across the country. This is not to imply that it is an effective program; rather it is seen by Indian people to be a *marginally* better alternative to the dependence created by the simple provision of monthly social assistance. The Department was initially excited by the impact of the program, but by the middle of 1972—some five months after Treasury Board authority had been received—some doubts were beginning to be expressed. The Director of Community Affairs stated three: there had not been as great a saving of social assistance as had been anticipated; the bands were not fully aware of the ultimate financial constraints on the program; and the labour market was not operating to meet the needs of Indian people by providing a continuing source of work.[10] This last comment must be understood in the context of the objective of the program as it was introduced in 1971-72: fostering long-term employment opportunities for Indian people.

While it was never stated explicitly in the file material reviewed, it was clear that by 1974 departmental officials were becoming concerned about the actual outcome of the program. On one hand, expenditures were seen as high, with little ongoing employment created as a result; but on the other hand WOP was seen to be a positive influence on Indian community life. In 1973, for example, internal departmental correspondence stated that direct band involvement in designing and planning each project was the only feasible way to begin to address the problem of unemployment on Indian reserves.[11]

Later, more salient comments on the program were made by a departmental official in correspondence with the Program Analysis and Management Services Branch. The correspondence addresses concerns about the effectiveness of WOP in creating employment and in reducing social assistance and other expenditures. In the general context of the nature of community employment programs, the writer states:

> The lack of employment opportunities in Indian communities is much greater proportionately than in other communities. In the majority of Indian communities the creation and maintenance of employment opportunities through a community employment program would constitute the *prime* source of employment; in many Indian communities such opportunities would be the *only* source of employment . . . .
>
> The nature of employment opportunities available in a community has a fundamental impact on its very essence . . . Any efforts at enhancing employment opportunities must . . . take . . . account of the effects on the community.
>
> In our program [WOP] we are very conscious of this point, constantly bearing in mind the cultural differences that exist, the variations in the definition of 'work', and the social values and habits that characterize the particular community.

> . . . the delivery mechanism must have a high capacity to respond to the needs of communities for the creation of satisfactory employment opportunities.[12]

The official emphasized that, for the Work Opportunity Program to be successful, there had to be adequate funding, band involvement in planning and decision making, and a continued emphasis on the uniqueness of Indian communities. Despite these comments the Department gradually pulled back on WOP funding while leaving the authority for social assistance funds transfer in place.

2. *Band Work Process*

The Band Work Process was initiated in 1977 in response to requests from two bands in northwestern Ontario.[13] The term 'process' was used to emphasize its goal of assisting bands in the development of long-term community employment strategies. The Band Work Process (BWP) had both short- and long-term objectives. The short-term objectives were:

> (a) to create meaningful employment opportunities for unemployed Indian . . . people on work projects that are beneficial to the community;
>
> (b) to support band governments in the development of medium- and long-term employment plans;
>
> (c) to develop departmental program development and delivery systems that result in a more co-ordinated and responsive application of resources.
>
> In the long term, the objective of the BWP was to ensure that participants were better equipped to take advantage of future labour market opportunities and, therefore, to reduce dependency on social assistance.[14]

The Band Work Process emphasized band management and planning as well as the development of employment initiatives that would reflect individual bands' needs and requirements. In its mechanics it operated in much the same way as WOP: that is, additional funds were made available for specific community initiatives that provided employment for unemployed Indian persons, most of whom would be on social assistance. The principle and method of social assistance transfer remained the same.

Where BWP differed from WOP was in the idea of involving Indian communities and band administrations in a developmental process intended to enhance their planning and management skills and give the communities a greater sense of control over their own destinies. Presumably it was thought that a developmental process would, in the long term, establish a more solid sense of community identity and thus place Indian people on a more solid base from which to gain access to the labour market and to increase their self-sufficiency.

It was difficult to find relevant BWP data at the national level. There was one reference to the program in its first year of official operation in the Department's annual

report for 1977-78. In that year, $1.3 million was spent on BWP operating expenses. The amount of social assistance transfer was not mentioned.

Considerably more data are available on the British Columbia region.[15] Between 1976 and 1980 a total of $2.5 million was spent on BWP, of which $1.2 million was SA transfer. The greatest use of the program was in 1978-79, when total expenditures were $925,000, of which $490,000 was SA transfer. An average of 1,080 person-months of work per year were created, or roughly 90 jobs. On average, 5 per cent of the employable caseload participated each year. Over the span of the program, 115 projects were initiated. These projects fell into four general categories: (1) community maintenance, housing and infrastructure (41 projects); (2) planning/training (18 projects); (3) social/cultural (17 projects); and (4) economic development (39 projects). In an extensive evaluation of the program, the Bureau of Management Consulting concluded in part that "it would be difficult to establish a strong causal linkage between employment generation and BWP."[16]

In 1980, responsibility for administering the program was transferred to the Department's Economic Development Directorate which, through an apparent oversight, failed to apply to Treasury Board for a continuation of the BWP authority. The program therefore lapsed, and no attempt was made to restore it.

We were unable to locate substantial national evaluation data. However, the B.C. evaluation was equivocal in its appraisal of BWP. In particular, it found that BWP had not significantly improved the planning and co-ordination capacities of participating bands, nor had it had any perceptible impact on SA dependency.[17]

3. *New Employment Expansion Development Program*

The New Employment Expansion Development Program (NEED) was initiated in 1983-84 as a joint venture of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND, as it was then known). It was administered and evaluated by the Department. Initially it was only to last the one fiscal year; however it was extended by permission to the end of June 1984.

Nationally, there were four main objectives:

- to create employment opportunities for unemployed Indian people;
- to fund local projects that would improve community infrastructure and provide long-term benefits at the local level;
- to achieve a more productive use of social assistance funds by converting existing expenditures into wage subsidies;
- to create real work force opportunities for employable Indian people who were dependent on social assistance.[18]

The remarks that follow are based on the B.C. experience with NEED. The objectives of the NEED program were almost identical to those of the first WOP initiative. In British Columbia—considering that the bands knew in advance of the time constraint on NEED—91 projects were approved, creating 830 jobs and about 23,877 weeks of employment. Nationally, the total NEED expenditure from all sources was just under $63,245,000, of which the B.C. share was $9,539,000. The funding sources and amounts were:

NEED (CEIC)	$4,904,573	51.4%
SA (DIAND)	$1,434,618	15.0%
Other (DIAND)	$3,199,858	33.6%[19]

When the B.C. experience with the NEED program was measured against the four objectives, the results—while positive—offered little insight into employment creation on Indian reserves, or on the role of social assistance in the process. The final report on the program made the following observations:

Objective #1: Create employment opportunities for unemployed Indians.

Results: 830 new jobs . . . were created.

Additional work weeks of employment were created in many reserve communities via ancillary support activities that occurred as a result of the NEED project (i.e., equipment purchase and rental, service activities).

Objective #2: Fund local projects that would improve community infrastructure and provide long-term benefits at the local level.

Results: 91 projects were funded in the B.C. Region, all managed by bands or tribal councils.

Lasting community improvements include

- 124 new houses
- 135 housing renovations
- 653 km of new or re-built fencing
- 67 km of roads improved, trails cleared
- 1,161 hectares of range land improvements
- 2,176 hectares of forest land improvements

Objective #3: Achieve a more productive use of social assistance funds by converting existing expenditures into wage subsidies.

Results: $1,434,618 of social assistance funding was transferred to augment NEED contribution funds. The 1984-85 social assistance expenditure for the B.C. Region was $29,653,500.

The $1.4 million transferred covered both fiscal year 83-84 and 84-85. In 1983-84 the total SA expenditure was $28.5 million.

The social development program data show that in 1984-85 $660,500 was transferred to the NEED program; thus the balance of $774,100 was transferred in 1983-84.

Therefore, in 1983-84 the NEED transfer was 2.7 per cent of total SA expenditures and in 1984-85 it was 2.2 per cent. More complete data for both years were not available. It is probable, however, that the WOP data for 1983-84 include the NEED transfer.

Objective #4: Create real opportunities for employable Indian people who were dependent on social assistance to enter the work force.

Results: Complete data were not available. In 1984-85 (the final three months of the NEED program) 1,694 case-months were transferred, or 2.1 per cent of the total for that year. About 58 families (205 persons including dependents) and 86 single persons participated in NEED in that year.

None of the projects was intended to be continuing, self-sustaining business venture; however, for many participants the NEED project was their first job of any duration, and for some youth, their first job ever.[20]

It is not evident what the Department was trying to demonstrate through the NEED program that had not already been attempted in WOP. It is clear—at least in British Columbia—that the program was used as an alternative to the WOP transfer. Presumably this was because there were also additional capital and infrastructure funds available.

More critically, however, it cannot be demonstrated that anything was achieved in reducing dependence on social assistance. Of interest was the Department's assessment of what contributed to the more successful projects, although what constituted 'success' was not defined. The successful projects were those where

> an active, locally controlled community planning process was in place. Band communities with a policy plan on economic development, resource inventories and management expertise enjoyed more satisfactory projects both in the outputs and outcomes (i.e., jobs, improvements to reserve infrastructure, and spin-offs to future ventures).[21]

These comments dovetail with the Department's emphasis at the time on band management training and community planning and reflect a particular view of what Indians 'needed' in order to become more independent of the Department. The comments also underscore the objectives of the previous transfer program, BWP, which used employment creation as a tool for long-range community planning and development.

4. *Indian Community Human Resource Strategy Program*

The Indian Community Human Resource Strategy Program (ICHRS) was introduced in the late summer of 1985. ICHRS was the result of a planning initiative from the Department's Resource, Employment, and Economic Development Branch (REED). While ICHRS depended on SA transfer to some extent, the Social Development Directorate had little involvement in its creation. The ICHRS initiative, still in effect in 1991,[22] was more comprehensive in scope than the previous employment creation programs with an SA transfer component. ICHRS operates under separate Treasury Board authority, but the SA transfer is made under the continuing WOP authority of 1972.

The long-range objective of ICHRS is to develop permanent employment for Indian persons living on reserves (although the employment need not be on the reserve). To accomplish this objective ICHRS has developed several strategies that combine education and training with community planning, employment development and entrepreneurial initiatives. A special ICHRS initiative called SEPI (Socio-Economic Program Initiative) was instituted for one fiscal year, 1988-89. Under SEPI, employable social assistance recipients were to be targeted for on-the-job training with on- and off-reserve employers; the object was that either the job placement would become permanent or the trainee would gain sufficient skills to find similar employment elsewhere. The scope of social assistance transfer under ICHRS—including SEPI—expanded considerably. In particular, the ability to use the transfer under certain conditions for education and on-the-job training, as well as for the established employment creation purposes, represents a much more significant role for SA funds in developing conditions to lessen dependence upon social assistance.

Following termination of the NEED program, most bands in British Columbia reverted to the WOP authority, using it to continue to provide on-reserve employment opportunities where they were able to locate funds to support a project. Under ICHRS the WOP authority continued as the SA transfer mechanism.

Initially the data for ICHRS were sparse. This may be because of under-use or confusion in how the SA transfer was to be reported. By 1988-89 the Department decided that all ICHRS and WOP transfers were to be reported simply as a WOP transfer. The sole exception was the SEPI initiative. Tables 5, 6, and 7 provide data on ICHRS, on ICHRS collapsed into WOP, and on SEPI.

There is a difficulty in assessing the ICHRS data because of its confusion with WOP. Thus, in 1989 even the Department makes no distinction between the SA transfers in the two programs. In B.C. Region, however, there is some indication of a decrease in usage of the SA transfer since the introduction of ICHRS. For example, in 1983-84 the transfer was used for 8.6 per cent of the total case-months (including NEED), while in 1988-89 this had dropped 5.7 per cent. Similarly, in the same period the percentage of total social assistance dollars transferred declined from 8 per cent to 7.3 per cent. With the exception of Alberta Region and excluding Ontario and Quebec for which comparable data were not available—all other regions registered slight declines in the percentage of case-month transfer between 1987-88 and 1988-89.

Table 5
Indian Community Human Resource Strategy Program
Social Assistance Transfer Data: B.C. Region
1985-86 to 1988-89 [33]

	1985-86	1986-87	1987-88[1]	1988-89[1]
Number of projects	N/A	1	2	N/A
SA $ Transferred	$2,800	36,800	158,500	N/A
Percentage Total SA Expenditure	.01	0.1	0.45	N/A
Percentage Total SA Caseload	.01	.07	0.2	N/A

Notes: 1 Data for 1987-88 and 1988-89 are incomplete.

Because there is little evaluation material available for ICHRS, and because there is no distinction made between use of the WOP authority for employment projects and its use for other ICHRS components, it is almost impossible to assess the impact and effectiveness of the SA transfer under the ICHRS program. As noted above there was a slight decline in the actual percentage of case-months affected by SA transfer. However, nationally the percentage of dollars transferred remained about the same. Given the comprehensiveness of the ICHRS initiative, it might have been anticipated that the percentages would show a more substantial increase.

Table 6
ICHRS/WOP SA Transfer Data: B.C. Region
1985-86 to 1988-89 [34]

	1985-86	1986-87	1987-88[1]	1988-89[1]
Number of projects	83	97	95	N/A
SA $ Transferred	$2,663,000	3,028,800	2,824,100	2,315,700
Percentage Total SA Expenditure	8.0	8.5	8.0	7.3
Percentage Total SA Caseload	6.9	7.0	6.7	5.7

Notes: 1. Data for 1987-88 and 1988-89 are incomplete.

Table 7
SEPI Pilot Project Data
March 31, 1989 B.C. Region [25]

	1988/89
Number of SEPI Bands	18
Number of Training Projects	19
Number of Trainees	71
SA $ Transferred	$182,300
Percentage Total SA Expenditure	0.6
Percentage Total SA Caseload	1.0[1]
Adjusted for 3 dropouts:	
Total SEPI Expenditure	$690,200
Percentage of SEPI Expenditure was SA Transfer	20.1
Percentage Total SEPI SA Transfer of Total SA Expenditure	0.4
SEPI as Percentage of Total Caseload	0.9

Notes: 1. Estimate only.

Concluding Comments

A 1985 document from the Department's Social Development Directorate identifies a key criticism of employment creation using social assistance transfer.

> Many of the current problems in federal government funding of economic development on Indian reserves arise from or are aggravated by the failure of the federal government to fund employment creation to Indians in its own right and to reduce social assistance appropriations accordingly.[26]

This comment seems to imply that there is a critical difference between income and employment. If it is the intention of the federal government to assure to Indian people a level of income and a standard of living enabling them to meet their basic needs in a money economy, such an objective can be met through an income support program. But if the objective is to enable Indian people to be self-supporting through employment—and thus dependent upon wages for their income—such an objective should not be confused with social assistance as a source for wages. Social assistance is, by definition, a source of income where employment and wages are absent.

If the analysis is pressed, however, the issue becomes the meaning of 'dependence' and its relationship to social assistance in the complete absence of a meaningful labour

market. This also suggests that 'employment' as it is understood elsewhere in Canadian society cannot have the same meaning on reserves. Thus, the relationship between social assistance and employment is meaningless in most situations on Indian reserves. This point will be addressed again in Part IV.

In concluding this section, the comments of a B.C. region departmental official are interesting and insightful. In August 1983—at about the time of the inception of the NEED program—the official was asked to comment on a paper, prepared by a colleague at headquarters, entitled "Indians in the Labour Force." The B.C. official began his response by stating that the history of Indian employment was important and that there had been periods when Indian development had flourished in the earlier part of the century. He went on to ask "What contributed to 'up' periods in modern Indian history?" He continued:

> . . . a factor which has led to a lack of employment and a general 'squeezing' of Indian development has been the concentration of development in a few large centres and the concentration on 'productive efficiency'. In this resource extractive province [B.C.] these factors have been of paramount importance in such industries as fishing, forestry, and agriculture.[27]

This tendency to centralize and concentrate development resulted in rising unemployment rates generally in British Columbia. Given this reality, the official believed it was important to explore how Indian people wished to pursue *their own* development. He also stated that Indian development was tied inextricably into Indian land and land claims in B.C. He continued:

> Many bands and individuals have philosophies and strategies for development which are based very much on their current and traditional land base and a lifestyle which may differ in part from the North American norm. In short, the fact that a significant proportion of the Indian population has not taken up factory life may stem from strong and well-founded convictions that there are other viable alternatives. In B.C. in particular, the work surrounding land claims undertaken by Bands and Tribal Councils demonstrates the depth and substance of this approach.[28]

Part II. Social Assistance and Employment: A Report on Discussions with Selected Indian Bands in British Columbia

In the summer and fall of 1989 we surveyed four Indian bands in British Columbia, conducting interviews to elicit from the bands, in as direct and frank a manner as possible, their experiences with and perception of the use of social assistance to create work in their communities. Given the nature of the topic, discussion also ranged into general issues related to the social assistance program, as well as the impact of social assistance on their communities and cultures.

The interview questions followed a standard format but, depending upon the person being interviewed, some questions were given more emphasis than others. The selection of the bands was based initially on size and geographic location. Because of time con-

straints and the availability of band members, however, selection was determined in the end by the availability of the band during the limited periods the researchers were also available. Nevertheless, a reasonable cross-section of bands was achieved, reflecting a variety of geographic locations, social assistance caseloads, and use of departmental programs.

In this section the interview results are presented in detail. Each band is introduced with some basic demographic and descriptive information. The demographic data are derived mainly from INAC statistical information, much of it supplied by band administrators. The data are followed by a relatively straightforward reporting of the discussions held with the representative(s) of the band. As much as possible what follows is either direct or paraphrased quotation from those interviewed. Editing (indicated with square brackets) provides continuity and context, and additional explanation is provided where necessary to assist in understanding the band members' comments or situation. Bands often had different perspectives on issues or placed more emphasis on one area of discussion than another. Thus, the themes will not always emerge consistently from one band to another.

1. *Moricetown*

Demographic Data

- *On-Reserve Population* (status only, as of 31 December 1988: 571)
- *Social Assistance*

Basic Needs Caseload	August 1989	March 1989
Unemployable		
Families	19	12
Number of persons	55	37
Singles	11	11
Employable		
Families	40	22
Number of persons	129	72
Singles	73	47
Work Opportunity Projects		
Families	25	27
Number of persons	97	103
Singles	13	10
Number of SA cases	181	129
Number of case-months (year to date)	768.5	1405
Average cases/month (year to date)	154	117
Ratio Employable:Unemployable	83:17	82:18
Number of Work Opportunity Projects	2	2
WOP cases as percentage of caseload	20.9	28.7

SA $ transferred for WOP		
a) $ year to date	**100,900**	**141,700**
b) % of basic needs	**33.8**	**24.9**
Unemployment Rate (CEIC Zone 980/990)	**8.2**	**9.9**
Average SA Dependency Rate	**60.0**	**34.25**

Location and Economic Situation

The Moricetown Band and its reserve are located on Highway 16, approximately 35 kilometres west of the town of Smithers, British Columbia, in the northwest part of the province. The community is situated in magnificent forested alpine country. Amidst rolling meadows and the backdrop of the Hazelton Range, the Bulkley River flows through a spectacular canyon at the southern edge of the village itself. The tribal headquarters of the Gitksan-wet'suwet'en—of which the Moricetown Band is a part—is located in Hazelton, some 35 kilometres further west. Prince George, the major north-central town, is 400 kilometres to the south and east. Prince Rupert, the centre of the provincial northern fishery, is 315 kilometres to the west. The forestry industry is the major source of employment in the area. Fishing and mining are also significant to the regional economy, and tourism and the related service sector are becoming increasingly important.

Interview Results

Two interviews were conducted, one with the social worker for the Moricetown Band, and one with the co-ordinators for social development for the Gitksan-wet'suwet'en Government Commission in Hazelton.

Interview Number 1:
Band Social Worker, Moricetown

The interview is presented in four parts: first, general comments concerning the function, influence and impact of social assistance on the Moricetown Indian community; second, the potential role of the band in creating employment opportunities; third, the issues surrounding social assistance and job creation; and finally, some concluding comments about band decision making, work and welfare, and social assistance now and in the future.

General comments:

Unemployment in this community is very high, but despite this, people don't want to leave. The attachment to the community is strong. Because unemployment is so high, social assistance is a major factor here. In one sense, social assistance can or could do a lot in terms of the services that could be offered (counselling, employment training, etc.), but we are restricted both financially and by manpower. The kinds of programs we would like

to be able to offer through the social assistance program are simply not funded at this time. So social assistance is a restricted program: it's restricted 'financially' in that we can't employ enough people to deliver the services we would like; and it's restricted as a 'program' in that it does not provide and fund enough services; that is, the kinds of services that we would like to be able to deliver.

Initially, the social assistance program was not compatible with Native culture. In fact, it isn't compatible now, but Native workers have been able to incorporate Native values into its delivery. A good example of this is the way workers use burial funds to accommodate the particular ways in which a Native burial is observed.

The 'employable' and 'unemployable' categories of assistance are all right. The employable category is useful because it assists us [the band] in concentrating on those whom we think should be encouraged to work. This is a particular problem for our youth who, following high school graduation, tend to go on social assistance. There is very little work on the reserve, yet they do not wish to leave the reserve. Even looking for work in Smithers is not an easy thing.

First of all, there is no public transportation between here and Smithers or other nearby communities. This makes the task of looking for work harder, and also makes the idea of daily commuting almost impossible. Even if there was more work in town (several mills have recently closed) and people were willing to live in town, there is hardly any accommodation. Another problem that is always just below the surface is discrimination. So, even when there is some employment available it is not always available to our people.

There is another issue related to the lack of employment and the reliance on social assistance in this community. For both categories (employable and unemployable) the rates are too low, but especially so for the unemployable and the handicapped. For the unemployable and the handicapped this means a continual subsistence income. The low rates coupled with lack of employment opportunities also encourages a tendency to gamble. Many of our recipients spend too much of their assistance on the lottery or on bingo in the hope of hitting it rich. They try to enrich their limited income by risking it. Even if they win—unless it's a *very* big win—they don't count what they've lost just to win. Usually when they win they haven't broken even.

Potential role:

[The Moricetown Band, together with all member bands of the Gitksan-wet'suwet'en Tribal Council, opted into the Alternative Funding Arrangements (AFA) program beginning 1 April 1990. This means that the band has considerably more discretion in how it uses departmental funds. At the time of the interviews, the band was planning ways to co-ordinate more effective use of social assistance in support of economic and employment development. The social worker, who had been part of the band planning process, explained some of these ideas.]

The band would like to be able to effect its own version of privatization by creating viable small businesses for some of the services it now provides to the community: general community maintenance, garbage collection and haulage, road maintenance, housing construction and repair. AFA and eventual self-government will permit the tribal council or the band to develop contracts with indigenous community businesses to perform these services. In some instances these businesses might be able to charge a small fee for the service. The development of more on-reserve child welfare services will also provide more employment opportunities.

A lot of employment could be created if the band could respond to the needs the community itself generates. These are not only the kinds of needs met by government services but needs that we presently meet by spending money in town—like groceries, car repairs, appliance repairs, and so on. The band recently determined that the community as a whole spent about four million dollars in Smithers alone last year. Moricetown is large enough to support some of its own small businesses; so we would like to look at establishing on-reserve businesses or having small branches of town businesses here.

As long as the community remains dependent on government programs it will not be able to 'see' beyond the reserve boundaries. Employment right now is limited to government jobs, to jobs that are there to serve some function related to a departmental program or requirement. We need to be able to reach beyond those programs. We want to look into the larger community and see what we might be able to offer to that community. Tourism is one obvious possibility. Right now we have a summer campground. In the future we would like to develop sport fishing, local history tours, guiding, and a lodge with a coffee shop. The Nisga'a are doing this now, so it is something that can be done.

Current issues:

Our most serious economic problem is the lack of employment opportunities. So the question we ask ourselves, now and for the future, is how social assistance can be used not only as a wage source for employment, but *as a program* to support job creation. We need to develop our own ways to complement government programs and to utilize government funds more effectively for our own communities.

Right now we have two Work Opportunity projects, the sawmill and the canyon development. The sawmill employs 25 persons and the canyon development, 5 persons. WOP is both useful and restrictive: it is useful in the sense that it does assist in creating employment and training opportunities; it is restrictive in that funds cannot be transferred for purposes other than for the actual jobs created [it can be used only for the specific wage supplements not for other aspects of job creation]. For example, with the sawmill WOP is useful, because it sustains steady employment; but it is restrictive because it can't be used to expand the mill.

There are presently 25 positions at the mill which are supported by WOP. These positions are 'chain' workers, buckers and fallers in the yard, loaders, graders, head riggers, pilers, first aid attendant, skidder, watchmen, and a supervisor. Recently the chipper was destroyed by fire, which eliminated some positions. The band hopes to

rebuild the chipper and add a planer. So presently the mill only grades and saws rough lumber and trucks it off. The plan is to expand the operation to 66 full-time jobs. This will be done by adding another shift to double the current complement to 50, and by hiring an additional 16 persons to staff the chipper/planer for two shifts. Some jobs have been created privately in relation to the mill. For example, four separate contractors do the logging for the mill and they have hired a few guys for their operations.

The community looks to the mill to hire a lot of people, but the mill wants to be sure that it maintains quality and that by doing so it will generate the dollars to create more work. Right now the 25 employees at the mill don't see themselves as being on social assistance. The mill pays up to $2,400/month of which the WOP portion is, on average, $700/month. The mill makes up the balance. But the WOP portion is really important because the revenue generated by the mill is not enough right now to support all 25 positions at competitive wages.

The mill benefits those who work for it and it benefits the community. People who have been on WOP in the past have moved on to other jobs. Right now, three new women at the mill have replaced persons who found other work. The mill workers are able to support local community endeavours, but of course they also spend their money in Smithers and Hazelton. We (the band) need to find ways for them to spend their money here. This will come with the development of tourism and business.

The canyon development project is the basis for our tourism plans. Right now it employs 5 persons on a seasonal basis to operate the campground. They maintain the RV sites and the shower facilities, collect and remove the garbage, and operate the small store. Besides the SA transfer under WOP, CEIC makes up the other part of the wage components under the Canadian Jobs Strategy Program (CJS).

[The WOP guidelines require that there be a reasonable turnover of staff "so that there is a fair opportunity for as many eligible persons as possible to participate."[29] The guidelines also limit the operation of a project to one fiscal year.[30] The Moricetown Band has difficulty in accepting the guidelines and chooses to exceed them with respect to the operation of the mill.]

The 25 persons who are in the WOP positions in the mill are in them for as long as they want, and we transfer the funds for as long as is necessary. There are three reasons for this: first, if we had turnover every 12 months or so then the mill would constantly be losing skilled workers; second, the mill, in effect, would never be more than a training ground for other mills; and third, we would be constantly disrupting the lives of people who had developed good work habits, a sense of a steady, living wage and independence and returning them to a state of dependence. The WOP guidelines are okay for some types of projects but not for others. Right now we can live with the guidelines as they relate to the canyon development because presently it's only seasonal. But, as we move toward a year-round operation then the guidelines obviously are not so good. The guidelines should not be the absolute basis for the approval of a project: they should attempt to meet the needs of the community as reflected in the project.

Concluding Comments:

This band hasn't strayed too far from the traditional ways of interaction. Our elders are still very much a part of the community and are always consulted on important decisions. As well, there is a strong unity with the tribal council and always has been. In this way—the place of our elders and our oneness with the tribal council—we have been able to maintain the continuity of our struggle as Indian people.

A recent addition to the band has been the return of Bill C-31 persons [those persons—usually women—who have either gained or re-gained Indian status under an amendment to the *Indian Act* in 1985]. Our band manager is one of those persons and she has brought a new way of seeing things to the reserve. She knows and understands government programs and has a good knowledge of 'the outside'. Not only that, she is someone who has not known dependency—her frame of reference toward survival and living is different. So, she—and other C-31 people—bring a different life experience to the reserve. Sometimes they find reserve life frustrating and they think there is a lack of vision on the reserve. But on the whole their influence is positive and we learn from each other.

The use of work incentives in social assistance is a good thing. 'Payment' for the performance of traditional tasks necessary for the community and for 'helping' other community members is not necessarily destructive. If handled correctly the use of work incentives can enrich, promote, and revitalize traditional helping roles.

This band would prefer to use social assistance funds differently. We also need more funds for different programs. Right now we can't address current needs because social assistance policy is too restrictive. The existing program is okay for meeting basic needs, in fact it's essential. *But* policy needs to expand, to be more flexible in meeting other needs, especially employment creation. Social assistance should continue to play a role in work and employment creation. After all, if we have the expectation that employable recipients work, then we must be part of the structure and solution that offers or creates work. Employment creation should not be limited by policy guidelines, especially not *time* guidelines.

Interview Number 2:
Social Development Co-ordinators,
Gitksan-wet'suwet'en Government Commission, Hazelton

[Interview comments are grouped under two headings: Comments on social assistance and comments on the Work Opportunity Program.]

Comments on social assistance:

Social assistance could and should be used more flexibly. For example, it would be far better sometimes not to call it 'social assistance' but simply to take the funds and use them for economic development. We know one band where a fellow came in to apply for

SA . . . he really needed it. But the band knew he was also trying to get his own business going but simply didn't have any start-up capital for his basic equipment. So the band advanced him six months of his social assistance entitlement, which covered his start-up. His business is strong and now he employs people and puts money back into the community!

The problem is that social assistance has been part of the destruction of our traditional ways of community life, especially survival activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering. It has simply become easier to get your cheque and buy your food. So we need room to innovate and foster a return to more traditional values and sense of community. Traditional activities that support the community should be encouraged and can be 'rewarded' by social assistance. It's not work for welfare [in the non-Native sense] but a method of supporting our community life or work in our traditional sense: the two are one and the same. In this way, a fellow who goes out and shoots moose for the community should be acknowledged for his contribution. Social assistance could play a role in that by building in a system of incentives in support of traditional ways. There will always be some need for social assistance, but we want our people to feel that they can and do work. The problem is in shifting the balance away from the near total dependence. So perhaps by making SA part of the activity of the community itself, part of the reward system, that would help.

Comments on WOP:

The program categories that are targeted—employable, unemployable, and handicapped—are not useful in terms of how we would utilize WOP. We think everyone in the community ought to be able to work and to offer something to their community. [This is not to be seen as pejorative in the non-Native sense; rather it is an expression of the intrinsic value of each member of the community and her/his capacity to contribute to the community in whatever way he/she is able.] WOP has been good in allowing bands to develop a variety of projects. But our experience is that the bands would like to target the program at different groups, especially at youth (i.e., dependent minors) to give them training and work experience; at women for job re-entry training; and at elders to support their organized activities.

[Present B.C. Region guidelines would not appear to permit dependent youth within an SA family unit to participate in WOP. Nor would WOP be able to be used for elders age 65 and over who would be in receipt of the Old Age Pension. WOP may not be used as an amount to support activities per se, but must be linked to an individual's entitlement and tied into a wage. Similarly, it may not be used to purchase space in training and education programs. However, under the ICHRS program, the WOP authority does permit transfer of SA funds for training purposes where a wage is part of training. However, social assistance may not be used to fund or purchase training. The point being made in this part of the interview is that funds from other sources are never sufficient to meet the demand (funds from ICHRS or CEIC) and that social assistance is one potential source to fund needed training.]

Related to this point is that other INAC programs like Economic Development and Education should have more flexibility to permit funds to be combined with WOP. This would really broaden the possibilities for SA to be used in combination with other programs.

We know of some bands that do 'stretch' the WOP guidelines. A good example is where one spouse in a two-parent family unit is participating in a WOP project. In the meantime, her/his spouse gets a job. So really the family may no longer be eligible for SA. But the band keeps the spouse in the WOP project anyway. It makes more sense to allow that person to continue to benefit from the experience.

Within this Tribal Council it has usually been the band managers that take the initiative in planning WOP projects. The most successful projects, though, are those where both chief and council and the band social worker are fully involved in their planning and remain supportive throughout.

2. *Osoyoos*

Demographic Data

- *On-Reserve Population* (status only, as of 31 December 1988: 204)
- *Band Estimate Including Non-Native:* 270 - 300
- *Social Assistance*

Basic Needs Caseload	July 1989	March 1989
Unemployable		
Families	12	6
Number of persons	35	17
Singles	10	9
Employable		
Families	6	3
Number of persons	16	8
Singles	3	12
Work Opportunity Projects		
Families	18 (June)	28
Number of persons	67	95
Singles	4 (June)	13
Number of SA cases	53 (approx)	71
Number of case-months(year to date)	224	909
Average cases/month (year to date)	56	76
Ratio Employable:Unemployable	58:42	79:21
Number of Work Opportunity Projects	N/A	6
WOP cases as percentage of caseload	49.5	57.7
SA $ transferred for WOP		

a) $ year to date	66,700	303,200
b) % of basic needs	55.7	71.1
Unemployment Rate (CEIC Zone 930)	12.5	10.7
Average SA Dependency Rate	60.4	83.8

Location and Economic Situation

The Osoyoos Indian Band reserve borders upon the eastern boundary of the town of Oliver, in British Columbia's Okanagan Valley. Penticton is about 35 kilometres to the north on Highway 97. Vancouver is 375 kilometres to the north and west by road. The international border with the United States is about 25 kilometres to the south. The reserve, which stretches further east into the surrounding mountains, is approximately 33,000 acres. Some of the lands have been leased for commercial and recreational purposes to private interests in Oliver. The band receives annual revenues from these leases, but most are not due to be renegotiated for some time. The immediate countryside is semi-arid and is characterized by scrub growth and grasses. Further east and with increased altitude the mountains become more forested.

The local economy is rooted in agriculture, especially fruit and vegetable farming. Tourism is also a major source of income. There is some forestry-related industry, and more recently, wine making has played an important role. The Free Trade Agreement with the United States has had, however, a major impact on both the wine making and fruit growing sectors. It is common to see large vineyards and orchards for sale; some have already been abandoned. Before the agreement, Canadian wine producers had to purchase their grapes from Canadian growers. Now, local farmers and distributors are unable to compete with their much larger American counterparts.

The band describes its relationship with Oliver as mixed: business relationships are good, but social relations could be better. There is still a fair degree of discrimination based on negative attitudes towards Native people. There is a good relationship with the local school district, which offers elementary schooling geared to Native children in which Native parents and leaders take an active and guiding role. It is thought that this program will help attempts to revive the Native language and culture of the area.

Changes in the community are relatively recent. One councillor, remembering her early childhood, recalled a largely self-sufficient community. The band had community gardens, cows, horses, chickens, ducks, and turkeys. There was still extensive hunting and trapping. The band traded with the white community for what it needed, or it sold furs. This life changed quickly and dramatically in the mid-1950s, when most of the children were removed and sent to residential schools. Community and family lives were completely disrupted, indeed destroyed. The councillor impressed on the researcher the energy, resolve, and learning it has taken to begin to rebuild a sense of the community, to heal broken spirits, and to develop family life again.

Interview Results

The interview results reported here are a compendium of discussions held throughout a day-long visit with the Osoyoos Band. The researcher met with the chief and members of the band council, the band social worker, the manager of the band's vineyard, the band's education co-ordinator, a WOP participant, and the band's drug and alcohol co-ordinator. The band uses WOP extensively: its proportionate transfer of SA (over 70 per cent in 1988-89) is well in excess of the comparable B.C. regional average (7.36 per cent). At the time of this study (1989) the band was in a disagreement with the department over the guidelines governing the WOP program. Most of the field research discussions dwelt on the band's difficulties with the Department's WOP guidelines and its perception that their enforcement by the department was going to destroy the band's attempts to gain some measure of independence and self-sufficiency. The band members' comments are therefore grouped under two headings: the band's reasons for using WOP, and the effects of departmental guidelines.

Reasons for using WOP:

Before we started using WOP there were a lot of problems in this community. There was no work and nearly everyone was on SA. All people did was pick up their cheque and go home. That's when problems started. If everyone's on SA the community starts to deteriorate; somehow it's very destructive of community life. When everyone's on SA, problems like alcoholism seem to snowball; it's just not very good for people. As well, the amounts that are granted are not very much. The rate for an 'employable' person is barely enough to live on. Maybe it serves as a deterrence, but still $193.00 a month for a single person is too low.

One councillor summed up the dilemma of social assistance in the community:

> "I don't feel that social assistance is very good for people. Social assistance just keeps people at home: it's very degrading. I've had to come in and apply for SA and I felt pretty low. But this is *home*, and I am not going to leave here for the sake of work. Why should I? I love this community; this is where I belong. *We should be able to have work here, on the reserve.*"

> So, we use social assistance a lot for Work Opportunity. It helps us to make economic conditions here a little better. It allows us to employ people we may not have been able to employ otherwise. It helps us to build a work force and a more cohesive community. Work Opportunity keeps us working: it's not much of a living, but it is better than not working. We feel that it helps us to cut down on alcoholism by getting people to work, to feel useful to the community. People on WOP don't think of themselves as being on social assistance. They think it's a job that the band has been able to provide, and that's really important. And what's really important, kids are able to say, "My mum works here," "My dad works there." So, the INAC guidelines are going to force us to cut back on this. We're gradually having to end the projects.

Effect of departmental guidelines:

At one time we had 7 WOP projects. These were:

1.	Inkameep Vineyards	20-25 full-time employees, March to October
2.	Inkameep Campsite	5-7 full-time employees, May to September
3.	Inkameep Preschool	4 full-time employees, September to June
4.	Forestry Project	10 full-time employees
5.	Chianut Farm	5 full-time employees
6.	Village Maintenance	2 full-time employees and 4 seasonal employees
7.	Carpentry and Construction Training	5 full-time employees

[In addition to the SA transfer, wages for both the vineyard and the campsite come from the two projects' revenues. For the remaining projects the band supplements the SA component from its own revenues, derived mainly from the land leases. These revenues cannot be increased because the leases are long-term. Three projects either terminated or about to be: the forestry project, the farm, and village maintenance. The others will—according to the band—suffer a similar fate. Two specific conditions of the B.C. guidelines are at the root of the problem.]

These had all been ongoing jobs, but the new WOP guidelines have restricted our use of WOP: any revenue we get from the projects we have to put back into the wages. We've told the Department this is not always possible. [The *Policy and Procedures Manual* which states "Project revenue must be applied first against social assistance transfer for wages/salaries and then against project overhead."[31]] Also, the guidelines don't allow us to plan ahead. We can't have any more continuity because WOP can only be used by each participant for 12 months.[32]

A good example is the vineyard. We have been able to use the vineyard as an entry point for low-skilled work. Through the training at the vineyard, people have been able to progress, to develop and upgrade their skills. Now, it is not necessary to the business itself—in fact, vineyard work is skilled and exacting—but, because it is a band business we have felt it is important to the future of the band and its members to use the vineyard as a place where our people can get training. In this way we can bring people along to take the more skilled positions and not have to contract out to off-reserve persons. But both the 12-month guideline and the requirement to apply any revenue against the SA transfer are hurting us and are not realistic.

It seems just when the projects are starting to succeed we're cut back. Sometimes we think the Department doesn't want us to succeed. We need to be able to use SA to support employment and use the revenues to put back into the businesses to steady them. The businesses are not strong enough to support themselves yet, so we must be able to reinvest the revenues in the business operations. If we can't continue to use WOP like we used to, then the projects will suffer. The vineyard will have to cut back. It will have to contract out so that only skilled persons will get work, and we won't be able to provide any semi-skilled, beginning opportunities.

We could 'fake' compliance with the guidelines; someone suggested we could change the names of the participants but the actual participants would remain the same. So, we could make it look as though we were turning people over as required when really we were not. But we won't do that; we won't work outside the guidelines. We can't bring ourselves to do that.

Our general revenues come from our leases, and we use those revenues to support the WOP wages. We don't use any other sources like CEIC. Our revenues, then, are always low. The farm takes a lot of our revenue to operate. We have a small beef herd and we grow alfalfa. The overhead on the farm is a lot, so we're not sure that any changes to WOP would help . . . but they wouldn't hurt! Nevertheless, we probably will have to wind down the farm operation.

Another problem with WOP [in the view of the chief] is that there are not enough funds in other INAC programs—especially in Education and Economic Development—to support and follow up WOP initiatives. We're told to have an economic development strategy, but then there aren't sufficient education and training dollars to support it. We've been told that our strategy depends too much on SA dollars. Well, this is true, but SA is the biggest, most reliable source of funds. [The chief also commented on a difference between the provincial and INAC social assistance programs.] I have my own business. WOP guidelines don't allow the transfer of SA funds for me to hire someone on SA from the reserve. But I was able to hire someone on provincial SA under a similar program.[33]

[The chief was referring to the fact that, as a private entrepreneur, he was apparently excluded under the Work Opportunity Program as an eligible employer. Actually, similar but *limited* funds were available from INAC in 1988-89 under the Socio-Economic Program Initiative. Given the limited nature of the funds, very few bands were able to participate in this program. It is not known whether INAC intends to mount another initiative in the future.]

We know that there are funding possibilities under the ICHRS program, but it is also underfunded. There is only so much money available for all the bands, so we might get it one year for one project and then it will be someone else's turn. Well, we can't plan like that—not for ongoing projects.

[Finally, the band expressed reluctance to become involved in the Alternative Funding Arrangements Program, which could—over a term of up to five years—allow the band to manage its funds more flexibly.] We would prefer to find ways to be completely free of departmental funds. [The band sees it future in the success of the vineyard, the campsite, the farm, and other ventures. It is asking for more flexibility in WOP/SA transfer over the short term to allow it to achieve greater independence in the long term.]

3. *Penticton*

Demographic Data

- *On-Reserve Population* (status only; estimate : 560)
  Band estimate, including Non-Native: 650
- *Social Assistance*

Basic Needs Caseload	August 1989	March 1989
Unemployable		
Families	6	7
Number of persons	20	21
Singles	8	9
Employable		
Families	35	24
Number of persons	128	87
Singles	29	37
Work Opportunity Projects		
Families	11	12
Number of persons	37	39
Singles	6	5
Number of SA cases	95	94
Number of case-months (year to date)	488	1213
Average cases/month (year to date)	98	101
Ratio Employable:Unemployable	85:15	83:17
Number of Work Opportunity Projects	5	5
WOP cases as percentage of caseload	17.9	18.0
SA $ transferred for WOP		
a) $ year to date	55,600	184,300
b) % of basic needs	25.4	31.3
Unemployment Rate (CEIC Zone 930)	12.5	10.7
Average SA Dependency Rate	33.5	30.5

Location and Economic Situation

The main community of the Penticton Indian Band borders upon the southwest boundaries of the City of Penticton along the mesa land of the Okanagan ranges. There is both a lower and upper community. The geography and the regional economy are similar to those of Osoyoos.

Interview Results

Unlike the other three bands in the field study, the Penticton Band has a non-Native as well as a Native social worker. The researcher was not able to visit the band. A meeting was arranged with the non-Native social worker, however, with the approval of the band

manager. The comments which follow have been reviewed and endorsed by the band manager on behalf of the band.

The focus of the meeting was the band's use of Work Opportunity in relation to Social Assistance. Both social workers have begun to place a strong emphasis on developmental aspects of the social assistance program. Of particular concern to them has been the high SA take-up rate among youth turning 19 years of age. "So long as this continues to happen as a rule," said one social worker, "then those involved in Social Development programs are a part of the problem, whereas they should be a part of the solution." The comments are grouped under three headings: general comments on the effect of social assistance on the community; how the community uses WOP; and alternatives for the future.

General comments:

Many of the elders would say "welfare is destroying us." They subscribe to the values of independence, interdependence, and personal and community responsibilities. They see the young people of the community as not doing anything. Many drop out before they complete high school. This affects the community. Elders see the community as having lost a sense of its own survival: of the work that makes the community work. They believe that young people have too much time on their hands and that this contributes to alcoholism and trouble with the law.

On the other hand, the young people of the reserve have been exposed mainly to a life of dependence on government programs. There is, as well, the current context of unresolved but active negotiations for aboriginal rights and land claims in which young people are involved and interested. In that context some young people have expectations that the band provide its members with employment, and failing this, provide them with financial assistance.

There is very little employment on the reserve. The band does have a silviculture project which employs a few but that's about it. Some people work off-reserve. The rest are unemployed. Our approach in the social assistance program has been to challenge first-time applicants more—especially youth—to find other ways of supporting themselves before they rely upon assistance. As well, and in support of this, we are trying to develop different WOP projects and better links to the Penticton community.

Social assistance and WOP:

The band uses WOP with two ideas in mind: one, provide interesting work experiences that develop transferable skills; two, use WOP in such a way that it serves to develop individual and community confidence and thus begins to re-establish traditional community support structures.

For example, we have a program of extended care for the elderly and infirm. This project has three components which occur in two phases: service to the elderly and infirm, employment, and training.

The first phase combines short-term employment with a service to the community. At any one time, 8 to 14 SA recipients are selected to provide in-home care to the same number of elderly and infirm individuals on the reserve. Over a 12-month period about 30 SA recipients go through the program. They are supervised by a licensed practical nurse also on WOP. Everyone who participates in this short-term 'employment' phase becomes part of a pool from which 18 are selected for formal training at Okanagan College. The band defrays all the administrative and non-salary costs from its own sources, and SA makes up the other part of the wage component. As well, some funds from the Adult In-Home Care program are used to supplement the SA transfer. Its attractiveness during this phase is that it provides a positive activity with some additional financial reward it can lead to further training, and the community receives a service.

The second phase encompasses the training component. This component is funded by CEIC together with the SA transfer. The Long-Term Care Aide/Homemaker course is an accredited program of Okanagan College, and the graduates are certified under provincial standards. In agreeing to provide this program for us, the college will hire a part-time Native instructor in addition to the regular full-time instructor. This position will also be funded by CEIC. Graduates of the program will be able to compete for positions in the extended care wards of hospitals and in other extended and intermediate care facilities.

A number of the persons already selected for the training phase have not been to a formal educational institution for 25 years or more. Some have had to do up-grading to grade 10 to meet the basic entry requirements. So, when they graduate as a group (in about 4 months) it will create a significant impact in the community. This kind of result can become contagious. Native communities are physically more closed [isolated] compared to other Canadian communities. So, as the community develops it enhances the development of its individual members and vice versa. Success breeds success. That's why this project is positive. It's important that social development programs be successful so that staff and users of the services experience success and have a positive attitude, rather than the negative image conveyed by traditional welfare programs.

We also have an employment liaison project, which had its origin in an examination of the band's economic relationship with Penticton. It became evident that the band spent a great deal of money in Penticton but very few band members actually participated in the local economy as workers or as business owners. So the idea was to raise the band's profile in the Penticton community.

The project uses social assistance funds in combination with funds from the band's Band Support and Capital Management budget, and its own revenues. The focus of the project is to place first-time job seekers, long-term unemployed, and the under-employed into appropriate training, combined training and employment, or straight employment. Initial targeting has been at young employables, although in time it will include anyone. Liaison and networking has been with CEIC, Okanagan College, and prospective

employers in the public and private sectors. The concept is not new. It is a function provided primarily by CEIC. However, since the standard agencies are not seen as effective, this project performs a valuable role. In the short time that the project has been operational the results are already encouraging.

The project is developmental in its approach. The liaison worker—who in this case is the chief of the band—establishes links with appropriate agencies. The goal is to create simple referral and appointment-setting mechanisms. This is done to minimize unnecessary waiting in lines and to minimize factors such as fear, anxiety, intimidation, frustration, and anger when encountering bureaucracies and unknown situations. The idea is to create easier access to more opportunities for more people. Special consideration or guaranteed training and job placement are not expectations of the project.

Interested participants are pre-screened, provided some orientation, and generally prepared in how to face bureaucracies and potential employers. Assistance is provided in interview preparation, resume development, and basic job-readiness. So far, in the first three months, at least seven people have been placed in either training or employment who otherwise might still be on social assistance. The project has also identified an additional 25 interested persons who will provide the nucleus for further work.

Alternatives for the future:

Social assistance itself is not all negative; in fact, even with its limitations, it is necessary. What's critical is the historically singular use of these funds. Government intervention and control of almost every facet of Native life denies Native people more freedom to determine their own destinies. Corporations—often aided by government—get access to natural resources in native territories with little return to native communities. Native people are left with social assistance. This unique social, economic, and political situation results in frustration and anger in Native communities.

The question is, can present government-controlled social assistance and development programs really improve Native communities; or is it time to let the communities try to develop their own programs? Perhaps it's time to let bands experiment with different approaches to work creation, work placement, and training separately or concurrently with work experiences.

The WOP guidelines pose a bit of a problem. The 12-month restriction on each participant doesn't make sense. For example, in the employment liaison project it just wouldn't work to have a different person as the liaison officer every year. It requires someone to be there for at least five years.

There are disincentives for the band in using WOP. The band contributes a fair amount of its own funds into the program. So naturally it says, "What do we get back?" There should be more of an incentive for the band or any band to participate. If the system allowed the community to retain all or a portion of the social assistance savings accrued by way of innovative programs, then these savings could be recycled into the

community to develop it further.[34] Once this concept is accepted, the details of the amount of dollars retained over a specified time period can be negotiated.

We think that the two projects I've described are the kinds of initiatives which should be acknowledged and rewarded under some incentive plan. This in turn will allow the Social Development Program to gain a positive image in the community which in turn can enhance more meaningful developments. It's time to change. It's time to try different approaches. It's time to let the community try.

4. *Stoney Creek*

Demographic Data

- *On-Reserve Population* (status only, as of 31 December 1988: 385)
- *Social Assistance*

Basic Needs Caseload	August 1989	March 1989
Unemployable		
Families	7	8
Number of persons	24	23
Singles	13	16
Employable		
Families	33	26
Number of persons	98	80
Singles	57	65
Work Opportunity Projects		
Families	4	5
Number of persons	15	16
Singles	17	3
Number of SA cases	131	123
Number of case-months (year to date)	590	1426
Average cases/month (year to date)	118	119
Ratio Employable:Unemployable	85:15	80:20
Number of Work Opportunity Projects	5	2
WOP cases as percentage of caseload	16.0	6.5
SA $ transferred for WOP		
a) $ year to date	8,700	18,600
b) % of basic needs	3.4	3.4
Unemployment Rate (CEIC Zone 970)	10.6	11.0
Average SA Dependency Rate	54.0	51.3

Location and Economic Situation

The community of Stoney Creek—or Sai-Kus—is located in beautiful semi-deciduous farm and ranch land about 12 kilometres south and partly west of Vanderhoof, B.C. Prince George, the main regional centre, is 97 kilometres east of Vanderhoof. The principal economic activities are logging and milling; there is also some ranching, farming, and tourism.

The band is of the Carrier nation and is a member of the Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council. This is a proud band that has felt the loss of traditional ways deeply. It has witnessed the erosion of its own ways of survival, its displacement by a mechanized economy, and the destruction of community life by social assistance and subsistence living. The band has also survived the effects of a once strongly prejudiced and discriminatory white community.

There is no work on the reserve except what government programs provide. There is little or no work in Vanderhoof. A small mill on reserve land west of town recently closed. The reserve has no substantial economic base. Those band members who develop good skills usually leave. Four families had moved to Oliver where they worked in the Okanagan Valley. Those who leave rarely come back to live.

Interview Results

Interview Number 1:
Band Social Worker, Stoney Creek

[The band's social worker commented on the effects of SA on community life and on the employment opportunities available to band members.]

Effects of social assistance on community:

When I was a kid I was never aware of welfare. We never relied on it. Well, it simply wasn't there. But we never starved. I was raised to survive on nature. The band moved with the seasons. We had a fishing camp. We caught fish and duck, moose, beaver, muskrat, and rabbit. Nearly all our foods were smoked, salted and dried for winter. We trapped for furs which we could sell or use ourselves. We also sold beadwork.

My family travelled to wherever there was work. Mum worked in the canneries and in meat packing. Dad—even though he had TB—worked the bush. So I worked really hard at physical work when I was young. We never just depended on our parents. I was brought up to look ahead; to manage my life by what potlatch teaches: respect, discipline, pride and humility. When you receive something you always give something in return. So I never remember anyone with their hand out.

Social assistance has taken away a lot from our people. It has taken away our self-reliance, our sense of community reliance. It's all lost to us now. It has destroyed us.

Things are done for people now. They've got used to a system where they come in and ask for everything. Even our old people are seen as 'unemployable'; there's nothing for them to do but wait for their pensions. My clients are bored. They don't know how to take responsibility. In particular our youngsters have lost that sense of community and family, of mutual responsibility and sharing. But even if we wanted to return to traditional ways it would be impossible. The trap lines are all logged out, and government hunting and fishing regulations are just too restrictive.

Employment and WOP:

There is not a lot of local employment, and what there is is seasonal. Things like forest fire fighting in July and August, tree planting and spacing, corn picking, and some highway crew work: that's about it. Some of the guys go in the hole with tree planting: they have to buy the right clothing and gear but they can't work fast enough to come out on top. A lot of people go down to the Okanagan in the summer to pick fruit. The mill that was on band land on the west side of town used to employ a couple of Native guys but it's closed now.

[Although relations with the white community were described as better, the following story of recent employment discrimination was told.]

In late August many of the young men on SA were offered contract work off reserve at Windy Point to do slashing and burning, planting and spacing. Two crews were to be hired. The first crew signed on at $250 per acre per man. The social worker issued 'special needs' money for work clothing. Some of the guys had their own saws. When pay day came all their meals, gas, and saw rentals were deducted from their cheques, leaving them with hardly anything. Knowing this, the second crew signed on at $12.50 an hour. But they didn't do any better. There wasn't even any recognition from the contractor for the men who brought their own saws. The non-Native crew members had meals and everything built into their contracts: they did a lot better.

[The social worker said that this was not an uncommon problem with off-reserve employment.] At least with SA transfer the band can ensure fair treatment. The trouble is SA transfer is so unpredictable for other sources of funds. In July we had six projects going.

The Sai-Kus Park project employs three persons. This is a tourism project. We're building 10 cabins, an RV site, a picnic ground, a golf course, a potlatch building, and a restaurant. When it's finished it will employ 50 persons. It's underfunded right now. SA has put in $5,000 and INAC another $1,000. It needs a lot more money.

Our sheet metal project employs 8 to 10 persons. Basically it's for trap making. CEIC put $33,000 into it and SA the rest.

The landscaping project is over now, but it did employ six workers.

A renovations project employed two persons for home maintenance and renovation. It was funded partly by RRAP [Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program] and by SA. The RRAP resources are spent, so the project is now over.

The other two projects involve construction of new housing, employing six persons, and a night watchman.

Most of our young guys want the band to be able to provide employment. So we use WOP a lot. The band tries to provide for itself wherever possible. In our SA program our 19 to 30-year-olds, our single employables are by far the largest part of the caseload. This means we need a lot more work on the reserve. But it is hard to keep them on the job. There's too much alcohol and it affects work routines. I try to help with counselling [there is also a band drug and alcohol counsellor] but sometimes I don't think I help at all.

I want to see WOP continue, but funding sources need to be more reliable and timely. Sometimes we wait half the summer for the funds for a project that's supposed to be for the whole summer. We also need our own people on reserve to provide basic services to our people. Things like electrical, plumbing, mechanical, and pipe laying jobs should be done by us. Those who leave the reserve to work down south usually leave for a long time. So we need to find ways to keep skilled people on the reserve. There are good carvers and carpenters here. We should be able to use SA to develop good businesses using them. They could do work for the band and off reserve. I think there's value in projects that bring the elders and the young people together. We need *ongoing projects* like that. We had a project like that about three years ago. It mixed the elders with the youth. They went camping, they learned how to can and dry fish, how to pick and preserve berries . . . it was great.

Interview Number 2:
Band Manager, Stoney Creek

Social assistance and WOP:

There is about 90 to 95 per cent unemployment on this reserve. The band is the main employer through its use of WOP. On the outside, two of three saw mills have shut down. We currently have a wood processing plant proposal under discussion with CEIC (Native Employment Development Program), but it has taken us six or seven years to advance it to this stage. We are also planning a tourist park on the lake edge and a trap manufacturing facility. Most of the WOP, though, is short-term and is related to carpentry.

While most people are happy for the chance to work, the SA clients are very dependent. The trouble is social assistance is a no-choice option. It is a poor system that is too inflexible, and the WOP guidelines are a good example of that. Most of our projects just end up being minor and short-term. I would like to see more funds used for jobs to encourage cultural development such as quilt and basket-making, a dance group and so on. We also need to focus on our singles for employment and to support the activities of our elders' society.

Interview Number 3:
An Elder, Stoney Creek

[The elders play an important and influential role not only in Stoney Creek but among the member bands of the tribal council. The elder interviewed here is active in the economic development of the Stoney Creek band and in an elders' economic advisory committee to the tribal council.]

General comments:

Well, we didn't choose Canada and we didn't choose to be Canadian. This country is our country. They [the white people] have all the resources and we have nothing. We haven't got a chance. We are governed by the *Indian Act*: our independence has been taken from us. And now with free trade . . . well, it will ruin us. You see we are up against so much. The band has nothing; nothing to invest.

When I was younger I was able to support my family from the land. I made money hunting, fishing, and trapping. But not long ago when I went back to the lands I used to hunt I was told I was trespassing! And just this summer, they took away my fish. The rules and regulations have destroyed us. At one time we used to farm but the land was taken from us. So there was a time up until the '50s that we survived. We even used to make ties and props for U.S. vineyards. [A logging truck rolled by.] But then the big machinery came and it displaced us. The logging trucks destroyed our trap lines. After machinery came welfare.

Well, welfare is not enough. Social assistance is so unfair to us. Anyway, the rates are too low. So not only is welfare bad for us, but the rates are bad!

Combining old and new ways:

We started living the white man's way but maybe we went too far. We need to meet half-way and rediscover some of our old ways. But there is also no going back.

Well, we are looking for things to do for our people. We have three main projects going or planned right now. There's Sai-Kus Park, the trap making plant, and the wood processing plant. We've finished the potlatch building for the park. It will have a golf course and a restaurant too. The park will employ 50 when it's finished. The trap manufacturing plant is going now. It employs 10. The wood processing plant would be in town but the plans aren't approved yet. It will employ 60 persons, 30 per shift.

Right now funding is the real issue, and the approval of our plans. The government keeps saying to us, "Just make a blueprint and the money will be there." So why are our plans always sabotaged? We have our blueprint; where is the money? We have an idea for a craft shop too. We would sell knitting, sewing, beadwork, carving. But we need money to help us.

Why don't we just use SA for employment? It makes more sense to take welfare, build in a bit more money, and create jobs. *What is the government afraid of to give us the wherewithal to be independent?* The social assistance dollars should be shared. That is our way. Suppose my family won the lottery: the money would be shared; it would be community money. So it is the same for social assistance.

The social assistance could be put into a project—like a craft shop—that would benefit the whole community. If we could pool the social assistance and develop projects then everyone would get their fair share. That is our way. Our people don't want a lot of money, but they do want happiness and independence.

Part III. Dominant Themes and Issues

The interview results presented in the previous section are in themselves powerful and clear. It is helpful, however, to identify some of the themes and issues that emerge from the field study. What struck the researchers were the common themes and issues underlying the responses from all the bands.

1. Managing Indians under the Guise of Indian Self-Management

The design of employment creation programs is alien to Indian communities, since it is the product of policies conceived outside their communities. While most of the programs are designed ostensibly to be responsive to the identified needs of the communities, they are nevertheless the result of top-down thinking. Implied in the design of the programs is that Indian communities have needs and that these needs must be translated into a community plan.

This does not mean that Indian communities do not have needs, but the design of the programs (and, most particularly, the Work Opportunity Program) imposes preconceived notions about how those needs are to be identified and met. What the communities said clearly in the field study was, "Allow us to design the programs. Allow us to determine the framework."

Paralleling this theme is the assertion that Indian people know their communities best. They have practical ideas about how to improve their communities, and they want the opportunities and funds sufficient to design and implement programs rooted in their own social organization and culture. It is only such programs that have a chance of continuing success in their communities. Related to this is the perception that the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs operates from an implicit assumption that Indian communities are in need of development; that they cannot manage on their own. But what does this mean? How is it that Indian communities fall short? What is the

unstated standard by which 'development' is measured? As the elder from Stoney Creek stated, "We are people capable of looking after ourselves."

2. *The Work Opportunity Program Policy and Guidelines*

The bands expressed considerable difficulty in accepting the policy and procedures governing the Work Opportunity Program. Fundamental to their rejection of the guidelines is a perception that the guidelines militate against the successful creation of employment, enterprise, and a sound community infrastructure.

Indian communities are *determined* to achieve a level of economic self-sufficiency and independence that will *ensure* their cultural and political survival. A key issue is to stop the process of economic bleeding; that is, they want to stop the drain of dollars from their communities into the dominant and local economies. To do this they want to use government funds as a means of marshalling other resources for projects and services that reflect community-determined priorities and serve self-identified community needs. In this sense, there is a clear shift away from viewing social assistance and social development programs as passive, perpetual measures of support and towards making them part of active solutions to self-defined problems. If this means redirecting social assistance funds into projects that develop and help sustain an economic base, then they are prepared to do this.

The Work Opportunity Program—despite its identified flaws—has become an obvious and natural conduit to support economic development using social assistance funds. One reason for this, as identified by the communities, is the lack of consistent and sufficient funding from government sources in other areas: education, training, and economic development. When seen in this context, the Work Opportunity Program has become integral to the economic planning of Indian communities, but its project-specific nature has become irrelevant. Moreover, the program guidelines are seen to be anachronistic, inflexible, destructive of incentive, and paternalistic.

Three aspects of the guidelines constitute particular obstacles to community progress and success:

1. The requirement that participation turn over at least once in every 12 months. The bands argue convincingly that projects that require skill and stability will seldom achieve them with such a provision. In addition, program participants tend to develop a sense that they are not on social assistance. Removing them from a project because their time is up reintroduces a sense of dependence if they go back to receiving SA. If they are lost to the community because they find similar off-reserve work, the project has simply been a cheap training ground for a non-Native business. Of course, this is always a risk even if a Native enterprise is completely self-sustaining. But the requirement seems to exacerbate the risk.

2. The requirement that any revenue produced by a project be applied first against the use of social assistance transfer is simply not realistic from a business perspective if projects are to develop into sustainable economic activities. For example, if this requirement is applied to the Inkameep Vineyard, the inability to reinvest its still limited revenues to maintain and improve the business will ultimately cause the business to fail. This requirement—in the view of Indian people—is a clear example of how the government does not wish Indian communities to succeed.

3. A continuing problem with social assistance transfer projects is the acquisition and continuation of core and supplemental funding for both wages and operating expenses. Government core funding is never guaranteed beyond one fiscal year. This means that projects most of which must conform to a longer-term community plan—*cannot be assured of operation even in the short term*. The instability of this kind of funding pattern induces feelings of fragility and uncertainty in the ability to create and maintain employment on reserves. Further, it is seen as an impediment to developing a sense of success in Indian communities, since piecemeal funding limits possibilities and continuity.

Work Opportunity and like programs are seen as an immediately available method of ameliorating, however temporarily, a bleak world of social assistance. It is a preferred method; but it is there and it is usable. It is at least one method of rekindling a sense of community and purpose, of people working together towards common goals. And it does serve to develop a pool of skills. As well, where it is used extensively in the community, as in the case of Osoyoos, a positive sense of independence develops in the community as a whole: people are seen to be working, and children develop an image of an active and involved adult population.

But these positive effects are offset significantly by at least three factors:

1. the restrictiveness and inflexibility of the guidelines, which hinder and frustrate the efforts of all the bands and—in the case of the Osoyoos Band—threaten to destroy all its projects;

2. the lack of funds from other programs to support WOP projects, undermining their ultimate viability; and

3. the requirement to have an economic development strategy in place, given that strategies are invariably judged good enough to be funded *or*, if they are satisfactory, there never is enough money to fund them.

3. *Access to Off-Reserve Employment*

Indian people from the communities we studied have been able to find off-reserve employment with varying degrees of success. Inadequate education and training have

affected the ability of many to get work. But other factors also play a significant role in the Indian view of off-reserve employment.

The changing political climate in Indian communities affects how band members perceive off-reserve employment. A critical factor in the opinion and experiences of the bands interviewed has been discrimination, on the part of not only potential employers but also the entire community. Discrimination, then, has contributed significantly to restricting off-reserve employment opportunities. But today, in a period of Indian cultural and political assertion, band members do not want to leave the reserve. The bands interviewed reveal a determination to provide for their own people; they also reflect a change in attitudes and expectations among Indian youth that the reserve could and should be a source of employment and economic sustenance.

But if off-reserve employment is sought, certain obstacles—including discrimination—are not easily overcome. The northern reserves visited for the field study are typical of the relative geographic isolation of Native from non-Native communities. Indeed, those visited are relatively close to major communities by northern standards. Still, the absence of public transportation makes looking for work a major undertaking, and if work is found, the difficulties of commuting or finding rental accommodation may soon make holding the job an impossibility.

4. *Social Assistance, the Community, and the Idea of Work*

One of the most striking observations of the field research is that the concept of social assistance on the reserves is considerably different from what is commonly understood in the general population. The pejorative phrases used are much the same—'dependency', 'lack of initiative', 'easier than working'—but in a subtle and profound sense the meanings are different. In Indian communities there is a concept of the individual as one with the community, as indivisible from the community. Non-Indian communities often attach a stigma to receiving social assistance, thus setting the individual apart *from* the community. In Indian communities, however, an individual receiving social assistance is *part* of the situation in which the *entire* community finds itself. Indian individuals do not think of themselves as 'being on welfare.' Because the *individual is inseparable* from the whole community, social assistance is thought of as precisely that—'social' assistance.

The usual approach to assisting persons receiving welfare is to treat 'being on welfare' as an individual, confidential matter—a matter that the individual, together with the case worker, is expected to resolve. But in Indian communities, the field research showed that holistic community-oriented approaches are the only viable way of reducing social assistance dependence. If this is the goal of the Department's Social Assistance Program, it will not be achieved unless the Program's design and implementation are brought into step with Indian community culture. This means, in part, seeing social assistance not as an individual benefit program, but as integral to all other community endeavours.

This implies a considerably different perspective on what is meant by employment creation using social assistance funds. It means creating the conditions in which Indian communities can rekindle a sense of community independence and survival through the inter-relationships of community work. It is the loss of this sense of community survival through community participation and contribution that has been undermined by the current system of distributing social assistance. Thus, when elders talk about the loss of incentive to work, they mean the loss of the intrinsic meaning of work for the community as a whole, not the erosion of the Protestant work ethic.

In short, the basic assumptions of the social assistance program are in conflict with Indian culture and traditions. In the non-Indian culture, work and work for welfare are seen as ways of demonstrating an ability to survive on one's own, of 'earning one's keep.' In Indian communities the creation of work from social assistance funds has limited meaning when it is seen as enhancing labour market employability; it is more meaningful in Indian communities when it is seen to be contributing to a better community life. In the communities we visited, Indian people do not want a life of dependence on social assistance, and they do not see the use of social assistance to create employment as a solution to the economic problems of their communities. But in the absence of anything substantially better, the value of social assistance in work creation is not that it will reduce dependence on social assistance but that it can contribute to a feeling of community success and revival.

5. *Stretching the Rules*

During the field research interviewees shared a few examples of how band administrations had gone beyond the dictates of policy to adapt the program to community realities. The following brief section highlights these examples and a proposed innovation in the social assistance program.

Advances on Benefits

A person who applies for social assistance and is found eligible is entitled to receive assistance only on a month-to-month basis. In one instance, however, a band determined that the applicant had a viable business proposal, although he had been unable to secure a loan to invest in it. The band advanced him six months of social assistance payments (for which he had established eligibility), and he was able to capitalize his business. It is now a successful operation.

This was a case where the band wished to support a band member whom they saw as being able to contribute to the band community. But the band had no resources other than social assistance funds to extend in support. The band foresaw that the individual would be able to become independent of social assistance if he had help, so they bent the

rules. Bands would like to be able to make more flexible use of social assistance funds in a way that is conducive to community economic development.

Continuing Participation Beyond Eligibility

In a two-parent family, one spouse was unemployed while the other was participating in a WOP project supported by SA transfer. When the first spouse obtained employment, the family's income exceeded their SA entitlement, so the family was no longer eligible for SA. As a result, no further SA transfer should have been made to the WOP project. But the band wanted to keep the person in the project, since it was important that the person continue to receive training to enhance employability. To discontinue the SA transfer would have been to penalize the person unnecessarily, and removing the person would have disrupted the project. This was another instance where the guidelines were unnecessarily inflexible; had they been applied correctly, they would only have been counter-productive.

Fostering Business Growth

At least two of the bands regularly exceeded the departmental guidelines with respect to participant turnover, the application of revenue against social assistance transfer or both. This was considered necessary to ensure the survival of the businesses. The bands noted that no business operator would have done different. But the Indian situation is unique; for the most part their capital resources are meagre. Social assistance funds are one of the few reliable sources to help sustain a business and at the same time provide training and employment. Surely, the bands argued, it makes sense for the Department to support these endeavours in any way that it can, so that the infusion of funds in the short term produces self-sustaining enterprise in the long term. If a business is able to break even or return a small profit now, it is important to nurture that success, so that in the long term there will be no need for departmental funds of any kind.

SA as an Incentive

Many bands contribute funds from their own revenues to support WOP employment creation. One proposal, from the band social worker in Penticton, is to allow a band to retain over a negotiated, specified period (e.g., three to five years) the amount of social assistance saved through the creation or obtaining of employment. These amounts could then be used specifically for community development and investment. At the same time as employment is generated, the community also has an opportunity to enrich its cultural, social, and economic infrastructure. Thus, the relationship between the individual and the community—and the community and the individual—is restored and enhanced.

6. *Daycare*

A theme that emerged consistently in interviews with all four bands—although it was not included in Part II—was the absence of a comprehensive daycare policy comparable to that of the province. This is perceived to be one of the most glaring and damaging service omissions in the Department's Social Development Program. It creates a considerable hardship and disincentive for parents—especially single parents—who wish to work. Families made up an average of 47 per cent of the social assistance caseloads of the four bands in this study.

The province of British Columbia has income-tested daycare subsidies that provide up to 100 per cent of daycare costs, based on maximum levels that vary with the type of daycare. No such provision exists in the Social Development Program. The provincial subsidy is not available to Indian persons living on reserve, even if they work off reserve.

Part IV. Social Assistance in Context

> *In the last 100 years, the dominant policy has been the assimilation of aboriginal peoples across this country. However, in spite of this policy and the programs that followed from it, there remain distinct aboriginal cultures in Canada today. It is a testament to the strength and durability of Native cultures that they have managed to survive at all.... The Native peoples... do not want to be assimilated into the mainstream of society; they do want to make their own unique place within the broader society. They seek freedom from economic dependency and political isolation, not only as individuals caught in the poverty trap, but as whole communities caught in a stranglehold of paternalism and deprivation.*[35]

In this part of the paper we briefly discuss the context and history of public decision making that guided government Indian policy by the late 1950s and that led to the 1964 Treasury Board Authority governing the administration of social assistance on Indian reserves. The purpose of this section is to provide a framework for better understanding the results and themes of the preceding interviews. In any analysis of public policy it is important to understand something about the dominant culture and values within which public decision makers function. Thus, one important question to ask about the decisions that led to the 1964 authority is, "What perceptions of the Indian guided the formulation of Canadian Indian policy?"

1. *Background to the Social and Political Context*

Until the 19th century the comparisons drawn by Europeans between themselves and the non-European 'other' were expressed in terms of what the non-European lacked. The non-European lacked God, lacked knowledge, lacked civilization. It was an anthropology of contrasts contained within the same temporal space yet located geographically *beyond*

Europe.[36] But in the 19th century the European understanding of time changed dramatically: new discoveries and theories of science were located in time—evolutionary time, geological time. The work of Lyell (the geological origins and history of the earth)[37] and of Darwin (the origins of the biology of the earth) had a profound effect on the Western understanding of its own place in history. If science was able to explain the earth and its inhabitant species in terms of evolutionary time, of *before* and *after*, then it was also the case that human civilization existed in evolutionary time.

> The Other now made manifest . . . a stratification of time. The Other was no longer a representation of ignorance; [but] of historical evolution. **Beyond** Europe was henceforth **before** Europe. Nineteenth century anthropology . . . became differences residing in developmental historical time . . .[38]

The revised formulation of the non-European and what became the measurement for modernism—was that of the 'other' as pre-history, as 'primitive.' In essence, of course, 'other' was now a converse image of Western civilization. If the West looked into a mirror it could see just how far it had come, how far it had advanced: the primitive culture, the primitive civilization made sense of and provided meaning for its own.[39]

> The very identification of . . . Other as "primitive," as "primitive mentality," as "primitive culture," presupposed a theory . . . of rational progress, of progress in and by reason (Enlightenment) and/or progress in and by history (nineteenth century). The . . . conception of "primitive" presupposed . . . a conception of progress. It was not the factual "discovery" of "primitive peoples" . . . that slowly, inductively, taught the European that his condition was that of an "advanced civilization," that forced him . . . to recognize . . . that great impersonal force "progress" . . . which caused him to be where he was. Rather, it was only through this . . . construction of and commitment to the concept of "progress" and its . . . employment in discrimination . . . that "primitive peoples" came into being.[40]

To understand the perception of the 'primitive other' within the context of western progress and civilization and how that perception implicitly became the focus of Canadian government Indian policy, it is useful to explore ideological aspects of the liberal, democratic state as it emerged in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The liberal beliefs and values which gained popular ascendance in the 20th century inevitably influenced how most Canadians perceived the Indian 'other.' While the Indian continued to lack certain attributes these were no longer defined publicly in simple moral or religious terms. Rather, the public perception gradually harmonized with the secularization of the state. Indians were placed on a temporal landscape and defined in relation to progress and citizenship: the language of underdevelopment. To situate the ideas of 'progress' and 'citizenship' in Canada we must see them in the evolution and nature of liberal democracy itself.

Although we can trace the development of English liberalism from as early as the 16th century, it is the emergence of our particular form of liberal democracy by the early part of this century that is of special concern. Macpherson[41] has identified two models of liberal democracy—the second an evolution from the first—which, in our discussion, help to situate Canadian Indian policy within a particular political culture. The first model, developmental democracy, arose from the social squalor and working class alienation

engendered by English 19th-century laissez-faire capitalism. It is a model attributed largely to John Stuart Mill.

The essence of developmental democracy was to increase the stake of the working class individual in society, thus promoting a greater sense of social belonging and equality. At the heart of Mill's purpose was to eliminate or minimize class conflict by attempting to define a democratic state that would permit neither the working nor the employing classes to promote legislation that advanced the interests of one at the expense of the other. It was, first and foremost, a moral model but—in Macpherson's assessment—naive in its understanding of the necessary relationship between the classes in an economic system based on capitalist enterprise.[42] Mill became convinced that the paramountcy of democracy would dispel the inequalities produced by the exploitative economic relationship between the classes. Mill believed that the interests of both classes lay in a democratic system whose purpose was the full and equal development of the individual. This could best be achieved not by imposing enforced equality but by having "the people reach the goal themselves, improving themselves by participating actively in the political process, every instalment of participation leading to an improvement in their political capacity, as well as their all-round development, and making them capable of more participation and more self-development."[43]

Mill proposed that the working class *aspire* to the level of education and informed participation in social affairs exhibited by the elite. To effect this, the working class needed the opportunity for individual self-development, to *learn* about society and how to participate in it. This could be achieved not only through the franchise but through public education and co-operative enterprise, which could compete in the market society. Mill continued to champion market society but he assumed that equal opportunity for individual development could lead to equal participation in it. This assumption, Macpherson asserts, was necessarily erroneous because of the inherently exploitative relationship of capitalism in the market.[44]

The importance of the model as an *ideal* rather than as a paradigm of reality was in the central notion of democracy as a vehicle for individual equality and self-development. Reforms of the period, including the extension of the franchise, public health, education, and beginning attempts at the regulation and redistribution of wealth held out the idea that the democratization of the political process and limited state intervention in the market would eventually result in the maximization of individual equality.

Mill's ideal served to create an image of the benevolent state, characterized by individual political equality and a belief in the actuality of—or certainly the possibility of—classlessness. Many of Mill's ideas were never realized, yet his *vision* of developmental democracy flourished. In the meantime, the inherent contradiction between capitalism and equality was either not understood or ignored by subsequent theorists. Thus Mill's vision carried forward well into the 20th century.

> The theorists of the first half of the twentieth century increasingly lost sight of class and exploitation. They generally wrote as if democracy itself, at least a democracy that embraced the regulatory and welfare state, could do most of what needed to be done, to bring a good society.[45]

These theorists saw nothing amiss with capitalism as the means of production. What was needed, from their point of view, and what democracy and the democratic party system seemed to provide, was a pluralism of interests, a sense of fellowship and citizenship that transcended differences (inequalities) in the marketplace. What was born of this opinion was the idea that the state could impartially represent the will of the people, and that this will could be expressed in terms of individual rather than class interest. From this view of liberal democracy—the individual as the central unit of the state—emerged what is arguably at the heart of its ideology and ethos: the concepts of individual freedom and equality of citizenship. It is these concepts that gave liberal democracy its moral purpose, its self-acquired image as the harbinger of progress, civilization, and individual rights.

By identifying the failure of later theorists to come to grips with the inherent contradictions between democracy and capitalism, Macpherson stipulated the second model. Contemporary liberal democracy, he argued, is *secondarily* about individual development and equality: *primarily* it is about capitalism and the preservation of that set of class relations and the transfer of power between individuals necessary to ensure its growth and productivity.[46] Through the party system the state has managed to disperse class interests and to achieve what Macpherson refers to as "equilibrium democracy" whereby the elites of the economic order array themselves before a relatively passive electorate and allow them to choose who will rule them.

> The main stipulations of this model are, first, that democracy is simply a mechanism for choosing and authorizing governments, not a kind of society nor a set of moral ends; and second, that the mechanism consists of a competition between two or more self-chosen sets of politicians (elites), arrayed in political parties, for the votes which will entitle them to rule until the next election .... [There is] no nonsense about democracy ... for the improvement of mankind .... Democracy is simply a market mechanism: the voters are the consumers; the politicians are the entrepreneurs.[47]

But the idea that liberal democracy is moral, that it is the best of available systems, that the enlightened civilization lies in the freedom and development of the individual as championed by liberal democracy, undoubtedly continues to be the ideological principle of liberal capitalism itself. It is almost as though the liberal view of the social world is the way the world was meant to be. Arblaster observes:

> Liberalism is the dominant ideology of the West ... Liberalism in its contemporary form is not so much a set of ideas or doctrines to which people subscribe by conscious choice; it is a way of seeing the social world, and a set of assumptions about it, which are absorbed by the individual in so natural and gradual a manner that he or she is not conscious of their being assumptions at all ....
>
> They are so widely accepted that they lurk concealed and undiscussed beneath the surface of our ordinary, apparently non-ideological language.[48]

It is reasonable to assume then that Indian assimilation policy—later referred to as integration—was initiated and administered by politicians and public servants infused with the liberal perception of the social world and who, when they looked into the Indian mirror, did not really see Indian peoples but saw only the 'other' who lacked liberal consciousness and liberal values. In the 20th century, the 'other' lacked the attributes of liberalism: she/he lacked a sense of the possessive, autonomous, rational individual, free

to seek her/his welfare in the market society and to acquire and use property for her/his own self-interest and wealth. In short, the Indian was humanity in nature still to become civilized and to be imbued with progress.

Because the federal government assumed that Indians were a vanishing people whose only hope of survival lay in becoming part of Western society, it was necessary to develop policies that would facilitate their adoption of liberal values. Of special importance was to teach Indians the universal truths of human nature: that individuals are autonomous and that they are driven by their desires, which can be restrained only by their reason.[49] At first, assimilation into liberal society was instilled primarily through the church and through church-run schools. This was virtually an extension of enlightenment thought where being civilized and being Christian were synonymous. It was no accident that the church was the primary agent of government assimilation policy, since both assimilation and conversion required the complete rejection and denial of former ways.

Government policy began to change in form and appearance as the ethos of developmental democracy and the age of secular modernism infused Western culture. By the middle of the 20th century assimilation was called integration, and to be civilized was to acquire and enjoy the benefits of citizenship. The church was replaced by the secular state as the agent of assimilation. In doing so the government—as embodied in the Department of Indian Affairs—became a microcosm of the liberal state. The programs offered by the Department to assist Indians in the integration process were themselves facsimiles of social institutions: band government, economic development, education, social development, and others all reflected aspects of the larger society to which Indians would aspire and into which they would be absorbed. The programs were integral to the principles and benefits of good citizenship. They reflected liberal values and they expected liberal behaviour.[50]

Thus, through government policies, Indians were the subjects of systematically imposed liberalism. Practically, this meant the liberalism of the market society, of capitalism and of private property. Not only were Indians expected to participate in the marketplace; they and their lands had already been displaced by it. But it was the introduction of the underlying philosophy of liberalism that had the most profound impact on Indian culture. Indians were confronted by two fundamental principles of liberalism completely alien to their own world view.[51] The first of these principles was the autonomy of the individual and her/his separation from the natural world. The second, which followed from and paralleled the first, was the separation of the individual from the human or social community into the world of the possessive, atomized individual.[52] For the Indian whose traditional world view was the universal transcendent over the particular, it was now that of the particular transcendent over the universal. The infusion of liberal thought and practices, with their emphasis on individualism, self-possession and acquisition, not only contributed to the erosion of independent, communal Indian societies and their economies but induced a profound dependence of their communities on a dominant market society that viewed them as primitive at best and, at worst, as lazy, shiftless savages.

2. *The Immediate Historical Background to the 1964 Treasury Board Authority*

The report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs (1946-1948) significantly affected the direction of the Indian Affairs Branch for nearly 20 years, from 1950 until the 1969 publication of the *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy* (commonly referred to as the White Paper). The Joint Committee report sharply criticized the federal government for the "wide gap in social and economic conditions" between Indians and other Canadians and "recommended numerous legal changes to remove disadvantages of Indian status and improved services to Indian people from the federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments."[53] The report, while rejecting the policy of enforced assimilation, re-emphasized the importance of policies that would enhance Indian citizenship, participation and integration into the mainstream of Canadian society. In this context it is possible to understand the thrust of Indian social policy by the late 1950s when the Welfare Division of the Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, began to develop strategies to encourage the provinces to extend their social welfare services onto Indian reserves.

In the late 1950s, social assistance policy for Indians and non-Indians residing on Indian reserves in Canada was in a state of uncertainty. Central to the uncertainty was constitutional disagreement over which level of government was responsible for providing social services to persons registered as Indians under the *Indian Act* and to what extent Indian reserve lands—and all persons resident on them—were purely a federal responsibility. These constitutional questions even now remain unresolved. The federal government has historically taken the view that Indian persons are Canadian citizens in their own right and thus are eligible for services provided by any level of government in whose jurisdiction they may reside. Similarly, Indian reserve lands are part of the provincial territory in which they are situated and therefore, for certain purposes, are subject to prevailing provincial law and regulation.

With some exceptions—notably the province of Ontario—the provincial governments have taken an opposing view. That is, the provinces take the position that Indians and lands defined as Indian are the responsibility of the federal government. Thus responsibility for providing social services to Indians and non-Indians living on reserve lands has been seen as federal by the provinces and provincial by the federal government. Despite this unresolved jurisdictional issue, the federal government has provided social assistance to Indians on reserve—and latterly to non-Indians—without legal prejudice and largely on compassionate grounds.[54]

Prior to 1964 the Indian Affairs Branch provided social assistance only to reserve residents of registered Indian status. Treasury Board Minute No. 539372, dated 26 November 1958, permitted the Branch to provide relief social assistance and to set its own rates.[55] There were very few trained social service workers employed by the Indian Affairs Branch. Assistance was administered by departmental field staff—usually clerks—sometimes by cheque but usually by a goods and services voucher. Subject to sections of the *Indian Act*, Indian bands were expected to pay up to 100 per cent of the

costs of assistance to their members from their own revenues and, where this was either wholly or partly impossible, the Branch disbursed monies from the public purse.[56]

The province of Ontario was an important exception to this general pattern of welfare delivery on Indian reserves during the 1950s. Following the recommendations of a 1954 special Select Committee of the provincial legislature established to enquire into the civil rights and liberties of Indians in Ontario, the province entered into agreements with Canada whereby the costs of provincial and municipal social services extended to Indians on reserve were reimbursed by the federal government. This process culminated in a 1959 amendment to the Ontario General Welfare Assistance Act (GWAA) conferring municipal status on Indian bands for the purpose of administering the act on reserves. The amendment enabled the costs of assistance to be shared three ways among federal, provincial and band governments.[57] Specifically, it was this revision to the GWAA that formed the basis for future Indian Affairs social assistance policy.

Finally, it is important to comment on the non-Indian social assistance system in place in Canada by 1959. The Canadian welfare state was still in a period of tentative development. The major reforms that would provide a sense of a comprehensive social security system (the *Medical Care Act*, the Canada Assistance Plan, the *Canada Pension Plan*, the extension of the old age pension and the introduction of a guaranteed income supplement) were still six years distant. Nevertheless, welfare reform was an active concern of the federal government. In 1956, to alleviate the problems of a recession and associated high levels of unemployment, the federal government—in cooperation with the provinces—passed the *Unemployment Assistance Act*. For the first time, this act enabled provincial welfare administrations to share 50 per cent of the costs of basic relief assistance with the federal government for unemployed individuals who were not eligible for a pension, unemployment insurance, or other forms of categorical assistance. Since individual eligibility was to be based on need, with no absolute ceiling placed on the amount to be cost-shared, it was the federal hope that provincial social assistance rates would rise.[58]

In February 1959 it was also the hope of the Indian Affairs Branch that, under the terms of the *Unemployment Assistance Act*, the provinces might be "encouraged" to provide social assistance to non-Indians living on reserves.[59] There were two identified reasons for this: first, there was nothing in the act to preclude the provinces from claiming 50 per cent of the cost of assistance provided to these persons on reserve; and second, the Branch was not empowered at the time to provide assistance to persons of non-Indian status. On-reserve residents of non-Indian status were ineligible for assistance from either jurisdiction. Since the Unemployment Assistance Act contained nothing to oblige the provinces to extend their services to non-Indians living on reserves, the Branch did not immediately pursue this issue at the cabinet level.[60] The unilateral action of Ontario to extend its services gave Indian Affairs the precedent it needed to convince the government to support a policy to obtain provincial co-operation in the extension of their welfare services. This support was obtained in March 1960.[61]

But the support of the Cabinet was lukewarm and given little priority for action. Although the Welfare Division of Indian Affairs continued to articulate the policy, there was little evidence in departmental files that revealed any real interest by the provinces

in extending their services.[62] This reluctance to act on the part of both levels of government had two outcomes: the Branch had to develop a strategy by which to give the issue a higher profile; and in the meantime the Branch was left to assume increasing responsibility for providing social assistance. It was not the objective of the Branch to be involved in welfare delivery, but this task continued to rest with it by default.

The opportunity to raise the profile of the policy came during the course of another Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Affairs.[63] Although the director of the Branch, Colonel H.M. Jones, appeared before the Committee in May 1960 and stated the government's desire to enter into negotiations with the provinces,[64] he was not satisfied that the point had been made strongly enough or that the reasons had been made sufficiently clear. Thus he emphasized in a briefing note to the new deputy minister, Dr. G.F. Davidson, that the solution lay not in the expansion of Branch welfare services but in influencing the Joint Parliamentary Committee to pressure the provinces to extend their services. "I believe this matter to be a major issue in Indian Affairs administration," he wrote, "and vital to the advancement and progress of the Indians .... I consider the alternative of enacting special Federal legislation ... would be retrogressive. I feel, therefore, that this matter should be reviewed by the Joint Committee."[65] Jones advised Davidson that he favoured a federal-provincial conference as a way of dealing with the provinces: piecemeal negotiations with individual provinces would result in unwieldy and fragmentary resolutions to issues that he believed required a unitary solution. Jones proposed to Davidson that he (Jones) would appear before the Committee and make this case for the Branch.[66]

Jones appeared before the Committee again on 2 May 1961 and emphasized the Branch position:

> I think the extension of provincial services and jurisdiction must eventually come. I do not believe that Indians can be treated as people apart indefinitely. There must come a time when they are accepted fully into the larger community .... The process must be developed by stages and there is one field ... where I believe it might come first. I would suggest that this is in the field of welfare.[67]

Several days later, J.H. Gordon, Chief of the Welfare Division also presented a major brief as part of the summary position and recommendations of all the Branch divisions to the Committee. Gordon's presentation is instructive for two reasons: first, he clearly articulated the welfare policy of the Branch; second, he provided clear insights into the thinking that guided the policy and that the Branch urged the Committee to accept.

Gordon began his presentation by citing the April 1960 statement by Ellen Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) to the House of Commons; Mrs. Fairclough had announced the federal government's readiness to negotiate with the provinces to extend provincial welfare services to Indian reserves.[68] She had also said that the federal government was prepared to assist with the cost of extending services to ensure that duplicate welfare services were not created that would result in setting Indian people apart from other Canadians. "This statement," Gordon said to the Committee, "is of fundamental importance to the welfare division and I believe the principle enunciated is widely accepted. Indeed three provinces and a number of major organizations have endorsed this ... view and have urged acceleration ...".[69] Despite

this apparent progress Gordon went on to describe the difficulties encountered in attempting to negotiate with the provincial welfare departments:

> Most provincial departments face demands for existing services which limited staffs and budgets are barely able to meet. Important sectors of provincial welfare programs depend upon participation of municipal and private agencies . . . it is often difficult for reserves to fit into this pattern and, because of the varying degrees of autonomy enjoyed by non-Indian communities, the treatment accorded Indians off the reserve may vary . . . . The costs and other implications vary from province to province depending upon a . . . variety of factors including general attitudes; the ratio of Indians to the general population; and the number of Indian communities . . . in areas . . . expensive to service because of remoteness, depressed economic conditions or where . . . no provincial administrative machinery now exists. In addition, there has been . . . apprehension amongst provincial welfare staffs at the prospect of an addition to present heavy case loads of persons in the unfamiliar settings of reserves.
>
> The consequence has been that . . . a good deal of resistance has been encountered.[70]

But Gordon was adamant that the goal of the Welfare Division was to become redundant. He viewed Branch responsibility for welfare services as transitional and in place only until Indians had full access to provincial services. Consequently, he stated that "the department has endeavoured to avoid the build-up of a large specialized welfare staff and organization. Also there is no specific welfare legislation respecting Indians either in the Indian Act or by other federal statute."[71] Nor did the Branch intend that there be any.

Still, the Branch was clearly in the business of providing social assistance to Indians, and Gordon was quick to define its philosophy in doing so:

> The . . . program places much more responsibility upon the individual Indian; changes the task of the Indian superintendent from administrator to educator (nutrition proper use of the food dollar—wise purchasing, etc.) and brings the standards and procedures into line with practices in non-Indian communities.[72]

Gordon described how social assistance-related services must encourage Indians to be self-reliant and to re-enter the work force. For Gordon, the task of Indian social assistance programs entailed a higher, public purpose:

> In the field of public assistance the maintenance of the self-respect of the individual who must seek help and his initiative and will to help himself is the most difficult of all the tasks assigned the Indian Affairs branch field officer. This function is particularly difficult where Indians feel there is an inherent right to full support from the Canadian taxpayer under the treaties and where the standard of living which can be achieved through the best efforts of industrious Indians is only slightly above subsistence levels.
>
> There is no easy nor quick solution to this problem. The basic reasons for dependency must be identified and recognized by the individual and the community and joint efforts made to correct them. It is important to avoid lower standards of assistance by comparison with . . . non-Indian communities but, at the same time, not to set standards higher than the levels employed Indians can achieve through their own efforts . . . . The program must meet the needs of the temporarily unemployed factory worker and white collar worker from well organized urban reserves and those of the illiterate trapper who depends mainly upon country food and the harvest of natural resources. The administrator must deny assistance when it is in the Indians' best interests to do so . . . .[73]

Even as the Branch stated its desire to be free of the welfare program, it clearly stated its objectives in administering one. Thus, Gordon's assumptions about the application of a welfare program in an Indian community were important: Indians were dysfunctional, individual welfare clients whose dependence upon social assistance was as easily explained as that of recipients in a city or in the country. While Indians may have been the victims of time and progress, they required the best efforts of public policy to assist them to be healthy, self-reliant individuals, independent of the public purse and engaged in gainful employment. Based on the assumption that Indian individuals were disengaged from the Canadian social and economic fabric, it was believed that this problem could be rectified by mirroring Canadian social institutions in Indian communities. If Canadian values and expectations inherent in these institutions were present on reserves they could be learned and internalized. Self-reliance and employment would follow. This was the consistent theme of Gordon's testimony, and it was constantly reflected in the principal government file of the period.[74]

The Committee presented its final report to the House of Commons on 8 July 1961. The text of the report reflected—almost without qualification—the prevailing philosophy and objectives of the Indian Affairs Branch. The preamble, which could almost have been written by Colonel Jones himself, tacitly emphasized the emergent view of Indians as members of the pluralist society, a right they had earned and "grown into":

> . . . the winds of change have been blowing through the ranks of Indian people, and . . . there is also a growing awareness . . . of their problems and needs amongst the non-Indian population.
>
> The time is . . . fast approaching when the Indian people can assume the responsibility and accept the benefits of full participation as Canadian citizens. Your Committee has kept this in mind in presenting its recommendations which are designed to provide sufficient flexibility to meet the varying stages of development of the Indians during the transition period.
>
> It is the view of the Committee that the government should direct more authority and responsibility to Band Councils and individual Indians . . . and that the Indians should be encouraged to accept and exercise such authority and responsibility.
>
> Your Committee believes that the advancement of the Indians towards full acceptance of the responsibilities and obligations of citizenship must be without prejudice to the retention of the cultural, historical and other economic benefits which they have inherited.[75]

To further the objective of full rights of citizenship, the Committee unequivocally accepted the Branch policy to extend provincial welfare services to reserves and iterated Jones's strategy to achieve it:

> Your Committee believes that wherever possible, existing provincial welfare legislation and services should be used for the benefit of the Indian population. Your Committee therefore recommends that this matter be placed on the agenda of a Dominion-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs with a view to transferring the social welfare jurisdiction with respect to Indians to the provinces.[76]

The lack of critical assesament of Branch policy by the Committee—indeed its seeming reliance upon it for direction and assurance of Indian 'advancement'—indicated

the extent to which the idea of developmental humanism in the market society dominated Canadian social thought. Indians were still 'children' in an advanced civilization; they had been the victims of 'progress', but their destiny lay in participating in the very process of that progress. The Committee report was a confirmation of the rightness of Canada and the liberal social order. This was particularly reflected in its endorsement of the plan to extend provincial welfare services—in fact, any services—that would enhance the movement of Indian people into mainstream Canadian life. Indians were not to be separate: they were to be seen as disadvantaged but ordinary Canadian citizens whose welfare lay in their individual participation in the Canadian economy.

Despite the full endorsement by the Committee of the Branch's policy, there was no visible outcome—no movement on the part of the provinces and no apparent initiatives by more senior levels of the federal government. Pursuit of the policy waned, and the Branch became consumed with the administrative details of its own social assistance program. In doing so, however, it remained committed to the idea that the social assistance program should be based upon the same principles as its provincial counterparts. These included the notion that 'public relief' should be needs-tested and considered only as a measure of last resort; that Indians needed to learn self-reliance and thrift; that relief allowances should always be less than the lowest wage so that Indians didn't become used to a certain standard of living while on assistance; and that to counteract the need for social assistance reserves should be developed and linked into white educational and employment systems.[77]

In early 1963, the minority Progressive Conservative government of John Diefenbaker fell and, in the subsequent election, was replaced by the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson. Pearson announced a new era of "consultative federalism," signalling a more active federal role in engaging the provinces in shared decision making. About the same time the Indian Affairs Branch experienced a change in its senior personnel, and the policy to negotiate the extension of provincial services was energetically revived.

A new Federal-Provincial Relations Division was established within the Indian Affairs Branch. In consultation with this new division, the Welfare Division formulated a comprehensive Indian community development policy. Included in the policy was a proposal to extend provincial welfare services to reserves and to raise the general standards of Indian community life so that Indians might become more self-reliant and engaged in the Canadian mainstream and less dependent on the Branch.[78] The Cabinet approved the new policy in the spring of 1964,[79] and a federal-provincial conference of welfare ministers was planned for November of that year.

Contained within the community development proposal was a further Treasury Board submission to permit the Branch to enter into cost-sharing arrangements with the provinces for social assistance and thus, in effect, to adopt provincial rates and standards.[80] Although Cabinet approved the entire proposal, the present 1964 Treasury Board authority was eventually approved separately and was operationalized well before the conference of welfare ministers. How did this transpire?

In December 1963, a senior official in Welfare Division had already drafted the separate Treasury Board submission with an accompanying rationale.[81] Based on a national survey of food costs conducted by the Branch, it had been determined that the social assistance rates provided under the 1958 Treasury Board authority were completely inadequate for at least 150 bands.[82] But there was more:

> ... the infant mortality rate amongst Indians is nearly four times the national rate. The pre-school mortality rate amongst Indian children is more than eight times the national rate .... Indian mortality rates trended upwards during 1962 .... The Tuberculosis death rate amongst Indians in 1960, the latest year ... statistics are available, was 23.8 per 100,000 persons as compared with 4.6 ... nationally. It is feared that the scale of relief assistance available to Indians is a serious contributing factor in these appalling statistics.[83]

The moral appeal to the Treasury Board was balanced by an assurance that the Branch was pursuing cost sharing with the provinces and that the request to apply provincial rates directly was to be seen only as an interim, preparatory measure.[84]

Despite the urgent situation the submission did not leave the Welfare Division. It was hoped that the more comprehensive proposal would be approved quickly. Then, early in 1964, correspondence from the government of British Columbia suggested that the Branch's rates were so low that Indians were leaving the reserves to qualify for higher provincial benefits.[85] Shortly after the receipt of this correspondence a question was raised in the House of Commons concerning alleged starvation of children at the Gleichen reserve in Alberta.[86] The allegation was refuted, but it touched a sensitive nerve within the Branch, and events moved more rapidly. The separate Treasury Board submission prepared in December was forwarded to the deputy minister for signature. But he too delayed, probably in the belief that the comprehensive proposal before Cabinet was the stronger option.

Cabinet finally approved the community development policy in May 1964. It was recognized, however, that the extension of provincial services required lengthy negotiations with the provinces and that any further delay in adjusting the existing rate structure would be intolerable. Therefore the separate submission was made to Treasury Board in June 1964,[87] although it was still intended as an interim, transitional measure to facilitate the extension of services and the new community development policy. On 16 July 1964, Treasury Board approved the Branch request to adopt provincial or local municipal rates and standards in the provision of relief assistance to Indians.[88]

The crisis of the rates was used to advantage by the Branch. It did nothing to cause a re-appraisal of Indian policy; instead, it strengthened Branch conviction that the future of Indians in Canada lay in their full participation in Canadian society. The inadequacy of social assistance on Indian reserves did not preclude the danger of Indian dependency on it. The 1964 Treasury Board authority was intended as a transition to the extension of provincial services and the crisis—though unintended—became instrumental in its approval.

The real objective was to treat Indians like all other Canadians. By adopting provincial rates and standards the Branch could not be easily criticized for ignoring its responsibilities to Indian people. And, where an Indian individual required social

assistance, the expectation that she/he would make every effort to obtain employment on the labour market was normal and reasonable. The last words are left to C.N.C. Roberts who, at the height of the activity surrounding the rates and the Treasury Board submission, made this observation following a superintendents' conference:

> Notwithstanding the criticism received ... regarding the documentation required I think we must insist upon a review of employable applicants' circumstances at least once each month. If their skills, experience and the efforts which they have made to secure employment are not reviewed at least once a month, increasing dependency and the conviction that relief is a "right" is inevitable.[89]

Part V. Conclusion

The community development policy introduced in 1964 was the beginning of a concentrated attempt on the part of the government to effect Indian integration and to reduce dependency through equal citizenship and economic opportunity. Social assistance and the use of employment creation programs—both of which implicitly seek these objectives—have been and are manifestations of the continuous evolution of these themes. The principal aim of the Treasury Board authority was also to enhance Indian citizenship and integration. But it assumed—like other policies providing inducements to integration—that Indian societies would willingly adapt to the structure and values of the dominant Canadian society. This has not happened. Why?

First, the welfare state in Canada—as in Great Britain, the United States and Australia—developed by necessity out of new social circumstances arising from industrialization, the Great Depression, and World War II. As a concept it has always been in an uneasy tension with the fundamental tenets of the liberal state. Modern liberalism, while it ascribes and attempts to ensure relative equality of opportunity, does not ensure equality of outcome. In the liberal democratic state the economy is ostensibly private and separate from the state. The state may intervene and regulate the economy from time to time, but it is essentially the role of the market to distribute wealth and the responsibility of individuals to participate in the market with their labour. The role of the liberal democratic state in ensuring economic security is, therefore, primarily residual in nature.

The welfare solution to Indian poverty was the solution imposed by the dominant society. Because the solution was based on Indian integration into the mainstream, it was similarly believed that the circumstances that necessitated welfare measures in non-Indian communities applied in Indian communities as well. But most Indian reserves in Canada lack a self-sustaining economic base. This reality is complicated by restrictions in law, which limit Indian government and control of reserve lands, and by the profound sense of historical independence felt by Indian First Nations. The application of welfare state measures on reserves occurs in virtual economic limbo; there is no economy to plan and no market in which to participate. The result is a monolithic, stagnant, on-reserve welfare state in which economic equality is based on minimal levels of income support.

Second, we observed earlier that a primary objective of employment development programs was to reduce Indian dependence on social assistance. It is clear that departmental thinking tried to link the creation of employment to the reduction of dependence on social assistance. In non-Indian communities, where there is a primary identification with the ideology and culture of the liberal market society, this is probably an appropriate solution to what seems to be an obvious problem: no work. But in Indian communities the issue is culturally and politically more sensitive.

A fundamental problem in the departmental concept of employment creation over the past 19 years has been its inability to link or to specify just how the creation of employment using social assistance funds would become employment that was not dependent on those funds. Certainly, it would seem that dependence on social assistance cannot be reduced as long as the employment created is based on continuing individual entitlement to social assistance and an unclear notion of that employment translating itself more permanently onto the labour market. The labour market solution to reducing Indian dependence on social assistance is not realistic. It is based on a concept of work and employment that is alien to the Indian sense of community and—from the Indian perspective—can only be seen as another aspect of integration or assimilation.

Are there any solutions to this dilemma? What might constitute a more productive and constructive approach is to determine from Indian communities what constitutes work or employment in their terms? Social assistance might then come to be used directly for these purposes. It could become part of a community solution instead of a response defined from the outside in liberal terms related to individual responsibility. It could truly become 'social' assistance.

Recent departmental initiatives in alternative funding arrangements and self-government are encouraging in this direction. However not all bands wish to pursue these options at this time. Still, many wish to be able to use social assistance funds flexibly and actively in ways that will address the social and economic needs of their communities. A positive first step by the department of Indian Affairs would be to seek a new Treasury Board authority in consultation with Indian communities and leadership. A new authority could enable the delivery of social assistance under broader options. As well, funds need not necessarily be targeted to individuals and their entitlement. To effect a new authority, policy and planning processes are required to empower First Nations to develop models of social assistance appropriate to their own cultures and social and community organization.

As a result of recommendations from the 1988 report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, *Transitions*, the province of Ontario has instituted a First Nations planning and advisory committee whose broad task is to develop further options and recommendations for the province on how social assistance and related services might best be defined and delivered in their communities. The committee is composed of a cross-section of Indian organizations, with some provincial and federal representation. Although its work is still in the formative stages, its process and mandate are equally important. The Ontario situation, while in one sense unique,[92] suggests how joint policy development might be used in other regions to effect a new Treasury Board authority.

If there were another joint parliamentary committee on Indian Affairs, its concluding report might echo the words of its 1961 counterpart. The winds of change are blowing through Indian communities. But they are not blowing in the direction of integration: they are counter-cyclical, drawing Indians into an ever stronger demand for autonomy and independence. Symbolic of present Indian dependence is social assistance. The research for this paper overtly or implicitly made that point. Social assistance symbolizes for Indian people the dependent interface with non-Indian society and is no longer an acceptable means of social or economic support in the face of rising expectations and nationalism. Social assistance may have ensured a certain level of survival for Indian people, but it has done little to advance their social development and has done much to contribute to the decline of their communities and cultures. Only Indian solutions situated in Indian cultures will counteract this decline and contribute to an autonomous, independent future.

Notes

1. Mary John, an elder of the Stoney Creek Indian Band in British Columbia. Quoted in Denise Brillon "Conversation with Stoney Creek women," *Kahtou* (Vancouver) 17 April 1989, p. 6.

2. Roger Gibbins and J. Rick Ponting, "Historical Overview and Background," in J. Rick Ponting, ed., *Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), p. 34.

   It is to be noted, however, that a strong opinion exists—to which this author subscribes—that the federal government continues to maintain a policy objective of institutional assimilation. That is, it continues to implement policies that foster Native adaptation to, and participation in, the dominant institutional structures of the Canadian society. Participation in the labour market is one obvious example. See Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long "Native Indian Self-Government: Instrument of Autonomy or Assimilation?," in J. Anthony Long and Menno Boldt, *Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian Nations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 38-56.

3. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, *Indian Social Welfare* (Ottawa: 1982), p. 74.

   Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Inuit Affairs Program, "Year End Status Report On Performance Indicators" (Ottawa: October 15, 1988), p. 6.

   Health and Welfare Canada, Welfare Services Branch, Canada Assistance Plan Division, File data for recipients of basic social assistance under CAP, 1971, 1981, 1986.

4. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, British Columbia Region, *Policy and Procedures Manual, Social Development Program*, Appendix 2, "Work Opportunity Program" (Vancouver: 1988).

5. Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, *Annual Report For Fiscal Year 1971-1972* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), p. 40.

6. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Inuit Affairs Program, "Year End Status Report On Performance Indicators" (Ottawa: 1988), p. 6.

7. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. *Annual Report*, 1972-1973, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975.

8. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Social Development Program, B.C. Region, internal file data.

9. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Social Development Program, B.C. Region, internal file data.

10. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Eskimo Affairs, internal correspondence, July 4, 1972, File 1/29-22 Vol. 2, 1971, "Work Opportunity Programs."

11. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Eskimo Affairs, internal correspondence, June 14, 1973, File 1/29-22 Vol. 2, 1971, "Work Opportunity Programs."

12. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Eskimo Affairs, internal correspondence, January 21, 1974, File 1/29-22, Vol. 2, 1971, "Work Opportunity Programs."

13. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Information Canada, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1975-76* (Ottawa: 1976), p. 37.

14. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Employment Programs Branch, *National Guidelines for the Band Work Process* (Ottawa: February 10, 1977), p. 2. Note that Treasury Board approval for BWP was not given until 4 August 1977.

15. Department of Supply and Services, Bureau of Management Consulting, "Developmental Applications of Social Assistance Funds, B.C. Region, Indian and Northern Affairs," Project No. 2-2705, February 1980.

16. *Ibid.*, 77.

17. *Ibid.*, 77-83.

18. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Economic Development Program, B.C. Region, "NEED Final Report" (Draft, May 1985), p. 6.

19. *Ibid.*, 5.

20. *Ibid.* 23-24. The material was paraphrased in some areas to accommodate Social Development program material obtained from internal file data, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, B.C. Region.

21. *Ibid.*, 24-25.

22. Since the principal work for this paper was concluded in early 1990 a new training initiative, Aboriginal Social Assistance Recipient Employment Training (ASARET), has been launched in 1991 by DIAND and Employment and Immigration Canada. The fundamental intent of ASARET is to ensure Indian access to all EIC employment training programs. For the most part, social assistance may be used to cover the costs of training under conditions similar to ICHRS.

23. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Social Development Program, B.C. Region, internal file data, 1989.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Inuit Affairs, Social Development Directorate, "Social Assistance Program Support To Employment and Training" (Draft, 29 October 1985), p. 15.

27. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian and Inuit Affairs, Economic Development Program, B.C. Regions, internal correspondence, August 19, 1983, File E4545-13 Vol. 2, "Employment/General Reports and Statistics."

28. *Ibid.*

29. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Social Development Program, B.C. Region, *Policy and Procedures Manual*, Appendix No. 2, "Work Opportunity Program," Section A, Part 2, p. 5.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, Section C, Part 4: 19.

32. *Ibid.*, Section A, Part 2: 6.

33. The program the chief was referring to is known as the Employment Plus Program, sponsored by the Ministry of Social Services and Housing. Under this program the provincial government will assist private sector businesses to hire employable social assistance recipients with up to 50 per cent of the hourly wage, to a maximum contribution of $3.50 per hour.

34. A similar proposal was made to INAC, B.C.Region by Justus-Simonetta Development Consultants in August 1981. See "Towards The Development Of Three Pilot Projects For The Re-Orientation And Re-Design Of The Social Assistance Program And Delivery System," Justus-Simonetta Development Consultants Limited for Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 31 August 1981, p. 54.

35. Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, *Transitions*, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee (Toronto: The Queen's Printer, 1988), p. 434-435.

36. Bernard McGrane, *Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

37. (Sir) Charles Lyell, *Principles of Geology: Being an inquiry how far the former changes of the earth's surface are referable to causes now in operation* (London: J. Murray, 1835) and Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or, The preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life* (New York: D. Appleton, 1860), cited in Bernard McGrane, *Beyond Anthropology*, p. 89.

38. Bernard McGrane, *Beyond Anthropology*, p. 94. McGrane refers to one of the first of the "modern" anthropologists, E.B. Taylor, who advanced this view of primitive, pre-historical societies. See E.B. Taylor, *Anthropology, An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization* (New York: D. Appleton, 1913 {1881}).

39. *Ibid.*, 95.

40. *Ibid.*, 99.

41. C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).

42. *Ibid.*, 49.

43. *Ibid.*, 60.

44. *Ibid.*, 61-62. Of the co-operatives, Macpherson writes:

> [For, while the co-ops would eventually replace the existing nineteenth century capitalist organization, they would continue to] compete in the market, and would be driven by . . . desire for individual gain. [Thus] Mill accepted . . . a system which required individuals to act as maximizing consumers and appropriators, seeking to accumulate the means to ensure their future flow of consumer satisfactions, which meant seeking to acquire property. A system which requires men to see themselves, and to act, as consumers and appropriators, gives little scope for most of them to see themselves and act as exerters and developers of their capacities. . . . [This is the] contradiction between capitalist relations of production as such and the democratic ideal of equal possibility of individual self-development.

45. *Ibid.*, 70.

46. *Ibid.*, 71 and C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Toronto: C.B.C. Enterprises, 1965), p. 4 and Chapter 4, "Liberal Democracy as a System of Power," p. 42-45.

47. C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, p. 78-79.

48. Anthony Arblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 6, 8.

49. *Ibid.*, 36-37.

50. Canada, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, Fourth Session, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*. No. 8 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961), p. 291.

    Colonel Jones appeared as a witness at the Joint Committee on 2 May 1961, at which time he testified:

> The Indian affairs branch used to use the word assimilation, but recently we have been using the word integration. It seems to fit more in with the feeling that the future of the Indians is to become ordinary citizens of the country but still retain their culture and background and those parts of their history and environment which they wish to retain. One afternoon in Geneva I heard some experts argue . . . on the difference between assimilation and integration. They had me all confused. Presently in Canada I think the Indians are much more happy with the word integration than with the word assimilation.

    Both policies are described in various books and publications. See, for example

    Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Indian and Inuit Affairs, Social Development Directorate, "Interpretation Of The Legal Mandate And Responsibilities Of Federal, Provincial, Municipal And Indian Band Governments For Social Services To Indian People With Special Reference To The Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement Of 1965." Draft Discussion Paper (Ottawa, 24 July 1984), p. 7, 20.

    James S. Frideres, *Native Peoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts*, 3rd edition (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1988), p. 345-346.

    J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). Miller provides good insights into assimilation policy but does not deal with integration *per se*.

    E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986). Especially Chapters 1 and 5.

John L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy," *The Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* Volume VI, No. 2 (1976), p. 13-30.

Sally M. Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). Weaver more specifically identifies and distinguishes between the two policies as separate initiatives.

Although arguments have been made (usually by the Department of Indian Affairs) that integration differed from assimilation, the perceived outcome amounted to the same thing: assist Indians to become fully civilized members of a 'modern' society and to adapt or discard traditional values and ways of life in the face of 'progress' and development. Integration did, however, carry with it the notion of special status or 'citizens plus.' Weaver notes that this concept caused confusion among federal policy makers since they tried to accommodate Indians with special programs and exemptions on the one hand and to treat them like any other Canadians on the other. The policies of special accommodation were inherent in the fiduciary relationship between the federal government and Indians under the *Indian Act* and various treaties. Assimilation policies would seem to have derived, in part, from the paternalistic role that the federal government assumed in the trust relationship, as well as from the federal government's role as an agent of capitalist expansion and land acquisition. Both assimilation and integration were policy initiatives based on assumptions of what was thought best for Indian people. Indians themselves were rarely—if ever—consulted about their objectives, and only occasionally about their efficacy.

51. Of course it is difficult to generalize on this point. In varying degrees, however, most Indian societies and cultures reflect a more universal, integral view of the world, a view that is tied to an attachment to the land and to a harmony with nature and life forces. Indian social organization is less individually oriented and based more on the needs of the collective. See, for example,

    Alan D. McMillan, *Native Peoples and Cultures of Canada* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988).

    R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson, eds, *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986).

52. Anthony Arblaster. *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism*, p. 37.

53. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "Interpretation Of The Legal Mandate," p. 22.

    J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, p. 221-222.

    Miller writes:

    > The committee report assumed that the work of assimilation and integration was well advanced . . . all that was required was . . . more time and less bureaucratic intervention in Indian communities. [While the new *Indian Act* (1951) did reduce the department's ability to interfere politically in Indian communities], the general outlines of the policy remained unchanged. The 1951 act assumed that the purpose of Indian policy was the end of Indians, as they became assimilated and chose to integrate . . . into the economic, political, and social life of Canada.

    John L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation," p. 24-25.

    Tobias writes:

    > After two years, the Joint Committee recommended (Proceedings 1948: 186-190):
    >
    > 1. The complete revision of every section of the *Indian Act* and the repeal of those sections which were outdated.

2. That the new Indian Act be designed to facilitate the gradual transition of the Indian from a position of wards up to full citizenship. Therefore the Act should provide:
   A. A political voice for Indian women in band affairs.
   B. Bands with more self-government and financial assistance.
   C. Equal treatment of Indians and non-Indians in the matter of intoxicants.
   D. That a band might incorporate as a municipality.
   E. That Indian Affairs officials were to have their duties and responsibilities designed to assist the Indian in the responsibilities of self-government and to attain the rights of full citizenship.
3. Guidelines for future Indian policy were to be:
   A. Easing of enfranchisement.
   B. Extension of the franchise to the Indian.
   C. Co-operation with the provinces in extending service to the Indian.
   D. Education of Indian children with non-Indians in order to prepare Indian children for assimilation.

54. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "Interpretation Of The Legal Mandate." Specifically, the federal government has centred its argument on the division of powers under the *Constitution Act*, 1867 and maintains that Section 91 of the act empowers the federal government to protect Indians and their lands only with respect to matters that are *uniquely* Indian. Under Section 92 of the act the provinces are responsible for providing social services. The federal government asserts that social assistance is a benefit of general citizenship and Indians are citizens like any other provincial residents.

    The provinces maintain, however, that Section 88 of the *Indian Act*—which derives its authority from Section 91 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*—overrides their general constitutional responsibility. Section 88 states that provincial laws of general application apply to Indians and lands reserved for Indians. The provinces argue that Section 88 does not include laws for the provision of social assistance because they are not laws of general application.

55. PAC, RG-10, Volume 6925, File 1/29-1, Part 9. Draft memorandum to Treasury Board prepared by C.N.C. Roberts, Indian Affairs Branch. No date, but about late December 1963. Roberts was summarizing current operating authorities for the Board.

56. *Ibid.*, Volume 6924, Part 5. Memorandum from Colonel H.M. Jones, Director, Indian Affairs Branch to George F. Davidson, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 30 November 1960.

    Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "Interpretation of the Legal Mandate," p. 16. Indian band revenues were held in trust in Ottawa and were administered by the Branch.

    The memorandum indicates that in the seven-year period 1950-57, 11.4 per cent of Indian trust fund disbursements was for "relief, hospital and medical fees." This dropped to 10.5 per cent from 1957 to 1960, although the overall relief expenditure from trust funds grew from an average $554,961 between 1950-57 to $835,221 between 1957-1960.

    Public Account welfare expenditure—including costs of administration, child welfare, and rehabilitation—for Indians on reserve increased from an average $2,494,653 between 1951-57 to $5,475,271 between 1957-1960; an increase of 119.5 per cent! Much of the increase was attributed to the "improvements in the standards of food, fuel and clothing on behalf of destitutes . . ."

57. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, "Interpretation Of The Legal Mandate," p. 17, 23-24.

    Ontario, Department of Public Welfare, *Annual Report of the Department of Public Welfare, 1958/1959* (Toronto: The Queen's Printer, 1959), p. 6.

    The formation of the Ontario Select Committee of 1954 was the result, in part, of the recommendations of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, 1946-48. The Joint Committee had found a wide gap in services available to Indian people on reserve in comparison to non-Indians off reserve and urged the extension of provincial and municipal services to Indian communities throughout Canada.

    A further outcome of the Ontario Select Committee was the formation in 1955 of an Indian Advisory Committee composed of Indian persons. The Advisory Committee reported direct to the Deputy Minister of Public Welfare and was clearly influential in bringing about the *Indian Welfare Services Act* (1955), the Ontario-Canada Child Welfare Agreement (1956) as well as the major revision to the *General Welfare Assistance Act*. See Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, *Ibid.*, p. 22-23 and Department of Public Welfare, *Annual Report of the Department of Public Welfare*, 1956/1957.

    See also Note 46, Tobias reference.

58. Dennis Guest, *The Emergence of Social Security in Canada*, Second Edition, Revised (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), p. 146.

59. PAC, RG-10, Volume 6923, File 1/29-1, Part 4. Letter from Laval M. Fortier, Deputy Minister, Citizenship and Immigration to Dr. G.F. Davidson, Deputy Minister of Welfare, Department of Health and Welfare, 24 February 1959. In this case "non-Indians" especially included Indian women who had lost their status under the *Indian Act*, non-Indian children in custody of Indian women, and non-Indian children of Indian origin (whose mothers had lost their status) in custody of their mothers or of relatives.

60. *Ibid.*, Jones to Fortier, 24 February 1959. It might also be assumed that the Branch was concerned about the escalating cost of providing assistance and was anxious to defray the cost through other agencies. (See Note 49). The intention of bringing the issue to cabinet attention would have been to provoke a confrontation with the provinces.

61. *Ibid.*, Part 6, Memorandum from Col. H.M. Jones to the Deputy Minister, Re: Extension of Provincial Welfare Services To Indians, 19 January 1961.

62. *Ibid.*, Parts 1 through 10. The file contains the essential headquarters correspondence of the period and reveals much about why the Branch wanted the provinces to extend their services. It conveys as well the Branch's complete inability to achieve this goal.

63. The Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs convened in the spring of 1959 and sat periodically until July 1961.

64. Canada, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, Third Session, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 3, 1960, p. 247.

    Jones appeared before the Committee on 12 May 1960 where he announced the federal policy of negotiating with the provinces to extend services. He was quoted in the proceedings:

    > What we have in mind as a policy—and the minister made an announcement about it in the house not too long ago—is to bring the full provincial welfare resources to the reserves rather than to set up parallel staffs and organizations. We prefer to make arrangements with the provinces and to have them give to Indians the same services on reserves that are available to non-Indians off reserves.

65. *Ibid.*

66. PAC, RG-10, Volume 6924, File 1/29-1, Part 6. Col. H.M. Jones to Dr. G.F. Davidson, Deputy Minister, 19 January 1961.

67. Canada, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, Fourth Session, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No.8, 1961, p. 278-279.

68. PAC, RG-10, Volume 6924, File 1/29-1, Part 5. A clipping from The Gazette (Montreal) datelined Ottawa, 9 April 1960 reported Fairclough's announcement to the House of Commons that the "Federal Government was now prepared to negotiate with the provinces the extension of normal provincial welfare services to persons living on Indian reservations."

69. Canada, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, Fourth Session, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No.10, 1961, p. 353-354. Among the national organizations that endorsed this point of view were the Canadian Welfare Council (Fourth Session, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, 1961, No.5, 103), the Anglican Church of Canada, the United Church of Canada (Third Session, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, 1960, No.9: 802-803 and No.10: 869) and the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada (Third Session, 1960, No.5: 381-382).

    Besides Ontario, British Columbia provided a weak and somewhat confused endorsement (Third Session, 1960, No.7: 676-696). Saskatchewan also endorsed the extension of services (Third Session, 1960, No.12: 1,067). Both British Columbia and Saskatchewan viewed the extension of services as an *incentive* for Indians to move off the reserve and become part of mainstream Canada.

70. *Ibid.*, 354-355.

71. *Ibid.*, 355.

72. *Ibid.*, 355.

73. *Ibid.*, 356. Gordon's testimony depicted a somewhat naive picture of the integrated, liberal Indian in post-industrial society. Additionally, he conveyed the Branch fear that Indians thought of social assistance as a matter of historical right. This theme also recurred frequently in the principal file.

74. See PAC, RG-10, Volumes 6923 to 6925, File 1/29-1, Parts 4-10, 1959-1964.

75. Canada, Twenty-Fourth Parliament, Fourth Session, Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Indian Affairs. *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, No. 16, 1961, p. 605.

76. *Ibid.*, 612.

77. See for example PAC, RG-10, Volume 6924, File 1/29-1, Part 5. Jones to Davidson, 30 November 1960; Part 6, Jones to all Regional Supervisors, 13 March 1961; Volume 6925, Part 7, J.H. Gordon to the Regional Supervisor, Quebec Region, 27 February 1962; and Volume 6925, Part 9, C.N.C. Roberts, a senior administrator to Walter Rudnicki, the new Chief of Welfare Division, 28 October 1963.

78. Sally M. Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy*, p. 27.

79. *Ibid.*, 27.

80. PAC, RG-10, Volume 6925, File 1/29-1, Part 9. Information contained in memorandum from R.F. Battle, Director, Indian Affairs Branch to Claude M. Isbister, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 16 April 1964.

    The Federal-Provincial Relations Division effectively developed the submission to Cabinet which included the welfare services proposals. The extension of welfare services was to be negotiated under master agreements with the provinces fashioned after the original principles developed in 1959 and approved in the spring of 1960. See page 90 and Note 54.

81. *Ibid.*, C.N.C. Roberts, draft document to file, request to Treasury Board for "Adoption of provincial or local municipal welfare rates and regulations for Indians." No date, but prepared after a directive from Rudnicki to Roberts on 17 December 1963.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*

85. *Ibid.*, Correspondence from E.R. Rickinson, Deputy Minister, Department of Social Welfare, British Columbia to C.M. Isbister, Deputy Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 27 January 1964.

86. *Ibid.*, Memorandum to the Director of Indian Affairs from the office of the Deputy Minister, Citizenship and Immigration, 21 February 1964.

87. *Ibid.*, Part 10, Notation of Treasury Board submission, 16 June 1964.

88. *Ibid.*, C.N.C. Roberts to Walter Rudnicki, 20 July 1964.

89. *Ibid.*, C.N.C. Roberts to R.D. Ragan, 16 April 1964.

90. C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy*: 47. Also, Ronald Manzer, *Public Policies and Political Development In Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 72.

91. John Myles, "Decline or impasse? The current state of the welfare state," *Studies in Political Economy* 26 (Summer 1988), p. 73-107. Myles observes that Canada's welfare state has never been a full or mature model of social and economic security.

92. As previously noted, the province of Ontario has, since the late 1950s, provided General Welfare Assistance on Indian reserves. The Department of Indian Affairs funds the province and the bands through the Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement of 1965. The other regions of the country are specifically subject to federal policy under the 1964 authority.

III.

Work and Welfare:
A conceptual review of the relationship between work and welfare

by

Andrew Armitage

III.

Work and Welfare:
A conceptual review of the relationship between work and welfare

Andrew Armitage

> Tasks of Work for Casuals: *As regards males—the breaking of seven cwt. of stones, or such other quantity, giving regard to the hardness of the stone that the committee may prescribe. As regards females—eight hours work in washing, scrubbing and cleaning or needlework.*
>
> Third Schedule, Poor Law, England, 1930

Three Views of Work and Welfare in Their Cultural Context

It was at Speenhamland in southern England, toward the end of the 18th century, that changes in the Elizabethan poor law attempted to bridge the gap between low agricultural wages and the needs of poor farm families. Poor law funds were diverted to provide a wage subsidy in the form of material aid, based on the number of children and the poor law "poverty line." This was an early example of an *institutional*[1] approach to the relationship between work and welfare.

This early innovation in poor law practice was not to last. In 1834 the British poor law was reformed in a manner that we would today call *residual*. The Speenhamland system was replaced with the principle of less eligibility and a work test. The principle of less eligibility was that the level of poor law relief must not exceed the income that the lowest-paid independent worker could achieve. The work test took the form of an enforced work requirement of all able-bodied persons who sought poor law relief. The English *Poor Law* remained essentially in this form until the 1940s.[2]

The *residual* and *institutional* views of the relationship of work to welfare have remained major features of a continuing debate.

The *social development* concept has also been applied to this debate. This concept redirects attention away from the problems of modern economic society to the structures and processes that have contributed to the problems. Examples of this view include the position of feminists who direct our attention to the less than equal position of women in our society and Native leaders who demand that we attend to the rights that derive from treaties and from their aboriginal occupation of Canada. In these views the problem of the relationship of work and welfare is an extension of more fundamental issues.[3,4] Without consideration of these issues, they argue, the work and welfare debate readily becomes a concealed discussion of how poverty can be managed and discrimination perpetuated.

The social development view also has an interest in whether "work" should be defined only in terms of the paid services of employees to an employer, or whether it should be broadened to include mutual services between the members of a family, co-operative or band.

The principal distinguishing characteristics of the three views are shown in Figure 1.

Values

Values lie at the heart of the work and welfare debate. Two financial transactions have unquestioned legitimacy in western economic values; they are the contract and the gift. The contract is respected because it records a relationship based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. Treaties are regarded as a form of contract between sovereign peoples. The gift is respected because it records a free passing of benefit from one party to another. These well established transactions have not proved sufficient, however, to ensure stability and social justice in our society. As a consequence, a third transaction has been added—the transfer.

The transfer was initiated with the Elizabethan poor law and is central to the concept of the welfare state. Nevertheless, 400 years after the poor law, the transfer still does not enjoy the cultural legitimacy of the contract or the gift. Instead it is disliked by both the giver and the receiver. The giver dislikes the transfer because it is compulsory, enforced by the state through taxation. The recipient dislikes the transfer because the consequence is stigma. There have been many attempts to suppress the alienating consequences of the transfer, usually through appeals to the values of social justice, equality and fairness, but with limited success. Instead the transfer continues to elicit feelings of unsatisfied mutual indebtedness between both the giver and the receiver. It should be recognized that these feelings originate in western culture and are not necessarily shared by members of other cultures.

The work and welfare debate is an example of the application of these values. The debate turns around an uneasy triangle of objectives and values, the components of which are program costs, adequacy of benefits and work incentives.[5]

Figure 1
Three Views of Work and Welfare

Characteristic	Residual	Institutional	Social Development
Toward individual	Needs compulsion	Needs incentive	Needs opportunity
Toward state	Minimal measures only	Comprehensive measures	Structural change needed
Toward work participation	Client *must* participate	Client *may* participate	Client needs opportunity to participate
Type of work	Forced labour	Regular minimum wage Employment	Empowerment, control over work
Relationship to welfare	Tied closely to welfare	Tied generally to welfare	Not tied to welfare
Development of policy	Controlled by government	Controlled by government	Shared by government and community

Figure 2
Tensions in the Work-Welfare Debate



These three objectives compete with each other in an unresolved dynamic, a dynamic made more intense in the 1980s by the overriding fiscal concern with government expenditures and the deficit.

The *residual* view emphasizes the right-hand side of the triangle. The objectives sought first are control of program costs and effective work incentives.

> A state which does for its citizens what they can do for themselves is an evil state; and a state which removes all choice and responsibility from its people and makes them like broiler hens will create the irresponsible society. In such an irresponsible society no-one cares, no one saves and no one bothers—why should they when the state spends all its energies taking money from the energetic, successful and thrifty to give to the idle, the failures and the feckless.[6]

In more specific terms:

> State benefits were held to be undermining work incentives by being paid out too readily at levels which made waged work unattractive. Initiative and enterprise were... being undermined by the "nanny state."[7]

In this view the solution to the work and welfare debate lies in lowering benefit levels. This will have the double effect of reducing program costs and restoring work incentives.

The *institutional* view emphasizes the bottom of the triangle. In this view a just society requires that we be concerned with the adequacy of benefits for the least capable members of society. This view was captured by the Senate Committee on Poverty in the 1970s and has been expressed consistently by the National Council of Welfare.

In the purest form of this view, concerns about the deficit and the level of social expenditure are disputed. These are seen as matters of political choice, and the attempt is made to shift the debate to the arena of inequality and social justice. Comparisons are drawn between the level of welfare benefits and the "welfare" benefits available to

business and to the rich through the tax system. "The poor need the incentive of lower benefits," proponents say mockingly, "while the rich need the incentive of lower taxes."

Ideally, government would take action to ensure a fairer distribution of total income:

> There would be two kinds of action. The difference between the income of those inside and outside employment would be reduced, as would the differences between those at the top and bottom of the pay structures of employment. The unpaid social responsibilities of women could be properly recognized for the first time .... It would be possible for a government to specify a maximum permissible earnings level at, say, four times the average wage.[8]

In the institutional view, work incentives are second in importance to the primary objectives of ensuring social justice and relieving poverty. People, it is assumed, want to work and will work provided that there are jobs and that it is in their economic interest to work. It follows that the main issue in the relationship between work and welfare becomes one of program design. Program design should ensure that those who have to rely on the state's minimum income guarantees always retain an opportunity to increase their income through work.

In both the *residual* and the *institutional* view, however, the social and class structure of western industrial society, including the existence of poverty, remain unquestioned. The task of social welfare policy is defined in terms of "managing" welfare in the context of the work required by society of all its members.

The *social development* view of the triangle begins with a critique of these assumptions. Feminist analysis of the welfare state, for example, developed aggressively during the 1970s and '80s and had to contend with the changing perspectives generated by the contention between traditional conservative and liberal views. When the institutional view was dominant, feminism was concerned with the assumptions within the welfare state that women are in a subordinate position to men and receive benefits either as dependents or as care givers. Recognition was sought for benefits as separate, independent adults:

> Dependence on the welfare state was identified as more acceptable than dependence upon individual men in the family. However at the point of formulating this preference and subsequent demands the very nature of the welfare state began to change.[9]

A state based on the liberal or institutional view, concerned with adequacy of benefits, was being replaced by a state based on the conservative or residual concepts of expenditure control and work incentives.

Women who had been sheltered from the expectations of work and independence by their presumed dependence on men found that their partial liberation had led not to independence but to their benefits being targeted as a more residual approach to welfare was introduced by conservative governments in Britain, the United States, and some Canadian provinces.

These governments were not sympathetic to recognizing the value of unpaid work in the home in caring for children and the elderly. Instead, program structures shifted to

emphasize the economy and entry into the pink ghetto of women's paid work in the labour force.

In reaction to these trends feminists argued for structural change in the way women's work is recognized and remunerated in the first instance.

A second expression of the social development view comes from Native people. At a time when Native people are seeking an independent understanding of their own culture and roots, this entire debate will appear alien to them because it originates in the cultural context of western industrial society. The *residual* versus *institutional* debate is not about the fundamentals of that culture but about the most effective and humane way to inculcate its economic values. Yet if Native people are treated within the work-welfare values of the dominant society, the measures designed for them cannot escape some of the consequences of the debate. Measures to reinforce the relationship between work and individual welfare are one way the economic values of western industrial society are applied and "deviant" behaviour penalized. To accept money based on the principles of the welfare transfer is to accept a position of dependency and of participation in both the benefits and the penalties imposed by the dominant society. Assimilation begins here.

The alternative view emphasizes cultural independence and treaty obligations, including recognition of aboriginal rights that have not been recognized in treaties. In this view the existing system of transfers comes a poor second to a system of entitlements based on contracts that recognize the historical role of First Nations prior to Confederation. When transfers are based on entitlements, representatives of First Nations should decide the use of the transfer, not the departments of government through which the transfer flows.

A third expression of this view is found in the work of Marxist critics of the welfare state. They see the debate as evidence of long-suspected internal contradictions in the welfare state and in the capitalist society of which it is an instrument.

> Friend and Metcalf criticize those who see the [welfare] state as a potential liberating force, arguing that instead it has operated in an ambiguous way: providing welfare support, but only in return for oppressive supervision of the working class by professionals .... It protects capitalism from effective challenge and encourages the subordination of the working class.[10]

There is a direct connection here with the *residual* view, in which the welfare state and the work/welfare relationship were structured deliberately in a manner that reinforced traditional economic values.

Residual Strategies: "Workfare"

The character and results of the *residual* view can be seen in the development and analysis of "workfare" in the United States.

In 1981 Congress allowed the states to impose a work requirement as a condition of receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). This change in federal policy followed experiments with work requirements in a number of states, including California. The change led to a major expansion of such practices and to their extension to single-parent families, most of which are headed by women.

Workfare as enacted in the United States had the following major features:

- mandatory participation on the part of designated clients;
- unpaid work, in that the client's income continues to be determined by income security eligibility conditions;
- participants are not regular employees and do not qualify for normal fringe benefits; and
- the work assignment must be in the public or the non-profit sectors.[11]

Important conditions were attached to workfare programs, including non-displacement of existing employees, placement in jobs that would help clients enter regular employment, and reimbursement for certain types of expense, e.g., transportation. Nevertheless, U.S.-style workfare went further toward imposing a punitive work condition, reminiscent of the poor law, on welfare recipients than any comparable Canadian program.

The closest parallel in Canada was Alberta's Community Self Help Project, introduced in 1982.[12] The Alberta program had to operate outside the Canada Assistance Plan, however, funded exclusively by the provincial government. As the program also proved costly, at $12.00 for every hour worked, other provinces understandably have not followed Alberta, and Alberta has now dropped the compulsory condition.

Compulsory work is the key feature of true workfare, differentiating it from subsidized employment and from the compulsory job preparation, job search, and job placement tests and requirements that are frequently part of Canadian programs.

Before discussing these Canadian variations on the workfare theme it is important to summarize the U.S. experience with workfare, because the concept continues to be seen by some as a desirable reform of Canadian income security policy.

In the United States the workfare program was known as the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP). CWEP and the program that preceded it, the Work Incentive Program (WIN), are the subjects of an extensive literature, which is summarized in a review article by Nancy S. Dickinson.[13]

> The findings of a 1978 study of 15 work relief programs summarized many present concerns about CWEP: (1) there were difficulties in developing a sufficient number of jobs for participants, (2) most jobs were in clerical or maintenance positions that involved few skills and little or no training, (3) the no/show, dropout rate ranged from 30 to 75%, (4) the use of sanctions varied reducing the deterrent effect, (5) the transition to regular employment in the workfare agencies was minimal, (6) minimum tracking of employment outcomes in the regular labour force blurred program effects, and (7)

> unions expressed concern about the programs' displacing and substituting for regular employees.[14]

In other words, in practice, workfare programs were riddled with internal contradictions and did not begin to approach their objectives. The difficulty and expense of operating a comprehensive workfare program was the major obstacle to achieving the original objectives. The jobs that such a program required did not exist, and producing them required that money be spent on materials, equipment, supervision, expenses, child care, and administration. In the absence of such expenditures, the limited opportunities and expense allowances resulted in a token program; in no state did it reach more than 20 per cent of the eligible AFDC population.[15] At this level it was inevitable that case workers would have to exercise considerable discretion in referrals to the program; the practical task became one of finding reasons to exclude clients so that the number of referrals would not exceed the capacity of the program. Needless to say this led to further inequities and distortions.

Evaluations of the programs' effectiveness in increasing employment among CWEP participants, as compared to other AFDC clients, was no more convincing. A controlled study of the effectiveness of the program in Washington state found that

> Thirteen months after their participation in the project 51% of CWEP clients had worked since completion of the program, an employment rate that was 9% less than that achieved for [the state's regular Employment and Training program] . . . and neither rate differs substantially from that which was achieved without any program, 51%.[16]

As a result of these unconvincing results, CWEP and other similar workfare initiatives have come to be viewed as essentially political programs undertaken for their symbolic effect. Such symbolism is not without its effects on welfare recipients, as it contributes to the perception that compulsion is required to make them work, undercutting the legitimacy of their status as beneficiaries. Stated another way, the purpose of workfare is to remove entitlement and to stigmatize welfare receipt.

Lawrence Mead argues that enforced work obligations should be a central part of a strategy to change attitudes in American inner cities, where culture of crime and non-work is seen as the problem. The aim of the policy would be "to close the considerable gap that now exists between the desires of the poor to work and their actual behaviour . . . work must be enforced, much as other public obligations—such as tax payment—are by other public agencies." The argument concerning the nature and number of available jobs is met by the argument that the public clearly wants the poor to work more than they do. The argument that such programs have been little more than token in the past is met by a call to make them comprehensive.[17]

Canada has been spared these excesses by the Canada Assistance Plan requirement that assistance be based on need. This requirement has been interpreted as preventing the withholding of benefits on income not "earned" through workfare. Nevertheless, there has been great pressure on provincial governments to "do something," first about burgeoning welfare rolls in the early 1980s and then, in the later 1980s, about the persistence of substantial welfare rolls in what was considered a period of recovery.

Patricia Evans of York University identified three major response strategies:

> (1) a "financial strategy" to increase the monetary rewards of low paid work; (2) a "service" strategy to provide a variety of supports to reduce obstacles to employment; and (3) a "restrictive" strategy to enforce labour force participation.[18]

We will return to the financial and service strategies in the next section of this paper, as it is only the restrictive strategy that begins to approach U.S.-style workfare.

The restrictive strategy is essentially a policy of harassment and coercion. Client's are rendered vulnerable to these practices because they depend on welfare. Typical tactics include enforced participation in "job clubs," where participants are supervised while they phone potential employers, often using the newspaper as a guide. If a job is offered the participant must accept it. This technique can also be used to supply minimum wage labour for fruit picking and other short-term seasonal jobs.

Client's can also be required to appear at the local welfare office for frequent meetings to discuss their employment search.[19] As most clients are dependent on their welfare workers for a range of supplementary benefits, they can be easily pressured into co-operating with these measures.

Evans found widespread use of these techniques and a trend toward applying them to single parents with children of younger and younger ages.[20] In most provinces this is done by reclassifying the recipient from unemployable to employable. This results in a reduction of benefits, giving the client a first experience of how the work coercion is to be applied.

As with the U.S. experience with workfare, however, there is a complete lack of evidence that these measures accomplish anything. Evans saw a clear reason for this failure:

> In contradiction to the [assumed] conventional separation of the role of work and welfare in the lives of single mothers.... The evidence suggests that sole support mothers on social assistance not only want to work but do work. Employment, however, does not necessarily equate with a temporary or permanent exit from social assistance: work and welfare are frequently mixed at the same time and over time.[21]

The problem lay not in the capacity or the motivation of the women on welfare, but in the low-paid, part-time and unstable nature of the service labour market in which they were participating.

Contributing to this problem is the concealed nature of the extent of the welfare transfer. Social assistance payments are accompanied by extensive benefits, including full health insurance coverage, including dental and orthodontic work, support to collect maintenance payments, access to daycare, home support services if the mother has to be hospitalized, and stability of income. Welfare benefits are thus worth more than their face value; as a consequence, the wise parent has no reason to exchange the full welfare package for wages equivalent to payment rates plus some temporary work expenses. Yet this is what many are urged to do.

Welfare programs have been modified to some extent to reduce the consequences of this loss of benefits. In some provinces benefits are extended for up to a year after the recipient becomes an earner, apparently on the assumption that the worker can achieve stable employment within a year and can earn a decent income and fringe benefits to replace those lost as welfare benefits end. More frequently, however, this leads to a situation where it is in the recipient's interest to return to welfare as the period of welfare coverage draws to an end, renewing the cycle of welfare dependence.

This failure to deal with the realities of the recipient's position led Evans to three interrelated concerns:

1. The first is the problem for public policy development that has resulted from transforming the problem of a low-paid unemployment market (and "benefit" effects in the welfare transfer) into a false problem of alleged lack of motivation on the part of welfare recipients.

2. The second is the "very real danger that the vulnerability of the single mother, in contrast to the power of the social assistance worker and supervisor, may operate to singular disadvantage to the sole-support mother and her family."[22] In other words, impelled by imperatives beyond her control, the mother is forced to waive her own judgements about what constitutes the best interests of her children and herself.

3. The "third danger inherent in ineffective work incentive programs is the increased jeopardy of the legitimacy of the single mother's entitlement to assistance."[23]

Although Evans's particular concern is with the sole-support mother, the issues she raises apply equally to all uses of the restrictive strategy.

In Newfoundland chronic and overwhelming unemployment has brought its own reality to the work incentive strategy. In Cape St. George, Newfoundland,

> Thirteen women sit in a semi-circle practising the "10-42 system"... Eight hours a day, the women are busily knitting and sewing blankets, socks and handkerchiefs for distribution to the poor. But what they are really doing, explains Constance Renouf, is collecting UI stamps. "This is a social services make work project," she frankly admits, "When we have finished our 10 weeks and earned the stamps to get unemployment, the project shuts down."[24]

The bankruptcy of compulsory and restrictive workfare strategies is complete when their purpose becomes not the continuing employment of welfare recipients but rather their transfer from one program and level of government to another. It was bad enough when the programs were designed to increase turnover in the low-paid labour force, but it now appears that even this modest objective has been exchanged for a game of musical chairs between assistance programs.

Institutional Work Incentives and Supports

The work incentive and support strategy is a universal feature of social assistance-type income security programs. The strategy includes the following principal features:

- voluntary participation, i.e., the client decides whether to take work,
- work is paid for in a regular manner not limited to income security benefits in amount or duration,
- employers can be in either the public or the private sector, and
- income security benefits, in the form of either payments or services, may subsidize employment earnings.

The triangular relationship between work and welfare objectives was introduced earlier in this paper:[25]

Tensions in the Work-Welfare Debate



Whereas the workfare strategy emphasized the right-hand side of this triangular relationship, the work incentive and support strategy emphasizes the base of the triangle. The work incentive and support strategy corresponds to Evans's financial and service strategies:

> [The financial strategy] may be used to improve the work effort of social assistance recipients [through] manipulation of the features of the income support system to increase the monetary rewards of low-wage work. These efforts identify the presence of disincentives within the welfare system, or conversely, the lack of incentives in the low-wage labour market as the obstacle to labour force participation.[26]

The service strategies include programs that have a direct effect on a recipient's relationship to the labour market through both pre-employment and job placement services and support services to employment, particularly daycare subsidies.[27]

A major strength of the work incentive and support strategy is that it recognizes the realities of the recipient's life. The interrelationship between work and welfare at low income levels is accepted, and there are no pejorative assumptions made about welfare recipients' interest in working. This position has been supported by extensive U.S. research on low-income and AFDC lifestyles.

> Among current AFDC female heads only 25% were never employed. Census and other surveys show from 30 to 50% work at some time during the year.... Rainwater and Rein took a sample of women who were ever on welfare in a five year period... and analyzed their work behaviour. From 44 to 62% had income from their own earnings in each of the five years.[28]

Chrissinger reports on a study comparing the effects of three classes of variable on AFDC labour force participation.[29] These were (1) labour force determinants, principally job preparation and placement programs, (2) monetary determinants, including income, in-kind support and child care costs, and (3) cultural determinants such as belief in the work ethic, marital relationships, stigma and dependency history. Of these three classes of variable, *"only economic factors appeared to significantly affect the mothers' decision whether to work."*

Widespread use of the work incentive and support strategy has been documented in various Canadian provinces,[30] the United States,[31] and Europe.[32] This strategy, and particularly the monetary work subsidy features of the strategy, are a practical application of the guaranteed annual income and negative taxation proposals of the 1970s. Proposals to entrench and institutionalize this strategy further continue to be advanced. At the national level the Universal Income Security Program (UISP) proposed by the Macdonald Commission[33] takes this approach. The Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance (The Forget Commission) proposed "a new national income supplementation program for the working poor and the long-term unemployed"[34] as a necessary companion measure to their proposal to tighten the emphasis in unemployment on social insurance, while reducing its social welfare role.

At the provincial level, the Ontario Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee[35] advocates a comprehensive use of this strategy. Similar concerns and proposals are found in the Quebec White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfer System (1984) and in the Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment (the House Commission, 1986).

Such unanimity of professional view is uncommon; yet there are problems with the *institutional* work incentive and support strategy. Three main problems have been identified:

1. Labour force participation: Despite the positive results found by behavioural studies examining attitudes, actual changes in labour force participation are usually modest. Where they do occur, they can often be attributed more effectively to changes in the labour market than to changes in the social assistance program.

A controlled experiment in Massachusetts found that differences in job finding were significant between clients who had the benefit of 33 per cent income retention when working and clients who did not.[36] A similar finding resulted from the Seattle-Denver negative taxation experiments.

> Contrary to the conventional view of the work incentive aspects of welfare reform, recent findings from the Seattle-Denver experimental income maintenance programs indicate that lower tax rates on earnings by welfare recipients will have only a minor

bearing on labour force participation rates, while adding billions to the cost of welfare.[37]

2. Undercutting the working poor: The effect of providing work incentives and support to welfare recipients is to increase competition for lower-paid employment. This results in serious inequities between the person who has taken such employment without being on welfare and the one who is. In her review of the results of the Ontario Work Incentive (WIN) program, Evans writes,

> The evidence from this examination of the WIN program suggests that it is simply not possible to provide supplements which are large enough to serve as an important factor in the decision of most single mothers to enter employment without creating serious inequities to the working poor. Not only would these anomalies be morally and politically difficult to defend, but the economically rational behaviour of the working poor would imply giving up employment to become eligible for the supplement.[38]

3. Program costs: A program that corrects for the deficiencies of the work incentive strategy by extending benefits to all becomes a very expensive program. Sweden, which some commentators see as doing an excellent job in this area, does it at a cost of $35,200 per unemployed person and a staffing ratio of one staff member for every 22 unemployed people. This is in addition to each recipient's annual direct income maintenance payments of $15,000.[39]

The Swedish example also illustrates the cultural nature of a society's response to the problem of unemployment and work. Sweden is prepared to pay a high price to preserve for each Swede equality of access to employment income. Canada appears to lack such a commitment.

Social Development Strategies

Whereas workfare and work incentive and support strategies have their origins in the income security system, the social development strategy encourages us to look outside that system for solutions to the work and welfare conundrum.

Characteristics of social development approaches include the following:

- an examination of the structures within society that are creating social problems,
- an emphasis on employment opportunities for both welfare recipients and other low-income earners,
- incomes that are fully "in the marketplace" and are not tied to welfare rates,
- support programs that are available to all low-income earners as social rights,
- an emphasis on community development and empowerment strategies that improve recipients' control over their lives, and

- client and community participation in policy processes.

There are program proposals at both a socio-structural level and the community level.

1. *The Socio-Structural Level*

Policy at this level is designed to alter fundamental relationships between work and income security programs, reducing the need for the latter so that the problem of having to relate work to welfare is changed and reduced. Several approaches have been proposed.

Policy Process Restructuring in New Zealand

New Zealand provides an interesting current example of a society that is willing to examine the premises underlying its social policy toward the Maori people. Furthermore this examination was conducted by empowering the Maori to examine established social policy institutions.

A major focus of the debate was participation in social policy formulation and in administrative processes. Once the New Zealand government admitted the circumscribed and culture-bound nature of its welfare institutions, the first steps that followed concerned the opening of the institutions to alternative cultural approaches.[40] A comprehensive review of the effects of racism on the structure and provisions of the Department of Social Welfare ensued, and the Maori Perspective Advisory Committee came to the conclusion that measures at many levels were required to ensure that non-racist and culturally appropriate views would predominate.

A new permanent body, the Social Welfare Commission, was established to advise the minister on policy, consult with tribal representatives, and oversee the administration of the department. The Commission consists of the four principal officers of the Department, together with two persons nominated by the minister of Maori affairs after consultation with tribal authorities, and two persons nominated by the minister of women's affairs.

Specific recommendations were also made on the work/welfare relationship:

> The Committee believes that the unemployment benefit is essentially negative in character.... The Committee recommends, therefore, that the law be amended to provide the authority for the Social Welfare Commission to develop variations on or alternatives to the payment of unemployment benefits. This would cover cases where the need of the individual can be met better by tailoring the payment to appropriate need for work, training or individual or collective enterprise.[41]

Recommendations were also made on the participation of Maori in the internal administration of such measures by the Department.

The distinguishing feature here is the depth of change that is sought as a means of building culturally appropriate programs.

Culturally Appropriate Measures for Native People in Ontario

Native people have the lowest rate of labour force participation of any social group in Canada and the greatest degree of poverty. Furthermore, because of the geographic isolation of many Native communities and because of low levels of education and training, much of the discussion of employment incentive and support measures seems inapplicable to them. Native people have not been targeted for work incentive programs in the way women have, probably because employers have not seen them as a good source of low-wage labour.

The Ontario "Transitions" report treats Native communities as a separate subject and argues that reform here has to begin from a position of respect for the First Nations' objective of self-government.

> The committee sees three steps necessary in enabling the Native people to design and deliver culturally appropriate social assistance and related services. Throughout all these phases, including the drafting of legislation... there must be ongoing consultation with Native peoples. The three stages are short term reforms that do not require legislative change; new legislation specifically directed at Native communities, giving them wide discretionary powers to design and deliver their own social assistance programs; and ultimately the transfer of legislative control over social programs to aboriginal governments.[42]

It has been the practice of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to require that Indian bands and tribal councils delivering social assistance programs follow the policies set by the province in which they are located.

Such a policy makes sense only while the ultimate objective is assumption of all policy and program responsibility by the provinces. It may be timely to recognize that this objective has the support of neither the provinces nor Native peoples and that discussion should begin with Native people on the process and stages through which they can move to assume full responsibility, not only for the delivery of social programs but for policy and program design.

In thinking about what such programs would be like, it is important to recognize the full set of objectives that have characterized welfare provision. The measures used have never been directed solely to providing relief to those members of the community without an income. They have also been a way of stratifying the community and defining an underclass who lack some of the usual benefits and freedoms.

This model of provision has been introduced into band administration through the controls placed on eligibility and funds distribution by INAC. Native people should appraise for themselves whether these objectives are pertinent to the self-governing

communities they are seeking to build. They should also examine how, in their own cultures, relief was given to the elderly and infirm and to those who lacked survival skills. There may be ideas here that are more relevant to Native culture that the imported poor law and welfare state concepts that have dominated our thinking.

It is only through such a thoughtful search of the roots of caring and giving that one can begin to judge the relevance of the work-welfare debate in the context of Native people.

Other examples of the application of the socio-structural level of social development to the work-welfare debate are provided by the issues raised by women in their search for equal treatment. These include labour market measures, measures to address workplace inequalities, and family policy measures.

1. Labour market measures: The lack of a government commitment to any particular employment level has been described by McBride.[43] This is particularly apparent when the employment, or lack of employment, of women is considered. In the post-war welfare state there was an explicit commitment to full employment and to the concept of a working wage for the male breadwinner. This concept was culture-bound in ways that we would not accept now, but it expressed a commitment to labour market structure and opportunity that we have lost. This is not true of all welfare states. Canada's performance can be compared, for example, with Sweden's:

> Successful attempts to maintain full-employment have meant more not less government . . . in the case of Sweden . . . the annual budget deficit reached 13% of GNP and government spending accounted for 67% of GNP, and spending on active labour market measures reached 2% of GNP. The result of such activity is that unemployment has not exceeded 3.5% in that country. Comparable figures for Canada in the early 1980s show federal deficits peaking at 6.9% of GNP: total government expenditures at 46.7% of GNP; and federal expenditures on training and job creation barely exceeding 0.5% of GNP. The unemployment rate reached 12%.[44]

Today a labour market approach would have to give particular attention to the low-wage service sector in which welfare recipients participate. As Evans notes, "Neither predictions of the continued expansion of the service sector, nor an increase in female unemployment suggest that the objective of long-term economic self sufficiency for the single mother can be achieved without strategies directed to the demand for labour."

In other words, wages, employment benefits, and employment stability have to be improved so that those that work in the service sector are treated with respect and equity.

Applied by Native people, this strategy requires first an examination by each community of their sources of income, including income from welfare payments; second, community wages and working conditions should be examined to ensure that all community members are treated appropriately.

2. Workplace inequalities: Workplace inequalities have acted to the particular detriment of women, who have been employed largely in low-wage service and clerical positions. In this view discrimination against women in employment practices and

settings is the problem. Measures to combat the problem include positive employment policies for women and policies aimed at achieving equal pay for work of equal value. Actions under labour codes and through human and civil rights legislation are key parts of this strategy.

Examples of pay equity policies are found in several provinces, including Manitoba, Quebec and Ontario. The Ontario *Pay Equity Act* is a recent example of such legislation; it came into effect on 1 January 1989 and gives major Ontario employers a year to develop a pay equity plan and five years to bring the plan into effect. Plans use established position rating techniques to compare such factors as the responsibilities, knowledge and skills required for positions, regardless of the sex of incumbents. Positions found to have similar ratings are required to have similar salaries, rather than having salaries set by the marketplace and by external comparison to similar positions.

3. Family policy measures: Muszynski draws our attention to the relationship between family policy and the work and welfare debate. The marginal employment situation of women is compounded by their family responsibilities for children and dependent seniors. A well rounded group of basic family support policies and programs would include

   - affordable, quality daycare
   - family allowances
   - housing allowances
   - maintenance collection measures, and
   - transitional supplements for sole-support mothers.[45]

The focus of these benefits should be the child, argues Muszynski. This focus requires expansion to recognize the interdependency of all family members and the need to treat the family as a whole.

The family continues to provide the principal source of care for the developmentally and physically disabled, the mentally ill, the older dependent senior and, today, persons with AIDS. It is by recognizing the value to the community of these family roles that we can begin to value unpaid work in the home. Why provide incentives or coerce people into low-wage employment, then replace the family care giver with professional services?

This perspective also extends to the family relationships that provide for strength and continuity of culture and caring in Native communities. In a study of Indian-managed child welfare programs in the Yukon, the major differences between Indian practices and Department of Health and Human Resources practices related to the role of the family.[46]

2. *The Community Level*

Both the workfare and the work incentive strategy treat clients as passive entities to be coerced or encouraged to do what others considered to be in their interests. The social development strategy, challenging this assumption, requires consideration of community development and empowerment strategies.

Newfoundland's Government Employment Programs (GEPs) fit this category when the projects undertaken are derived through a community development process,[47] as does the approach to the welfare of Native communities described in the Transitions report. There is also a strong feminist interest in establishing more co-operative and empowering ways of organizing both employment and social services.

A wide range of activities have been developed using community development principles. They include activities in the social services and in economic development projects.

Social Service Projects

Mutual support has always been an important social service activity. It is through self-help groups that the community has become aware of the problems of sexual assault, the need for safe transition houses, the problems facing single parents, the extent of discrimination against persons with AIDS, the importance of community living to people with disabilities, the problems of Native people dealing with provincial child welfare authorities, and many other issues.

Earlier in the development of the social services it was assumed that the objective of self-help groups was to obtain recognition of a need from government agencies, which would then assume responsibility for services. The assumption that responsibility should be transferred to government agencies is no longer universal.

The pluralist social services being developed today may receive some of their funding from government bodies, but they remain accountable to community boards. This service model provides many opportunities for the development of community-based social services that also provide a source of employment to members of the disadvantaged community.

The assumption of child welfare responsibility by Indian bands is important not only because it allows the development of more culturally appropriate services, but also because it provides a new source of employment for Native people. By funding services that contribute to community welfare, the funding agency is accomplishing a second objective—reducing the dependency of the community on hand-outs. The objective of replacing welfare by work is being accomplished in a manner that recognizes the needs of the community.

A caution is appropriate at this point. The objectives of social development are accomplished to the extent that community control exists. Social development is not

accomplished when social services are privatized through contracts, with the non-Native agency maintaining control over all elements of policy and procedure.

The privatization of social services occasions ambivalent responses. On one hand, jobs in existing social service agencies are lost; yet on the other hand opportunities are created for community groups to develop services. Resolving this ambivalence requires an examination not only of where jobs are lost and gained, but also of where policy and procedural control lies and the nature and employment conditions, including pay, of the jobs created.

Nicholls and Corsi found many examples of job creation activities in the social services in their report on "Unemployment, Youth and the Future of Work." The examples included

- financial counselling services
- job change projects
- small business promotion and resource services
- data banking and computer networking services
- co-operative development services
- news services
- artistic and craft support services and co-operatives
- housing maintenance and renovation projects
- co-operative daycare and home support services.[48]

Economic Development Projects

Some of the activities listed by Nicholls and Corsi extend well beyond social services to the development of independent enterprises. This includes both co-operative and profit-making enterprise.

Such enterprises lie outside the field of tax-supported transfers and derive their income from the marketplace. No stigma is attached to this sector; indeed current values and rhetoric laud the independent entrepreneur.

There are excellent examples of Indian bands that have developed enterprises that compete in the marketplace. In the Yukon the Champagne-Aishihik people operate a general contracting company competing for road and sub-division contracts. The Nuu-chah-nulth people operate a retreat and conference centre close to the Pacific Rim National Park, and there are numerous examples of successful artistic and craft enterprises.

These are examples of local community actions of the type that many commentators on the work/welfare debate endorse. Dickinson writes, for example,

> As Goodwin (1977)[49] succinctly and sagely noted, "the welfare problem cannot be separated from the lack of jobs". (p. 36) Income tax credits, supported work, and transitional employment are familiar options for influencing the demand side of the labour market. Additional options include grant diversion . . . and client corporations. More attention needs to be paid to these and other efforts to deal with the inadequacies of the labour market in providing meaningful and family supporting work for welfare recipients.[51]

More recently Riches, writing on Canada, says

> . . . we should include Native organizations, churches, groups of disabled people and business. We should be working with the unemployed in terms of empowerment . . . [51]

Fortunately it would seem that we have already begun to find ways to address these issues that provide both employment and empowerment through their capacity to foster community development.

Other Perspectives on the Work/Welfare Debate

1. An Economist's Perspective

Robert Morfitt poses some basic questions about all transfer programs and work incentive measures. "Obviously, a transfer program *per se* has greater work disincentives than no program at all." Furthermore, "If the guarantee [of income] was reduced at the same time as the tax rate so as to hold program expenditures constant the net effect on labour supply would . . . more likely be positive."[52]

The language is unfamiliar, but the sense is unmistakable. The way to reduce costs and increase work incentives is to lower benefits. These arguments are endorsed by those whose ultimate objective is the withdrawal of all welfare programs.

> Mr. George Gilder ("Wealth and Poverty," 1981) and Mr. Charles Murray ("Losing Ground," 1984) have both asserted that welfare has discouraged self reliance and fostered dependency. Mr.Murray wants the scrapping of federal welfare and income support for working age people. Better, he thinks, for a child to grow up hungry in a home that believes in the virtues of work than for it to be raised at the state's expense.[53]

Although these voices lie outside the mainstream of the debate, they are nevertheless an important reminder of where some of the arguments lead. If cost reduction is the primary objective, it will not be obtained in the end by workfare measures, work incentives, or diversion of funds into community development measures. All have been shown to cost more than a simple concentration on delivering available transfer funds directly to those that need it most.

No, the simple and direct way to reduce program costs is to lower benefit levels. Lowering benefit levels reduces costs in two ways; not only does each beneficiary receive

less, but the number of claimants declines as it becomes in their interest to work more, albeit for lower total incomes. Some of course will not make the transfer to work; they will simply become poorer.

Thus the work and welfare debate merges with the broader issue of the kind of society we wish to have and the extent of inequality we are prepared to tolerate.

2. *A Cyclical Perspective*

In *Regulating the Poor*, Piven and Cloward show how welfare policies have been cyclical, expanding and becoming generous in periods of perceived threat to the social order, then becoming restrictive and punitive in periods of stability.[54]

Many of the authors reviewed in this paper see a steady increase in restrictiveness. Dickinson sees this pattern in the United States, showing how, in successive social security reforms since the 1960s, work incentive policy has come to play a larger and larger role and accommodate increasingly punitive measures.[55]

Evans, Riches and McBride see a similar pattern in Canada. For example, there has been a steady evolution of federal employment policy from work subsidy measures, which were used widely in the 1970s, to a concentration on training and placement measures in the 1980s. The recently announced changes in Unemployment Insurance (April 1989) take the process one stage further. Eligibility for unemployment benefits is restricted and funds are to be diverted from cash benefits to training. In addition, the general revenue subsidy to the unemployment insurance fund is to be ended.

Although we may look to the development of more culturally appropriate ways of examining the work-welfare relationship as it affects Native people, we can not assume that this will be the direction of future policy. Indeed if current trends continue, a more likely set of future policies would include the introduction of U.S.-style workfare into the requirements to be met by Indian bands in administering assistance to their members.

Conclusion

The workfare debate is, ultimately, a debate about how we are going to treat the poor; and the poor are disproportionately women and Native people.

While restrictive fiscal objectives dominate the debate, it makes sense to concentrate attention first on the hard facts of poverty, rights and social justice. This means concentrating attention on the left-hand side of the work-welfare triangle, where cost considerations bear directly on the adequacy of benefits. This makes the work objective secondary to the basic income objective of relieving poverty.

All the studies of workfare and work incentive and support programs conclude that the poor, much like the rest of the population, will work when it is in their economic interests to work. Given that all the work-related strategies consume funds for little if any gain in actual work, one has to question why they are being pursued.

The true conservative responds to this argument with the frank recognition that the way to cut costs is not to increase work-related programming but to cut benefits.

To the extent that cost cutting is not the only objective, social development strategies look like the best place to apply resources. This is particularly the case where social policy also has the objective of recognizing a different culture and empowering the members of that culture to manage their own affairs. In the development of social policy for the 1990s we should look for ways to alter the underlying relationships and assumptions that have fed the work and welfare debate for the last 200 years, beginning with recognition of their cultural origins.

We should look for ways to build programs that respect cultural differences and the role of the family. We should look for ways to empower communities and beneficiaries and equip them to exercise the freedoms that the welfare state was expected to provide. We should resist measures that consolidate and extend the paternalistic, patriarchal and bureaucratic maze that the welfare state has become.

In applying this approach to the situation of Native people, some of the issues begin to merge with more general issues of self-government and cultural self-determination. In particular Canadian social policy faces two central challenges:

1. Whereas a major function of the *Indian Act* has been the "management" of Indian people, the challenge for social development is to abandon this approach, replacing it with management by Indian people.

2. Whereas a second major function of the *Indian Act* has been the "protection" of Indian people, the challenge for social development is to abandon protection, replacing it with respect and recognition of the *proper place* of First Nations in Canada.

Notes

1. Three concepts are used throughout this review to indicate major differences in the relationship between welfare programs and western industrial society. The first historically was the *residual* concept. In this form of the relationship, welfare programs come into operation only after social problems have become visible and pressing because of failure in employment markets or in the family. The second is the *institutional* concept, where welfare programs operate as continuing necessary provisions and are considered essential to western industrial society. The third is the *social development* concept, in which attention is directed to correcting the social conditions from which social problems have developed.

The term social development has also been used in the name of some departments of government. This use is not the same as the use of the term in this paper, as such government departments typically offer programs at all three conceptual levels.

Although these differing concepts had been present implicitly in discussions of social welfare, they were clarified through policy analysis undertaken in the late 1960s. For a fuller discussion of the use of these terms, see Wilensky and Lebaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare* (New York: Free Press, 1965); and Romanyshyn, *Social Welfare: Charity to Justice* (New York: Random House, 1971).

2. See England, Statutory Rules and Orders, 1930, No. 185, *Poor Law, England*, Third Schedule, article 134.

3. Patricia Evans, "Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of Reform," *Canadian Public Policy* XIV/2 (1988).

4. Graham Riches, "Unemployment and the State," *Canadian Social Work Review* 6/1 (1989).

5. Charles Froland and Joseph Bell, "Policy Experimentation: Framing the Welfare Debate," *Social Service Review* (September 1979).

6. R. Boyson, ed., Down with the Poor (London: Churchill Press, 1971), p. 7.

7. John Clarke et al., *Ideologies of Welfare: from dreams to dissolution* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 137.

8. Peter Townsend, *Why are the Many Poor* (London: Fabian Society, 1984), p. 32.

9. Clarke, p. 153.

10. Clarke, p. 155.

11. Judith Gueron and Patricia Auspos, "Workfare," *Encyclopaedia of Social Work* (1987), p. 899.

12. Leslie Bella, "Work for Welfare," *Perception* 7/1 (1983).

13. Nancy S. Dickinson, "Which Welfare Work Strategies Work?," *Social Work* (July-August, 1986).

14. Dickinson, p. 268.

15. Dickinson, p. 269.

16. Dickinson, p. 269.

17. Lawrence Mead, "The Logic of Workfare: The Underclass and Work Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy* (January 1989).

18. Patricia Evans, "Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of Reform," *Canadian Public Policy* XIV/2, p. 126.

19. "Welfare Cut Off Threatened for 75,000 'Employables'.... In a letter to be sent today to 75,000 singles and couples classified as employable the ministry says they won't get their cheques this month unless they can make a valid list of all the places they have applied for jobs." *Vancouver Sun*, 4 August 1989.

20. P.M. Evans and E. McIntyre, "Welfare, Work Incentives and the Single Mother: An interprovincial comparison," in *The Canadian Welfare State: Evolution and Transitions*, ed. Jacqueline S. Ismael (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press 1987), p. 101-125.

21. Evans and McIntyre, p. 115.

22. Evans and McIntyre, p. 118.

23. Evans and McIntyre, p. 119.

24. Julian Beltrame, "Pogey becomes staple of life in Newfoundland," *Vancouver Sun*, 17 April 1989.

25. Froland and Bell, p. 444.

26. Evans and McIntyre, p. 107.

27. Evans and McIntyre, p. 111-112.

28. Mildred Rein, "Work in Welfare: Past Failures and Present Strategies," *Social Service Review* (June 1982), p. 216.

29. Marlene Sonju Chrissinger, "Factors Affecting Employment of Welfare Mothers," *Social Work* (January 1980), p. 53.

30. Gilles Seguin, "Descriptive Overview of Selected Provincial Income Supplementation and Work Incentive Initiatives," in *The Canadian Welfare State*, ed. J. Ismael (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987).

31. Dickinson, p. 266f.

32. "Welfare and Work," *The Economist*, 26 November 1988, p. 20.

33. Canada, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1986).

34. Shirley Seward and Mario Iacobacci, ed., *Approaches to Income Security Reform* (Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987), p. viii.

35. Ontario, Social Assistance Review Committee, *Transitions*, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1988).

36. Barry Friedman et al., *An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Work Experience Program* (Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University, 1980).

37. Charles Adams, "A Reappraisal of the Work Incentive Aspects of Welfare Reform," *Social Service Review* (December 1980), p. 125.

38. Evans, p. 133.

39. "Welfare and Work," *The Economist*, 26 November 1988, p. 20.

40. New Zealand, *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu*, The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare (Wellington: 1988).

41. *Puao-Te-Ata-Tu*, p. 29.

42. *Transitions*, p. 83.

43. McBride, p. 7.

44. McBride, p. 8.

45. Leon Muszynski, "Better Help for Single Parents," *Policy Options* (April 1988), p. 23.

46. Andrew Armitage, Elizabeth Lane, Frances Ricks and Brian Wharf, *Champagne/ Aishihik Child Welfare pilot project: Evaluation* (University of Victoria, 1988).

47. Gerry Dick, "GEPs vital to community improvement in rural Newfoundland," *Employability Resources Network Newsletter* 2 (Spring 1989). (Newaletter published by Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa.)

48. William Nicholls and Jean Corsi, "Study Project on Unemployment, Youth and the Future of Work," *Newsletter*, School of Social Work, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C. (March and June 1985).

49. L. Goodwin, *The Work Incentive (WIN) Program and Related Experiences* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Labour, Employment and Training Administration, 1977).

50. Dickinson, p. 271.

51. Riches, p. 21.

52. Robert Morfitt, "Work Incentives in the AFDC System," *American Economic Review* (May 1986), p. 220-222.

53. *The Economist*, 26 November 1988, p. 19.

54. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor* (New York: Random House, 1972).

55. Dickinson, "Which Welfare Strategies Work?"

Bibliography

Adams, Charles F. Jr. 1980. "A Reappraisal Of the Work Incentive Aspects of Welfare Reform." *Social Service Review*. (December)

Armitage, Andrew, Elizabeth Lane, Frances Ricks and Brian Wharf. 1988. *Champagne/Aishihik Child Welfare Pilot Project: Evaluation*. Victoria: University of Victoria.

Bella, Lealie. "Work for Welfare: Alberta's Experiment in New Improved Work for Relief." *Perception* 7/1.

Berlin, Sharon and Linda E. Jones. 1983. "Life After Welfare: AFDC Termination among long term recipients." *Social Service Review* 57. (September)

Boyson, R. ed. 1971. *Down with the Poor*. London: Churchill Press.

Byfield, Virginia. 1982. "Bob Bogle and the Poor Laws." *Alberta Report*. (1 November)

Canadian Council on Social Development. 1988-1989. *Employability Resources Network: Newsletter*. Ottawa.

Chrissinger, Marlene Sonju. 1980. "Factors Affecting Employment of Welfare Mothers." *Social Work*. (January)

Clarke, John et al. 1987. *Ideologies of Welfare: from dreams to dissolution*. London: Hutchinson.

Dickinson, Nancy S. 1986. "Which Welfare Strategies Work?" *Social Work*. (July-August)

Evans, Patricia. 1988. "Work Incentives and the Single Mother." *Canadian Public Policy* XIV/2.

Evans, Patricia and Eilene L. McIntyre. 1987. "Welfare Work Incentives and the Single Mother." In *The Canadian Welfare State: Evolution and Transition*, ed. Jacqueline S. Ismael. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

Friedman, Barry et al. 1980. *An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Work Experience Program*. Center for Employment and Income Studies, Brandeis University. (October)

Froland, Charles and Joseph Bell. 1979. "Policy Experimentation: Framing the Welfare Debate." *Social Service Review* 53. (September)

Googins, Bradley and Dianne Burden. 1988. "Vulnerability of Working Parents: Balancing Work and Home Roles." *Social Work*. (July-August)

Gueron, Judith and Patricia Auspos. 1987. "Workfare." *Encyclopaedia of Social Work*. New York.

Lemann, Nicholas. 1988. "The Unfinished War." *The Atlantic Monthly*. (December)

Lightman, Ernie S. 1989. "Working for Plenty of Nothing." *The Globe and Mail* [Toronto]. (30 March)

Macarov, David. 1980. *Work and Welfare: The Unholy Alliance*. New York: Sage Publications.

McBride, Stephen. 1987. "The Employment Policy of the Mulroney Government: Implications for the Provinces." *3rd Conference on Provincial Social Welfare Policy*, Banff. (April)

Mead, Lawrence. 1989. "The Logic of Workfare: *The Underclass and Work Policy." The Annals of the American Academy of Sociology and Political Science*. (January): 156-168.

Morfitt, Robert. 1986. "Work Incentives in the AFDC System." *American Economic Review*. (May)

Muszynski, Leon. 1988. "Better Help for Single Parents." *Policy Options*. (April)

New Zealand. 1988. "Puao-Te-Ata-Tu." Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Maori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare. Wellington.

Nicholls, William. 1988. *Study Report on Unemployment Youth and The Future of Work*. Vancouver: School of Social Work, U.B.C. (March)

Ontario. Social Assistance Review Committee. 1988. *Transitions: Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee*. Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward. 1972. *Regulating the Poor*. New York: Random House.

Rein, Mildred. 1982. *Dilemmas of Welfare Policy: why work strategies have not worked.* New York: Praeger Publications.

Rein, Mildred. 1982. "Work in Welfare: past failures and future strategies." *Social Service Review* 56. (June)

Riches, Graham. 1989. "Unemployment and the State." *Canadian Social Work Review* 6/1.

Ross, David. 1981. *The Working Poor: Wage Earners and the Failure of Income Security Policy.* Toronto: James Lorimer.

Seguin, Gilles. "Descriptive Overview of Selected Provincial Income Supplementation and Work Incentive Initiatives." In *The Canadian Welfare State: Evolution and Transition.* Ed. J. Ismael. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

Seward, Shirley B. and Mario Iacobacci. 1987. *Approaches to Income Security Reform.* Ottawa: The Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Splane, Richard. 1987. "Eligibility and Less Eligibility: Social Assistance in Alberta." *3rd Conference on Provincial Social Welfare Policy,* April 1987. Banff.

Townsend, Peter. 1984. *Why are the Many Poor.* London: Fabian Society.

United States Senate. 1986. *Work and Welfare.* Report prepared for the subcommittee on employment and productivity. Washington, D.C. (August)

Wasylyzia-Leis, Judy. 1982. "Economic Prospects and Policies for Women." *Canadian Woman Studies.* (Summer)

"Welfare Reform: new research and policy developments." 1986. *American Economic Review* 76. (May)

Willms, Sharon. 1987. "Work for Welfare: British Columbia's Initiative." *Canadian Review of Social Policy.* (May)

Wilson, Stephanie et al. 1980. "Guaranteed Employment, Work Incentives and Welfare Reform." *American Economic Review.* (May)

Annex A

Agenda

Workshop on Approaches to Welfare Reform for Indian Communities

March 28 - 29, 1990

Wednesday, March 28

9:30 am - 10:15 am	**Introductory Remarks**	
	Chair:	Shirley B. Seward Director, Studies in Social Policy Program Institute for Research on Public Policy
	Official welcome by A.R. Dobell, President of IRPP	
10:15 am - 12:15 pm	**The Use of Social Assistance for Employment Creation on Indian Reserves: An Appraisal**	
	Chair:	Frank Cassidy, Research Associate, IRPP
	Presented by:	Hugh Shewell, University of Toronto
12:15 pm - 1:15 pm	Lunch	
1:15 pm - 3:15 pm	**Work and Welfare: A Conceptual Review of the Relationship Between Work and Welfare**	
	Chair:	Frank Cassidy
	Presented by:	Andrew Armitage School of Social Work, University of Victoria

Wednesday, March 28th (cont'd)

3:15 pm - 3:30 pm	**Coffee break**
3:30 pm - 5:00 pm	**General discussion**
	Chair: **Frank Cassidy**
7:00 pm - 9:00 pm	**Reception**

Thursday, March 29

9:00 am - 12:00 pm	**General discussion and implications for further research**
	Chair: **Shirley B. Seward**
	This session will begin with a summary of the previous day's discussion by Frank Cassidy.

Annex B

List of Participants

Ms Karen Allen	Manager, Economic Policy Management Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Professor Andrew Armitage	University of Victoria
Ms. Rose Marie Blair-Smith	Vice-Chairperson, Social Programs Council for Yukon Indians
Ms. Lynn Brooks	Liaison Officer Council for Disabled Persons
Dr. Frank Cassidy	School of Public Administration University of Victoria
Dr. A.R. Dobell	President Institute for Research on Public Policy
Mr. Francis Frank	Elected Chief Councillor Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation
Mr. Tom Goff	Director of Social Development Ontario Regional Office - Indian Services Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Ms. Barbara Hume	Supervisor, Social/Health Program Champagne/Aishihik Band

Mr. Tom Iron	Fourth Vice-Chief Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations
Mr. Patrick Johnston	Senior Policy Advisor Office of the Premier of Ontario
Mr. Albert Julian	Band Administrator Eskasoni Band Council
Mr. Mark Krasnick	Executive Director Ontario Native Affairs Directorate
Mr. George E. Lafond	Director of Health Saskatoon District Tribal Council
Mr. Ovide Mercredi	AFN Regional Chief (Manitoba) Assembly of First Nations
Grand Chief Joseph Norton	The Mohawk Council of Kahnawake
Ms. Audrey Parke	Director Alberta Indian Health Care Commission
Mr. J.S. Rayner	Assistant Deputy Minister, Indian Services Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Chief Albert Scott	Vice-Chairman Health and Social Development Commission Kinistin Band
Ms. Shirley B. Seward	Director, Studies in Social Policy Institute for Research on Public Policy
Mr. Hugh Shewell	University of Toronto
Mr. Neil Sterritt	Director of First Nations Government Assembly of First Nations
Ms. Sherri Torjman	Social Policy Consultant
Ms. Hélène Sioui-Trudel	National CHR Coordinator for NIICHRO Assembly of First Nations
Ms. Marie Watts	New Vision Consulting
Ms. Susan Williams	Director General, Social Development Branch Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

Related IRPP Publications

Please send orders to:

The Institute for Research on Public Policy
P.O. Box 3670 South
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3K6

or phone 1-800-565-0659 (toll free)

Gail Grant	*The Concrete Reserve: Corporate Programs for Indians in the Urban Work Place.* 1983 $5.00 ISBN 0 920380 93 X
Raymond Breton & Gail Grant, Eds.	*The Dynamics of Government Programs for Urban Indians in the Prairie Provinces.* 1984 $19.95 ISBN 0 9020380 99 9
Fred Wien	*Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia.* 1986 $20.00 ISBN 0 88645 036 5
Bryan Schwartz	*First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal Peoples, Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft.* 1987 $25.00 ISBN 088645 045 4
Frank Cassidy & Norman Dale	*After Native Claims? The Implications of Comprehensive Claims Settlements for Natural Resources in British Columbia.* 1988 $15.95 ISBN 088645 081 0
Frank Cassidy & Robert L. Bish	*Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice.* 1989 $14.95 ISBN 0 88645 089 6
Harold Bherer, Sylvie Gagnon et Jacinte Roberge	*Wampoum et lettres patentes: étude exploratoire de l'entrepreneuriat autochtone.* 1989 23,00 $ ISBN 2 7637 7177 7
Harold Bherer, Sylvie Gagnon & Jacinte Roberge	*Wampum and Letters Patent: Exploratory Study of Native Entrepreneurship.* 1990 $23.00 ISBN 0 88645 116 7

L'Institut de recherches politiques

Une présence nationale

Créé en 1972, l'Institut de recherches politiques est un organisme national et indépendant à but non lucratif, possédant des bureaux d'un bout à l'autre du Canada.

La mission de l'Institut est d'améliorer la politique d'État au Canada en encourageant un processus politique plus général, mieux informé et plus efficace et en contribuant à la mise en application de ce processus. Pour remplir cette mission, l'Institut :

- identifie les questions importantes auxquelles devra faire face le Canada dans un avenir à long terme et entreprend des recherches indépendantes sur ces questions;
- favorise la dissémination générale des résultats-clés des activités de recherches (celles menées par l'Institut et d'autres);
- encourage le débat impartial et la critique de questions de politique d'État, de manière à provoquer la participation de tous les secteurs et de toutes les régions de la société canadienne, et établit la liaison entre la recherche et les mécanismes d'apprentissage social et d'élaboration de politiques.

Direction de l'Institut

L'Institut est dirigé par un Conseil d'administration, conseillé par des représentants des gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux et d'autres organismes nationaux de recherche, ainsi que par des groupes d'experts venant de l'extérieur, qui se réunissent en comités consultatifs pour aider le Comité de recherches. La présidente, en tant qu'administratrice en chef, est responsable de la mise en pratique et de l'administration des politiques et des programmes de l'Institut, ainsi que de la direction du personnel.

Mode de fonctionnement

L'Institut est décentralisé; ses chercheurs sont établis d'un bout à l'autre du Canada, ce qui permet d'assurer que toutes les régions contribuent aux recherches entreprises. L'Institut travaille également en collaboration avec des chercheurs particuliers ou des instituts d'autres pays.

Les chercheurs sont engagés sur une base contractuelle pour un temps limité, souvent pour la durée d'un projet spécifique. Cette politique permet à l'Institut non seulement de renouveler régulièrement son personnel de recherche, afin de refléter le caractère évolutif de son programme de recherche, mais aussi d'employer un plus grand nombre de chercheurs de premier ordre.

Indépendance et neutralité

L'indépendance de l'Institut est assurée par les revenus d'un fonds de dotation auquel ont souscrit les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, ainsi que le secteur privé. L'Institut obtient en outre des subventions et des contrats de la part des gouvernements, des entreprises et des fondations, pour soutenir les activités de ses programmes et pour mener à bien des projets de recherche particuliers.

L'Institut favorise la compréhension et la discussion publiques de questions d'envergure nationale, controversées ou non, et publie les conclusions de ses recherches avec clarté et impartialité. Il n'exerce aucun contrôle ou influence ni sur la conduite des projets de recherche, ni sur les conclusions qui en découlent : les recommandations ou les conclusions énoncées dans les publications de l'Institut sont strictement celles de l'auteur et n'engagent aucunement l'Institut, le Conseil d'administration ou les collaborateurs. L'Institut observe une attitude de neutralité envers les questions de politique d'État.

La décision de diffuser l'information au nom de l'Institut est la responsabilité ultime de la présidente. Elle bénéficie à cette fin des conseils du personnel de l'Institut et de ceux des lecteurs extérieurs, quant à l'exactitude et à l'objectivité d'un manuscrit. Seuls sont publiés les manuscrits qui traitent de façon compétente d'un sujet digne de l'intérêt du public. Les publications de l'Institut paraissent dans la langue de l'auteur et sont accompagnées d'un résumé rédigé dans les deux langues officielles.

Alternatives to Social Assistance in Indian Communities

Edited by
Frank Cassidy and Shirley B. Seward

Culturally inappropriate and ineffective. This is the widespread verdict on the current approach to social assistance in First Nations communities. By ignoring the cultural basis of economic and social development, programs create dependency on governments, destroy self-reliance, and discourage community efforts to improve collective well-being.

A national workshop on Approaches to Welfare Reform in Indian Communities provided a meeting ground for participants representing First Nations from across Canada, federal and provincial governments, and the academic and social policy communities. The goal was to review current approaches to welfare in Indian communities and explore alternative strategies.

Participants noted that programs tend to be anachronistic, inflexible, and paternalistic. By contrast, welfare reform must be based on a holistic approach aimed at establishing and fostering self-reliance, an overriding emphasis on people, not programs, a sharp acceleration in the move from paternalism to self-government and self-determination, and greater respect for distinctive cultural values and community needs.

The goal of this volume is to help Canadians continue the task of redefining the relationships among Canada, the provinces, and First Nations. Among the essential steps are acknowledging past failures, reorienting the underlying philosophy and structure of social assistance, and adopting strategies that emphasize community development and empowerment.

ISBN 0-88645-137-X

*Frank Cassidy is with the School of Public Administration, University of Victoria. At the time of the preparation of this book, **Shirley B. Seward** was director of the studies in social policy program at the Institute for Research on Public Policy. She is currently Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre in Ottawa.*

The Institute for Research on Public Policy
L'Institut de recherches politiques
A national, independent, research organization
Un organisme de recherche national et indépendant